NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 20a0472n.06
No. 19-4103
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Aug 10, 2020 BILLY BYLER, et al., ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE ) AIR METHODS CORP., et al., NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ) Defendant-Appellees. OHIO ) )
BEFORE: CLAY, ROGERS, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Billy Byler and Donald Reid were each airlifted to a
hospital after suffering severe injuries. They later received large bills from Air Methods
Corporation for the costs of the helicopter ride, but Air Methods has not filed suit to recover its
charges. Byler and Reid sued Air Methods and its parent company, Rocky Mountain Holdings,
LLC, as part of a putative class action under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
Plaintiffs allege that they formed implied-in-fact contracts with Air Methods and that Air Methods
breached its obligations under those contracts to charge reasonable rates. The district court
properly dismissed this claim, however, as plaintiffs’ complaint merely recites the elements of an
implied-in-fact contract and fails to allege facts that, taken as true, would establish that plaintiffs
assented to the terms of a contract with Air Methods. In the alternative, plaintiffs alleged that no
contracts were ever formed with Air Methods and asked the district court to issue a declaratory
judgment that they have no obligation to pay the amounts charged by Air Methods. The district No. 19-4103, Byler, et al. v. Air Methods Corp., et al.
court dismissed that claim as well, declining to exercise its declaratory jurisdiction. Plaintiffs,
however, have adequately pled a basis for declaratory relief, and the facts alleged strongly favor
the exercise of such jurisdiction. A remand is therefore required.
Defendant Air Methods Corporation (“Air Methods”) provides air ambulance services in
Ohio and other states. Following a serious accident, Air Methods transported plaintiff Billy Byler
by helicopter 36 miles to a hospital in Youngstown, Ohio. Air Methods later sent Byler a bill for
$25,344.30. Byler’s insurance covered $19,388.39, leaving a balance of $5,955.91. Byler has
paid $2,154.28 out of pocket towards that balance. The other named plaintiff in this case, Donald
Reid, was airlifted by Air Methods to a hospital 31 miles away in Cleveland, Ohio. Reid was
charged $48,308.33. The complaint does not specify how much, if any, Reid has paid to Air
Methods. Reid alleges that after he was told of the charges, Air Methods refused to bill Reid’s
insurance company until Reid agreed to accept financial responsibility for any remaining balance.
Plaintiffs allege that Air Methods has threatened or initiated collection efforts against them
to recover the portion of its bills not covered by insurance, a practice known as “balance billing.”
In general, plaintiffs describe Air Methods’ collection efforts to include lawsuits based on state-
law breach-of-contract theories, though no such lawsuits have yet been brought against the named
plaintiffs.
In February 2017, Byler and Reid brought a putative class action lawsuit against Air
Methods and Rocky Mountain in the federal district court for the Northern District of Ohio.
Plaintiffs asserted claims for “breach of implied contract,” “unjust enrichment,” and “declaratory
and injunctive relief.”1 Air Methods moved to transfer or stay the case in light of a similar class
1 Federal jurisdiction was asserted under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), on the grounds that “[t]he matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the sum or value of $5 million and is a class action in which Plaintiffs and Class members are citizens of states different from Defendants.” No question on appeal has been raised regarding the jurisdiction of the district court.
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action lawsuit filed against it in the District of Colorado. See Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., No.
16-cv-02723, 2018 WL 2322075 (D. Colo. May 22, 2018). The district court granted Air Methods’
motion to stay the case until the resolution of the Colorado action. See Byler v. Air Methods Corp.,
No. 1:17-cv-236, 2017 WL 10222371, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2017).
After the district court in Colorado granted Air Methods’ motion to dismiss, the district
court lifted the stay in this case. Plaintiffs then proceeded to file an amended class action
complaint, bringing two causes of action. The first, titled “breach of implied contract,” alleged
that “Plaintiffs and Defendants had an implied contract concerning Defendants’ transporting
Plaintiffs,” which “existed based on a promise that may be inferred from the parties’ conduct.”
Though according to the complaint the parties had formed an implied-in-fact contract, that contract
did not contain a definite price term. Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of this missing price term,
Air Methods “voluntar[il]y under[took] to provide services with the understanding that a
reasonable price would control.” According to plaintiffs, Air Methods breached this implied
contract by charging rates that “bear no reasonable relationship to [the cost of] the services
rendered.”
In their second cause of action,2 plaintiffs requested declaratory relief. In particular,
plaintiffs asked that in the event the district court rejected their breach-of-contract claim, the court
issue a declaratory judgment stating that there were no enforceable contracts with Air Methods.
In the absence of enforceable contracts, plaintiffs contended, Air Methods would no longer be able
to recover charges against plaintiffs and others similarly situated pursuant to a breach-of-contract
theory. Further, plaintiffs sought a declaration to the effect that Air Methods would be precluded
from instituting collection actions based on a theory of implied-in-law contract or “quasi contract,”
2 Plaintiffs’ second cause of action is mislabeled “Count III” in the complaint.
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because such state-imposed remedies were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”),
49 U.S.C. § 41713. Also under their request for declaratory relief, plaintiffs sought what appeared
to be injunctive relief, in the form of “a prospective order from the Court requiring Defendants:
(1) to cease charging for the transporting of patients without an express agreement or full
disclosure as to the rates for mileage and helicopter base rates; and (2) to cease [] attempts to
collect outstanding bills for which no agreement as to price exists from Plaintiffs and the Class
members.” Finally, plaintiffs sought as part of their second cause of action disgorgement or
restitution by Air Methods of all overpayments.
On Air Methods’ motion, the district court dismissed both claims in plaintiffs’ complaint.
The court held first that plaintiffs had not adequately pled breach of implied-in-fact contract. The
court observed that the formation of an implied-in-fact contract requires “offer, acceptance,
consideration, and a meeting of the minds.” According to the court, plaintiffs’ complaint was
“completely void of facts demonstrating conduct sufficient to infer that the parties reached a tacit
agreement before Defendants transported Plaintiffs to their respective hospitals.” As plaintiffs had
failed to allege the existence of a contract in the first instance, the court held that plaintiffs could
not state a claim for breach of contract.
Although plaintiffs made clear that their breach-of-contract claim rested solely on a theory
of implied-in-fact contract, the district court went ahead and concluded that the complaint could
be read to allege the existence of an implied-in-law contract, also known as a constructive or quasi
contract. As the district court explained, an implied-in-law contract is not a contract at all in that
it does not rest on the parties’ intentions. Rather, it is a legal fiction designed to prevent unjust
enrichment when a party receives a benefit at another’s expense.
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The court held, however, that to the extent plaintiffs’ complaint stated a claim for breach
of implied-in-law contract (on the theory that even under an implied-in-law contract, Air Methods
could charge only reasonable costs), that claim fell within the scope of the express preemption
clause in the ADA. The ADA provides that “a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation,
or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.” 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). The
Supreme Court has interpreted this preemption provision to cover state common-law rules that
enforce contractual obligations not taken on voluntarily by airlines and their customers. See
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 287-88 (2014). An implied-in-law contract, in contrast
to a traditional contract, does not involve mutual assent of the parties and instead “arises out of the
obligation cast by law upon a person in receipt of benefits which he is not justly entitled to retain.”
Sabin v. Graves, 621 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). Therefore, the district court, in
accordance with its earlier decision in Medical Mutual of Ohio v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 341 F. Supp.
3d 771, 783 (N.D. Ohio 2018), and the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp.,
922 F.3d 1053, 1064-67 (10th Cir. 2019), concluded that claims to enforce implied-in-law
contracts are preempted by the ADA.
Despite its determination that implied-in-law contract claims are preempted by the ADA,
the district court declined to declare that Air Methods would be prohibited from collecting on its
bills through an implied-in-law contract theory in a future action against the plaintiffs. The court
acknowledged that preemption “cuts both ways,” and would therefore prevent Air Methods from
relying upon an implied-in-law contract theory to recover unpaid charges for its services. Air
Methods, however, had not filed a counterclaim seeking to collect its fees. Accordingly, the court
reasoned that it could “only speculate regarding the types of claims, if any, Defendants would
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pursue.” Given this uncertainty, the court declined to exercise its jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgment Act. No class was ever certified. Plaintiffs timely appealed the district
court’s ruling on their breach-of-contract and declaratory-judgment claims.
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ first claim for breach of contract because
plaintiffs failed to plead the existence of an implied-in-fact contract. While plaintiffs’ complaint
recites the elements of an implied-in-fact contract, it does not allege conduct which, if proven,
would establish that plaintiffs formed contracts with Air Methods.
As the district court correctly stated, there are three types of contracts recognized in Ohio:
express, implied in fact, and implied in law. Legros v. Tarr, 540 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Ohio 1989).
Contracts implied in fact share the same elements as express contracts, including mutual assent of
the parties. See Stepp v. Freeman, 694 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). The difference
between express and implied-in-fact contracts lies in how they are proven. See id. “In an express
contract, the assent to the contract’s terms is formally expressed in the offer and acceptance of the
parties.” Reali Giampetro & Scott v. Society Nat’l Bank, 729 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (Ohio Ct. App.
1999). In an implied-in-fact contract, by contrast, “the meeting of the minds must be established
by demonstrating that the circumstances surrounding the parties’ transaction make it reasonably
certain that the contract exists ‘as a matter of tacit understanding.’” Id. (quoting State ex rel.
Mallory v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Bd., 694 N.E.2d 1356, 1367 (Ohio 1998)). Contracts implied in law,
on the other hand, are not truly “contracts” in that they do not require an agreement between the
parties. Legros, 540 N.E.2d at 264. Instead, they exist “to prevent a party from retaining money
or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another.” Id.
Plaintiffs leave no doubt that they attempt to plead an implied-in-fact contract. Their
complaint states that
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[a]lthough no express promise between Plaintiffs and Defendants existed, because offer and acceptance were not clearly established by spoken or written words, an implied contract existed based on a promise that may be inferred from the parties’ conduct. These were real contracts based on mutual assent of the parties and an intentional manifestation of the parties’ assent.
As Air Methods correctly points out, however, plaintiffs have not alleged facts suggesting they
assented—expressly or tacitly—to Air Methods’ transporting them to the hospital. In other words,
there is no description of the conduct from which to infer a meeting of the minds. Indeed, the
complaint lacks any factual details concerning the nature and circumstances surrounding plaintiffs’
accidents. As the district court noted, “[b]oth Plaintiffs were air lifted after sustaining significant
injuries. Plaintiffs do not allege that they were coherent and agreed to be transported, or that a
family member signed documents on their behalf before they were transported. There is no
allegation that any discussion took place between the parties prior to their transport.” Plaintiffs’
counsel’s contention at oral argument that it would still be possible for plaintiffs to have entered
into contracts while unconscious and without a personal representative to consent on their behalf
simply does not comport with Ohio law, which requires a meeting of the minds for the formation
of an implied-in-fact contract. Legros, 540 N.E.2d at 263; cf. Morehead v. Conley, 599 N.E.2d
786, 788-89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
Plaintiffs’ repeated conclusory assertions that they entered into implied-in-fact contracts
with Air Methods are not sufficient to meet the pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a). The plausibility of a complaint is determined based on “factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. Following these basic
pleading principles, we have previously affirmed the dismissal of a claim for breach of contract
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where the plaintiff alleged merely that “there existed valid contracts.” Farnsworth v. Nationstar
Mortg., LLC, 569 F. App’x 421, 430 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted); see also Alshaibani v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 528 F. App’x 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2013)
(holding that conclusory allegations regarding the element of breach failed to state a claim).
The plaintiffs’ complaint in the related case of Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp. was similarly
deficient. In granting Air Methods’ motion to dismiss in Scarlett, the district court held that “[t]he
facts in this case do not give rise to an implied-in-fact contract” because “[p]laintiffs have not
alleged any meeting of the minds or conduct between the parties by which the Court could infer
that they had an agreement before the plaintiffs were transported.” 2018 WL 2322075, at *8. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court and held that plaintiffs had failed to plead
an implied-in-fact contract. Scarlett, 922 F.3d at 1066-67. The Tenth Circuit rejected a last-ditch
effort by plaintiffs to effectively amend their complaint by arguing in their appellate brief that
some of those transported by Air Methods “may have entered implied-in-fact contracts by
expressly stating a desire to be transported because many of them were possessed of their faculties
at the time of transport.” Id. at 1066 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court further stated
that this “one sentence argument about the creation of implied-in-fact contracts would not warrant
reversal given the fact-intensive inquiry required to determine whether an implied-in-fact contract
was formed.” Id. at 1067.
In contending that their complaint is sufficient on its face to allege a claim for breach of
implied-in-fact contract, plaintiffs first point to the allegation in their complaint that “Plaintiffs
and Defendants had an implied [-in-fact] contract concerning Defendants’ transporting Plaintiffs,
as demonstrated by the fact that Defendants did so, and billed Plaintiffs for their transport services,
thus allowing a factfinder to infer the existence of the parties’ contracts by tacit understanding.”
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In addition, plaintiffs assert that “[t]he terms of the contract were implicit in the emergency
circumstances, making it such that a discussion of terms was not necessary.” The terms of this
agreement were: “transport [plaintiff] to the nearest hospital, as quickly as possible.”
But as the district court correctly determined, these allegations are not sufficient to plead
the existence of an implied-in-fact contract and are instead consistent with an implied-in-law
contract. Indeed, the factual scenario described in the complaint closely resembles the classic
example of an implied-in-law contract, where a professional provides care to someone in need
during a medical emergency. See Morehead, 599 N.E.2d at 788-89 (Ohio law); ConFold Pac.,
Inc. v. Polaris Indus., 433 F.3d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 2006); Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164, 165-
66 (Ark. 1907); Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 20 (2011). Contrary
to plaintiffs’ suggestion, an allegation that Air Methods sent plaintiffs a bill might just as well
suggest an obligation implied in law. Further, the allegation that Air Methods expected plaintiffs
to pay for air transportation services does not suffice to plead that plaintiffs actually agreed to pay.
We came to a similar conclusion in Murray Hill Publications, Inc. v. ABC Communications, Inc.,
264 F.3d 622, 638 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Michigan law), abrogated on other grounds by Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160 & n.2 (2010). In holding that plaintiff had failed to
plead an implied-in-fact contract claim in that case, we explained that “[a] claim that one party
was aware of the expectations of the other is a far cry from a claim that the first party agreed to a
course of conduct that would fulfill those expectations.” Id.
Byler’s partial payment to Air Methods is also not indicative of his intent to be bound
earlier at the time he was airlifted. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Medical Mutual of Ohio v. Air Evac
EMS, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 3d 771 (N.D. Ohio 2018), in this regard is misplaced. In that case, the
court noted in dictum that conduct showing a pattern of past payment “could demonstrate a course
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of dealing between the parties to prove a meeting of the minds.” Id. at 780. It is one thing to say
that past dealings between two parties may serve as evidence that those parties later entered into a
contract. It is quite another to say that two unfamiliar parties formed a contract based on their post
hoc conduct.
The closest plaintiffs get to describing their contractual intent is in paragraph 58 of their
complaint, where they allege that “[t]o the extent Plaintiffs, at the time of contracting, had any
understanding concerning Defendants’ price, they understood that Defendants would charge them
a reasonable price.” There is no allegation, however, that this “understanding” on the part of the
plaintiffs was communicated—directly or indirectly—to Air Methods in the form of an acceptance
of terms. Under Ohio law, “[s]ecretly held, unexpressed intent is not relevant to whether a contract
is formed.” Nilavar v. Osborn, 711 N.E.2d 726, 733 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). Furthermore, price
was the one term that the parties did not agree upon. As stated in the complaint, “Plaintiffs and
Defendants entered into contracts for Defendants’ services, but their contracts did not include
terms regarding pricing, rates, or charges.” For these reasons, the allegation regarding plaintiffs’
understanding of the price to be paid does not help them.
While the district court for the foregoing reasons properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for
breach of implied-in-fact contract, plaintiffs may still be entitled to relief on their second claim,
for declaratory relief.3 Plaintiffs argue that if the court does not find the existence of an implied-
in-fact contract, the court should issue a declaratory judgment that (1) there is no enforceable
contract between plaintiffs and Air Methods; (2) absent an enforceable contract, any attempt by
Air Methods to collect excessive fees on the basis of an implied-in-law contract would be
3 Although plaintiffs also brought claims for injunctive relief within the “declaratory relief” section of their complaint, they do not challenge the denial of injunctive relief on appeal. Those claims have therefore been abandoned. See Robinson v. Jones, 142 F.3d 905, 906 (6th Cir. 1998).
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preempted by the ADA; and (3) “Defendants have no legally enforceable right to collect the prices
charged in court proceedings, or other collection efforts, and Plaintiffs and the Class[] have no
obligation to pay Defendants the prices charged.”
The district court recognized that, in the event no contract was formed, Air Methods would
likely attempt to collect its fees through an implied-in-law contract theory. The court noted that
contracts implied in law are preempted by the ADA, and the court stated that insofar as Air
Methods sought to recover fees from plaintiffs under such a theory, plaintiffs would be permitted
to raise a preemption defense. None of the parties appears to dispute this conclusion on appeal.
In any event, courts have been unanimous in the view that implied-in-law contract claims and
related claims for unjust enrichment are preempted by the ADA because they are predicated on the
lack of an agreement and thus involve a state-imposed obligation. See, e.g., Scarlett, 922 F.3d at
1065; Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 69-71 (1st Cir. 2013); Med. Mut. of Ohio, 341
F. Supp. 3d at 781; Stout v. Med-Trans Corp., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1296 (N.D. Fla. 2018).
Dismissal of plaintiffs’ declaratory-judgment claim was improper at this stage of the
case. The district court relied on the fact that Air Methods had not counterclaimed for its fees,
reasoning that the court could “only speculate regarding the types of claims, if any, Defendants
would pursue.” The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that the district court in a case of actual
controversy “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Being
dunned for fees that a party claims it does not owe would appear to be a paradigm case for
declaratory judgment relief, especially in a case such as this where Air Methods has not put forth
a theory for why it might be entitled to more-than-reasonable fees.
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Although the district court has “unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to
declare the rights of litigants,” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995), the district
court abused its discretion in declining jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ declaratory claim. The court
did not apply the relevant factors in making its discretionary determination, and those factors in
this case weigh strongly in favor of entertaining the declaratory judgment action.
The factors governing the exercise of jurisdiction, first introduced in Grand Trunk Western
Railroad Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984), are:
(1) whether the declaratory action would settle the controversy; (2) whether the declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations in issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race for res judicata;” (4) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and (5) whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or more effective.
United Specialty Ins. Co. v. Cole’s Place, Inc., 936 F.3d 386, 396 (6th Cir. 2019) (alteration
omitted) (quoting Grand Trunk, 746 F.2d at 326). Although the district court acknowledged these
factors, the court did not appear to apply them and otherwise included only three lines of analysis
explaining its decision to decline jurisdiction. A proper exercise of discretion under the
Declaratory Judgment Act includes a “reasoned analysis of whether issuing a declaration would
be useful and fair.” W. World Ins. Co. v. Hoey, 773 F.3d 755, 759 (6th Cir. 2014). We have also
suggested that a failure to apply the Grand Trunk factors constitutes reversible error. See
Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB v. Kattula, No. 19-1138, 2019 WL 7882540, at *1-2 (6th Cir.
Nov. 6, 2019) (unpublished order); AmSouth Bank, 386 F.3d at 785; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mercier,
913 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289-90.
The district court’s minimal analysis and its disregard of the Grand Trunk factors therefore
warrants reversal in this case.
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Moreover, it is within our discretion to weigh the Grand Trunk factors where the district
court has not done so, rather than remanding for the district court to do so in the first instance. See
Mercier, 913 F.2d at 277. That course is warranted here, where based on our review of the record,
the factors point very strongly in favor of exercising jurisdiction.
The first two Grand Trunk factors—whether a declaratory judgment would settle the
controversy between the parties and clarify the legal relations in issue—favor the exercise of
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs asked the court for a declaration that (1) there is no enforceable contract
and that (2) without a contract, any attempt to collect excessive fees from plaintiffs is preempted
by the ADA. Were the district court to issue a declaration to this effect, Air Methods would be
foreclosed from recovering excessive amounts under either a contract or quasi-contract theory in
state court: the contract claim would fail for lack of an enforceable contract, while the quasi-
contract contract claim would fail as preempted. Thus, the declaratory judgment would settle the
controversy and clarify the legal relations between plaintiffs and Air Methods. Furthermore, an
important consideration under the first two factors is whether the declaratory judgment would be
res judicata in a parallel state-court proceeding. In Bituminous Casualty. Corp. v. J & L Lumber
Co., 373 F.3d 807, 814 (6th Cir. 2004), for instance, declaratory jurisdiction was not warranted
because the plaintiff in the parallel state-court litigation was not a party to the federal declaratory
action and thus “any judgment in the federal court would not be binding as to him and could not
be res judicata in the tort action.” Id. In contrast, the parties to the instant federal litigation are
likely to be the same as those in any future state-court collection actions, thereby giving preclusive
effect to the federal-court declaratory judgment.
Third, this is not a case in which the declaratory remedy “is being used merely for the
purpose of ‘procedural fencing’ or ‘to provide an arena for a race for res judicata,’” considerations
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that would weigh against issuing declaratory relief. Cole’s Place, 936 F.3d at 399 (quoting Grand
Trunk, 746 F.2d at 326). Plaintiffs in this case face the looming uncertainty of not knowing
whether they will be held liable for large sums of money. This is on top of the negative
consequences that potentially flow from Air Methods’ out-of-court collection efforts, including
the accumulation of interest on the charged amounts. It is in these types of situations, where there
is a threat of ongoing harm, that declaratory relief is most appropriate. See AmSouth Bank, 386
F.3d at 786. There is no indication in the record that plaintiffs have filed their federal lawsuit as a
means of preempting a coercive suit by Air Methods in another forum. We have been “reluctant
to impute an improper motive to a plaintiff where there is no evidence of such in the record.”
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 550-51, 558 (6th Cir. 2008). In Flowers, for example,
there was no finding of improper purpose on the part of the declaratory plaintiff despite the
likelihood that the issue in the federal declaratory action would later come before a state court. Id.
We noted that, while the federal action “may have been an attempt to preempt an issue which the
state court would eventually consider, the Declaratory Judgment Act gives [plaintiff] the right to
do precisely that.” Id.
The fourth factor supports the exercise of jurisdiction because the declaratory action would
not “increase friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state
jurisdiction.” Cole’s Place, 936 F.3d at 399 (quoting Grand Trunk, 746 F.2d at 326). This factor
takes into consideration “which court, federal or state, is in a better position to resolve the issues
in the declaratory action.” Flowers, 513 F.3d at 560. This inquiry supports the exercise of
declaratory jurisdiction because a central issue in this case is the scope of federal preemption,
while the content of state law is clear. To the extent that issues of state law in the declaratory
action later appear in coercive state-court suits, those issues will be simple and straightforward,
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thus minimizing the advantage of deciding them in state court rather than in federal court. See id.
In contrast, the fourth factor weighs against federal court declaratory relief when there are parallel
state-court proceedings involving similar or identical issues of state law. In these instances, “a
district court might be indulging in ‘gratuitous interference,’ if it permitted the federal declaratory
action to proceed.” Id. at 559 (alteration omitted) (quoting Wilton, 515 U.S. at 283). That is not
the case here, however, as there is no allegation or evidence in the record that there are pending
coercive actions by Air Methods against the plaintiffs in state court. At oral argument, plaintiffs’
counsel confirmed that Air Methods has not yet initiated state-court collection actions against the
named plaintiffs, and Air Methods did not indicate otherwise.
The fifth factor does not cut against the exercise of jurisdiction, as the alternative remedies
available in this case are not “‘better or more effective’ than federal declaratory relief.” Cole’s
Place, 936 F.3d at 401 (quoting Grand Trunk, 746 F.2d at 326). For instance, plaintiffs’ option of
raising preemption and other contract defenses in a future state-court action would be clearly
inferior to a federal declaratory remedy given that it would require plaintiffs to wait until Air
Methods sued to collect their fees. Another option would be for plaintiffs to bring a declaratory
judgment action in state court under Ohio Revised Code § 2721.02. While this would likely entail
similar advantages as a federal declaratory action, it is not clear that the state-law remedy would
be superior. We recognized as much in Flowers when we determined that a declaratory remedy
under Kentucky law would not be clearly superior to a federal declaratory judgment. 513 F.3d at
562.
Finally, the reasons given by the district court do not justify declining jurisdiction. While
Air Methods has not attempted to collect its fees in federal court through a counterclaim, a party
may properly obtain a declaration of rights for purposes of anticipated litigation in a different court.
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See, e.g., Flowers, 513 F.3d at 550-51, 556; Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 327
F.3d 448, 451, 454 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Air Methods billed them for
large sums and have initiated collection efforts. Accordingly, the district court’s concern that “the
court can only speculate regarding the types of claims, if any, Defendants would pursue” does not
weigh against the exercise of declaratory jurisdiction.
We take no position on the merits of plaintiffs’ declaratory claim. On remand, plaintiffs
are free to argue that they did not form a contract with Air Methods or that the ADA preempts any
Ohio law that permits Air Methods to collect excessive fees. For purposes of this appeal, we hold
only that the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s declaratory-judgment action was premature.
For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ declaratory-
judgment claim. The judgment of the district court is affirmed with respect to plaintiffs’ claim of
breach of implied-in-fact contract.
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