Modified and Affirmed and Opinion Filed August 14, 2023
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-00845-CR
BILLY BOB BOWEN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-2054570-N
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel Opinion by Justice Molberg
After a jury found appellant Billy Bob Bowen guilty and the trial court made
certain findings during sentencing, the trial court entered judgment convicting
Bowen of aggravated kidnapping as charged in the indictment and sentencing him
to twenty-five years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s
Institutional Division. Bowen appealed, and his newly-appointed appellate counsel
filed an Anders1 brief and motion to withdraw as his counsel because, in counsel’s
1 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45 (1967). professional opinion, the appeal is without merit and is wholly frivolous.2 Based on
our own review of the record, Bowen’s counsel’s brief, and the State’s response, we
conclude the appeal is frivolous and without merit. Thus, we grant counsel’s motion
to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified herein in this
memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND Bowen was charged by indictment with the first-degree felony offense of
aggravated kidnapping.3 The indictment alleged, in pertinent part:
That [Bowen] . . . on or about the 29th day of April, 2020 in the County of Dallas, State of Texas, did unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly abduct, TASHA HUDSON, hereinafter called complainant, in that defendant restrained the complainant by confining complainant and by moving complainant from one place to another, and by secreting and holding complainant in a place where complainant was not likely to be found and by threatening to use deadly force, and defendant did intentionally and knowingly use and exhibit a deadly weapon, namely: A FIREARM, during the commission of the offense and abduction, Bowen pleaded not guilty. A jury decided the guilt/innocence phase and heard
testimony from eight witnesses, including but not limited to the complainant, Ms.
2 Counsel’s motion to withdraw states this conclusion after stating that no “reversible error” exists, and, by doing so, she appears to conflate frivolity with reversibility. The two concepts are certainly not the same. An appeal is “wholly frivolous” or “without merit” when it “lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988), see also Crowe v. State, 595 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.). Arguments are frivolous when they “cannot conceivably persuade the court.” McCoy, 486 U.S. at 436, Crowe, 595 S.W.3d at 320. An appeal is not wholly frivolous when it is based on “arguable” grounds. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Reversal only occurs if arguable error is found to have occurred, and was harmful. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2. Many non-frivolous arguments identify errors that do not result in reversal. 3 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.04(b) (“A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly abducts another person and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense.”); see also id. § 20.01(1)–(2) (defining “restrain” and “abduct” for purposes of chapter 20). –2– Hudson. After both sides closed, the trial court instructed the jury on the offense
and on two lesser-included offenses, and after deliberating, the jury found Bowen
guilty of the offense as charged in the indictment. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.04(b).
Bowen elected to have the trial court assess punishment. Under § 20.04(c),
aggravated kidnapping is a first-degree felony except as provided by § 20.04(d),
which states, “At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue
as to whether he voluntarily released the victim in a safe place. If the defendant
proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense
is a felony of the second degree.”
The trial court made a finding during the punishment phase that Bowen
voluntarily released the victim in a safe place. The trial court also found true two
enhancement paragraphs to which Bowen had pleaded not true. At the conclusion
of the punishment proceedings, the trial court sentenced Bowen to twenty-five years’
confinement in TDCJ’s Institutional Division.
Bowen timely appealed and filed a motion for new trial that was overruled by
operation of law. Bowen was appointed new appellate counsel, and his appointed
appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief in support.
ANALYSIS
A. Bowen’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw and Anders brief After court-appointed appellate counsel files an Anders brief, we
independently examine the record to determine whether the appeal is “wholly
–3– frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. An appeal is wholly frivolous when it lacks
any basis in law or in fact, and an argument is frivolous if it cannot conceivably
persuade the court. Crowe, 595 S.W.3d at 319. In conducting our review, we do
not review the merits of potential issues set out in the brief or raised in a pro se
response but instead determine whether there are any arguable grounds for reversal.
Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If we conclude,
after conducting an independent review, that appellate counsel has made a thorough
and conscientious examination of the record and agree the appeal is frivolous, we
must grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment. In
re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Meza v. State, 206
S.W.3d 684, 688–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
The brief before us meets the requirements of Anders. It presents a
professional evaluation of the record citing to legal authority and showing why there
are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 406.
Counsel has concluded, based on her review of the entire record, that “the appeal is
without merit and is wholly frivolous.”
Counsel certified that “a copy of [her] brief and the complete record has been
forwarded to [Bowen] at his last known address” along with a letter informing
Bowen that counsel has filed an Anders brief and motion to withdraw stating that in
counsel’s professional opinion the appeal is without merit, that he has the right to
review the record and to file a pro se brief if he so desires; that he has a right to seek
–4– discretionary review if this Court concludes that the appeal is frivolous, and that he
may request an extension of time from this Court for the filing of a pro se brief if he
so desires. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(outlining counsel’s duties).
After counsel filed her motion to withdraw and Anders brief, we also advised
Bowen of his counsel’s filings, provided him with a copy, and advised him he had a
right to review the appellate record, a right to file a pro se response in our Court and
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Modified and Affirmed and Opinion Filed August 14, 2023
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-00845-CR
BILLY BOB BOWEN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F-2054570-N
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel Opinion by Justice Molberg
After a jury found appellant Billy Bob Bowen guilty and the trial court made
certain findings during sentencing, the trial court entered judgment convicting
Bowen of aggravated kidnapping as charged in the indictment and sentencing him
to twenty-five years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s
Institutional Division. Bowen appealed, and his newly-appointed appellate counsel
filed an Anders1 brief and motion to withdraw as his counsel because, in counsel’s
1 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45 (1967). professional opinion, the appeal is without merit and is wholly frivolous.2 Based on
our own review of the record, Bowen’s counsel’s brief, and the State’s response, we
conclude the appeal is frivolous and without merit. Thus, we grant counsel’s motion
to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified herein in this
memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND Bowen was charged by indictment with the first-degree felony offense of
aggravated kidnapping.3 The indictment alleged, in pertinent part:
That [Bowen] . . . on or about the 29th day of April, 2020 in the County of Dallas, State of Texas, did unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly abduct, TASHA HUDSON, hereinafter called complainant, in that defendant restrained the complainant by confining complainant and by moving complainant from one place to another, and by secreting and holding complainant in a place where complainant was not likely to be found and by threatening to use deadly force, and defendant did intentionally and knowingly use and exhibit a deadly weapon, namely: A FIREARM, during the commission of the offense and abduction, Bowen pleaded not guilty. A jury decided the guilt/innocence phase and heard
testimony from eight witnesses, including but not limited to the complainant, Ms.
2 Counsel’s motion to withdraw states this conclusion after stating that no “reversible error” exists, and, by doing so, she appears to conflate frivolity with reversibility. The two concepts are certainly not the same. An appeal is “wholly frivolous” or “without merit” when it “lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988), see also Crowe v. State, 595 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.). Arguments are frivolous when they “cannot conceivably persuade the court.” McCoy, 486 U.S. at 436, Crowe, 595 S.W.3d at 320. An appeal is not wholly frivolous when it is based on “arguable” grounds. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Reversal only occurs if arguable error is found to have occurred, and was harmful. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2. Many non-frivolous arguments identify errors that do not result in reversal. 3 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.04(b) (“A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or knowingly abducts another person and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense.”); see also id. § 20.01(1)–(2) (defining “restrain” and “abduct” for purposes of chapter 20). –2– Hudson. After both sides closed, the trial court instructed the jury on the offense
and on two lesser-included offenses, and after deliberating, the jury found Bowen
guilty of the offense as charged in the indictment. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.04(b).
Bowen elected to have the trial court assess punishment. Under § 20.04(c),
aggravated kidnapping is a first-degree felony except as provided by § 20.04(d),
which states, “At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue
as to whether he voluntarily released the victim in a safe place. If the defendant
proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense
is a felony of the second degree.”
The trial court made a finding during the punishment phase that Bowen
voluntarily released the victim in a safe place. The trial court also found true two
enhancement paragraphs to which Bowen had pleaded not true. At the conclusion
of the punishment proceedings, the trial court sentenced Bowen to twenty-five years’
confinement in TDCJ’s Institutional Division.
Bowen timely appealed and filed a motion for new trial that was overruled by
operation of law. Bowen was appointed new appellate counsel, and his appointed
appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and an Anders brief in support.
ANALYSIS
A. Bowen’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw and Anders brief After court-appointed appellate counsel files an Anders brief, we
independently examine the record to determine whether the appeal is “wholly
–3– frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. An appeal is wholly frivolous when it lacks
any basis in law or in fact, and an argument is frivolous if it cannot conceivably
persuade the court. Crowe, 595 S.W.3d at 319. In conducting our review, we do
not review the merits of potential issues set out in the brief or raised in a pro se
response but instead determine whether there are any arguable grounds for reversal.
Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If we conclude,
after conducting an independent review, that appellate counsel has made a thorough
and conscientious examination of the record and agree the appeal is frivolous, we
must grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment. In
re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Meza v. State, 206
S.W.3d 684, 688–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
The brief before us meets the requirements of Anders. It presents a
professional evaluation of the record citing to legal authority and showing why there
are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 406.
Counsel has concluded, based on her review of the entire record, that “the appeal is
without merit and is wholly frivolous.”
Counsel certified that “a copy of [her] brief and the complete record has been
forwarded to [Bowen] at his last known address” along with a letter informing
Bowen that counsel has filed an Anders brief and motion to withdraw stating that in
counsel’s professional opinion the appeal is without merit, that he has the right to
review the record and to file a pro se brief if he so desires; that he has a right to seek
–4– discretionary review if this Court concludes that the appeal is frivolous, and that he
may request an extension of time from this Court for the filing of a pro se brief if he
so desires. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(outlining counsel’s duties).
After counsel filed her motion to withdraw and Anders brief, we also advised
Bowen of his counsel’s filings, provided him with a copy, and advised him he had a
right to review the appellate record, a right to file a pro se response in our Court and
a right to seek discretionary review should we declare his appeal frivolous. See id.
at 320–21 (outlining appellate court’s duties). Bowen did not request the appellate
record and filed no pro se response.
We have independently reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we agree
the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that could
arguably support the appeal.
B. Modifications to Judgment Although not an arguable issue, various modifications to the judgment are
needed, however. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. State, No. 05-19-01201-CR, 2021 WL
2451166, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 16, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (making various modifications to judgment on Court’s
own motion in Anders context).
We may modify the trial court’s judgment to make the record speak the truth
when we have the necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v.
–5– State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc) (refusing to limit the
authority of the courts of appeals to reform judgments to only those situations
involving mistakes of a clerical nature); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d).
Thus, on our own motion, we modify the judgment as follows, consistent with
the record before us: (1) in the “Statute for Offense” section, we replace the phrase
“20.02(A)(l-6) Penal Code” with the phrase “Texas Penal Code § 20.04(b), (d)”; (2)
in the “Findings on Deadly Weapon” section, we replace “N/A” with the phrase
“YES, A FIREARM”; (3) in the sections regarding Bowen’s pleas to the first and
second enhancement paragraphs, we replace “N/A” with the phrase “NOT TRUE”;
and (4) in the sections regarding the trial court’s findings on the first and second
enhancement paragraphs, we replace “N/A” with the phrase “TRUE.”4
4 The State argues we should modify the “Degree of Offense” section of the judgment to state “SECOND DEGREE FELONY” instead of “FIRST DEGREE FELONY” because of the trial court’s finding under Texas Penal Code § 20.04(d). But no such modification is necessary, considering the trial court’s finding on the enhancement paragraphs. See Perez v. State, No. 04-03-00742-CR, 2005 WL 839470, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (while kidnapping offense was a second degree felony where jury found appellant released victim in safe place, see TEX. PEN. CODE § 20.04(d), court concluded punishment was correctly enhanced to that for a first-degree felony under Penal Code § 12.42(b) because the jury also found appellant had previously been convicted of a felony). –6– CONCLUSION We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment
as modified above.
/Ken Molberg/ 210845f.u05 KEN MOLBERG Do Not Publish JUSTICE TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
–7– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
BILLY BOB BOWEN, Appellant On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas No. 05-21-00845-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-2054570-N. Opinion delivered by Justice THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Molberg. Justices Pedersen, III and Miskel participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
(1) in the “Statute for Offense” section, we replace the phrase “20.02(A)(l-6) Penal Code” with the phrase “Texas Penal Code § 20.04(b), (d)”;
(2) in the “Findings on Deadly Weapon” section, we replace “N/A” with the phrase “YES, A FIREARM”;
(3) in the sections regarding Bowen’s pleas to the first and second enhancement paragraphs, we replace “N/A” with the phrase “NOT TRUE”; and
(4) in the sections regarding the trial court’s findings on the first and second enhancement paragraphs, we replace “N/A” with the phrase “TRUE.”
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 14th day of August, 2023.
–8–