Billy Baggett v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: June 18, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-0396
• Status: Published

Opinion

RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2026; 10:00 A.M. TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0396-MR

BILLY BAGGETT APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 22-CR-00104

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, ECKERLE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Billy Baggett (“Baggett”) entered a conditional guilty plea in

Christian Circuit Court to theft by unlawful taking ($1,000 to $10,000) and first-

degree criminal mischief and was sentenced to two years in prison. The

conditional plea reserved Baggett’s right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of his

motion to dismiss based on the Commonwealth’s failure to try him within 180 days

of his request for final disposition of his charges in violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), KRS1 440.450–KRS 440.510. For the reasons

below, we reverse the judgment and sentence and remand for the circuit court to

dismiss the indictment.

BACKGROUND

In February 2022, Baggett was indicted in Christian County for theft

by unlawful taking over $10,000 and first-degree criminal mischief in connection

with stealing a lawnmower and causing property damage. After being arraigned,

he was released on his own recognizance. While incarcerated in Tennessee on

other charges, Baggett submitted an IAD Form II to prison officials to request final

disposition of the outstanding Kentucky charges. IAD Forms III and IV were

completed and signed by Warden Johnny Fitz of the West Tennessee State

Penitentiary (where Baggett was serving) and forwarded to the commonwealth

attorney and circuit court clerk.

Although the original forms are not in the court file, copies tendered

by Baggett’s attorney show that the forms were signed by Warden Fitz on August

7, 2023. Baggett’s attorney also provided copies of return receipts signed by

representatives of the Commonwealth Attorney’s office and the circuit court

clerk’s office, postmarked August 17, 2023. Despite receipt of the IAD forms,

nothing happened in Baggett’s case until January 29, 2024, when the

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-2- Commonwealth moved for a continuance because “the previous Commonwealth’s

Attorney failed to prepare the necessary [IAD] paperwork.” An email the same

day from the Commonwealth Attorney to the court and Baggett’s counsel states,

“My office is not at fault for not meeting the time restrictions of 180 days when

this IAD was signed by the warden and inmate Baggett on 08-02-2023. [The

former Commonwealth Attorney] and her staff had plenty of time to complete the

request, but they did not.”

Baggett moved to dismiss the indictment because more than 180 days

had passed since his August 2023 request for a speedy trial. The Commonwealth

opposed the motion, arguing that the IAD allows a court to grant a continuance for

“good cause.” It claimed it should not be held responsible for the previous

administration’s failure to complete the IAD paperwork. In support, it cited the

prosecutor’s IAD manual, which states “a prosecutor who is not responsible for a

violation of the IAD will not incur a dismissal when others have caused the

violation[]” and Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 49, 113 S. Ct. 1085, 1089, 122 L.

Ed. 2d 406 (1993). It also cited Johnson v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.3d 696 (Ky.

2014), abrogated on other grounds by Roe v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814

(Ky. 2015), which held that “lack of awareness of Appellant’s IAD request among

his defense counsel, the trial court, and the prosecutor, in combination with the

difficulty in securing the attendance of an apprehensive witness” supported a

-3- finding of good cause to continue a trial. Id. at 701. The circuit court found the

Commonwealth had shown good cause for a continuance and denied Baggett’s

motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The construction and application of the IAD are questions of law, so

our review is de novo. See Ward v. Commonwealth, 62 S.W.3d 399, 402 (Ky.

App. 2001).

ANALYSIS

Baggett argues the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss

because the Commonwealth failed to show good cause for a continuance. The

Commonwealth responds that Baggett did not prove the required notice to trigger

the IAD’s time limits or, alternatively, that good cause existed for the continuance.

The IAD is “a statutory scheme which prescribes procedures by which an out-of-

state prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of charges pending against him

in Kentucky (Article III) . . . .” Ward, 62 S.W.3d at 402. The statute “clearly sets

forth the time limits within which a defendant who is subject to the statute must be

tried.” Bryant v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Ky. 2006).

Paragraph one of Article III of the IAD, KRS 440.450, provides:

Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party

-4- state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint . . . .

However, “for good cause shown,” the court “may grant any necessary or

reasonable continuance.” KRS 440.450(Art. III)(1).

We first quickly dispense with the Commonwealth’s argument that

Baggett failed to prove the required notice to activate the 180-day time limit. In

Fex, 507 U.S. at 52, 113 S. Ct. at 1091, the United States Supreme Court held that

“the 180-day time period in Article III(a) of the IAD does not commence until the

prisoner’s request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been

delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the

detainer against him.” See also Johnson, 450 S.W.3d at 700. It is undisputed that

the Commonwealth received the IAD paperwork. However, as noted above, the

originals are not in the court file. Thus, the Commonwealth contends there is some

question as to whether the court ever received Baggett’s IAD request. It notes the

return receipt signed by the court clerk “is proof that ‘something’ was sent, but it is

not conclusive that it was the IAD paperwork[.]”

-5- This assertion ignores the evidence. Baggett tendered copies of his

IAD request showing that they were signed in early August 2023. He also

provided copies of return receipts sent from West Tennessee State Penitentiary,

signed by representatives of the Commonwealth Attorney’s office and the circuit

court clerk’s office. These return receipts are postmarked August 17, 2023, just

two weeks after the IAD forms were signed. Both return receipts bear the

handwritten notation “re: Baggett.” And, as noted above, the Commonwealth

concedes that it, in fact, received Baggett’s IAD request as it is in their file. Thus,

there is no question that the forms were sent. Taken together, we believe this is

more than enough evidence to prove actual notice of Baggett’s IAD request.

Having determined that Baggett properly invoked the IAD, the

question becomes whether the Commonwealth demonstrated good cause for failing

to bring him to trial within 180 days of its receipt of his IAD paperwork. We hold

that it did not. The Commonwealth’s only explanation for failing to comply with

the IAD is that the previous Commonwealth Attorney essentially “dropped the

ball.”

While the IAD does not define “good cause,” Kentucky courts have

found good cause for a continuance where a defendant received a new attorney a

week before trial, Roberson v. Commonwealth, 913 S.W.2d 310, 314 (Ky. 1994),

overruled on other grounds, abrogation recognized by Parks v. Commonwealth, 89

-6- S.W.3d 395 (Ky. 2002), and where the Commonwealth was unable to secure a key

witness for trial. Johnson, 450 S.W.3d at 701. At the federal level, good cause has

also been found where court congestion prevented trial within the IAD’s time

limits, despite the trial court’s best efforts to accommodate. Brown v. Wolff, 706

F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1983). And good cause has been found where the state

sought to remedy a defective indictment. King v. Brown, 8 F.3d 1403, 1410 (9th

Cir. 1993).

However, we have been unable to locate, and the Commonwealth has

not cited to, any authority holding that the Commonwealth’s simple failure to act

within the statutory time limits constitutes good cause. Inattention, carelessness, or

complacence by the Commonwealth is contrary to the spirit of the IAD, which is

“to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of . . . charges[.]” KRS

440.450(Art. I); see also State v. Pero, 851 A.2d 41, 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

2004) (“The intent and rationale for enacting the IAD was to counter the perceived

evil when prosecutorial delay or inattention fail to provide a defendant incarcerated

in another jurisdiction an opportunity for prompt disposition of charges.”).

Nor do we think it matters that the previous administration’s failure to

act caused the violation. It is the Commonwealth that is a party to the IAD and has

an affirmative duty to comply with its terms. The Commonwealth Attorney is

merely an agent of the Commonwealth. Whether under the previous

-7- administration or the current administration, the Commonwealth’s duty is the

same.

The Commonwealth cites Johnson, 450 S.W.3d 696, for support for

the idea that good cause exists for a continuance where the prosecutor is unaware

of a speedy trial request until right before the time limit is about to expire. In

Johnson, our Supreme Court determined that the defendant had failed to strictly

comply with the IAD but noted that even forgiving this noncompliance, the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause for a continuance

considering the “lack of awareness of Appellant’s IAD request among his defense

counsel, the trial court, and the prosecutor, in combination with the difficulty in

securing the attendance of an apprehensive witness[.]” Id. at 701. There are

several problems with the Commonwealth’s reliance upon Johnson. One, the

above statement is dicta. Two, there was no evidence in that case that the

Commonwealth knew of the IAD request, whereas here the Commonwealth clearly

did but just failed to act. And three, other grounds for good cause existed in that

case, e.g., the difficulty in securing a critical witness for trial. Here, the only

proffered ground for a continuance is that the previous Commonwealth Attorney

neglected to complete the IAD paperwork. We simply cannot find that this

constitutes “good cause” for a continuance, considering the IAD’s purpose.

-8- Finally, we briefly address an argument made by the Commonwealth

below in support of its motion for a continuance, which the trial court apparently

relied upon. In claiming it should not be held responsible for the prior

administration failing to complete the IAD paperwork, the Commonwealth cited a

portion of the prosecutor’s IAD manual which states: “the U.S. Supreme Court and

most other courts have . . . held that a prosecutor who is not responsible for a

violation of the IAD will not incur a dismissal when others have caused the

violation.”2 The prosecutor’s manual in turn cited Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43,

113 S. Ct. 1085, 122 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1993) (among other cases) for support. The

circuit court referenced this authority in finding good cause. At the hearing on the

motion to dismiss and motion for continuance, the court stated:

Well, I’m going to deny the motion to dismiss because I believe that the cases that the Commonwealth has provided concerning third parties that interfere . . . who dropped the ball . . . though their failure to, uh, adequately respond to an IAD, uh, motion shouldn’t interfere with uh, the actual officer responsible for doing that from doing . . . his or her duty. Um, and I think that’s exactly what happened here.

However, Fex did not concern what constitutes good cause for a

continuance under the IAD. It defined the contours of a defendant’s duty under the

IAD. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the IAD’s speedy trial requirement

2 For clarity, we take “dismissal” to mean dismissal of the case.

-9- did not commence “until the prisoner’s request for final disposition of the charges

against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the

jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him.” Id. at 52, 113 S. Ct. at 1091.

In rejecting defendant’s assertion that the 180-day countdown should

begin when he tendered his IAD request to prison officials, the Court noted that

such an interpretation would produce unfortunate results: “If, through negligence

of the warden, a prisoner’s IAD request is delivered to the prosecutor more than

180 days after it was transmitted to the warden, the prosecution will be precluded

before the prosecutor even knows it has been requested.” Fex, 507 U.S. at 50, 113

S. Ct. at 1090. The Court noted that this consequence could perhaps be avoided by

the state invoking the IAD’s “good-cause continuance” clause but believed it

unlikely that the statutory intent was to have this clearly undesirable result hang on

the largely discretionary application of that provision. Id. at 50-51, 113 S. Ct. at

1090.

Thus, Fex did not hold that a “prosecutor who is not responsible for a

violation of the IAD will not incur a dismissal when others have caused the

violation.” It determined that the IAD’s 180-day time limit (and consequently the

prosecutor’s duty under the IAD) only begins to run once a prosecutor receives a

defendant’s IAD request. If, as in the hypothetical in Fex, a warden fails to deliver

the paperwork to the prosecutor, a defendant would not be entitled to dismissal of

-10- his charges. But this is because the defendant failed to strictly comply with the

IAD’s requirement that “he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting

officer” his IAD request, not because of some general rule that dismissal is

inappropriate when someone other than the prosecutor caused the violation. In any

event, as noted above, the distinguishing fact in this case is that, here, the

Commonwealth Attorney was responsible for violating the IAD, even if not the

current Commonwealth Attorney. Simply put, the Commonwealth’s (and circuit

court’s) reliance upon Fex was misplaced, and the circuit court erred in granting

the Commonwealth’s motion for a continuance.

If an inmate is not tried within 180 days, the IAD provides that “the

appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or

complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with

prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.”

KRS 440.450(Art. V)(3). Because the Commonwealth failed to bring Baggett to

trial within 180 days of receiving his IAD request,3 and because it failed to show

good cause for a continuance, Baggett’s indictment must be dismissed.

3 The exact date the Commonwealth and court received Baggett’s IAD request is unclear from the record. As noted above, the record contains return receipts signed by representatives of the Commonwealth Attorney and Christian Circuit Court Clerk postmarked August 17, 2023. Thus, Baggett’s IAD request was likely received shortly after August 17, 2023. This would put the expiration of the 180-day speedy trial requirement on February 13, 2024, at the earliest. Regardless, the time limit had certainly expired by the time the circuit court denied Baggett’s motion to dismiss (and granted the Commonwealth’s motion for a continuance) on January 8, 2025.

-11- CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the March 18, 2025, judgment and sentence of the

Christian Circuit Court is reversed, and we remand with instructions to dismiss the

indictment.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jennifer E. Hubbard Russell E. Coleman Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

Matthew R. Krygiel Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky

-12-