Billingsly v. City Univ. of N.Y.

2025 NY Slip Op 30377(U)
CourtNew York Supreme Court, New York County
DecidedJanuary 30, 2025
DocketIndex No. 150173/2025
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2025 NY Slip Op 30377(U) (Billingsly v. City Univ. of N.Y.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court, New York County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Billingsly v. City Univ. of N.Y., 2025 NY Slip Op 30377(U) (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2025).

Opinion

Billingsly v City Univ. of N.Y. 2025 NY Slip Op 30377(U) January 30, 2025 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 150173/2025 Judge: Hasa A. Kingo Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. INDEX NO. 150173/2025 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 23 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/30/2025

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. HASA A. KINGO PART 05M Justice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 150173/2025 MONICA BILLINGSLY, MOTION DATE 01/06/2025 Petitioner, MOTION SEQ. NO. 001 -v- CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, THE CITY OF NEW YORK, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CITY AMENDED UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, BOROUGH OF MANHATTAN COMMUNITY COLLEGE, DORMITORY DECISION + ORDER ON AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK MOTION

Respondents. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 2, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18 were read on this motion to/for MISC. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS .

In this special proceeding, Petitioner Monica Billingsly (“Petitioner”) moves by order to show cause for leave to serve late notices of claim, or to deem those notices previously served timely, nunc pro tunc. The court previously issued a decision on January 22, 2025, without the benefit of Respondent Dormitory Authority of the State of New York’s (“DASNY”) opposition. Having now duly considered DASNY’s opposition and the arguments presented at oral argument, the court vacates its prior decision, order, and judgment. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the petition is granted as to the City University of New York (“CUNY”), the City of New York, the Board of Trustees of the City University of New York, and the Borough of Manhattan Community College (“BMCC”) (collectively, “the City Respondents”), and denied as to DASNY.

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENTS

On March 22, 2024, Petitioner sustained personal injuries after she tripped and fell while descending the stairs inside of the Fiterman Hall Building at BMCC located at 245 Greenwich Street, New York, New York (NYSCEF Doc No. 6, Billingsly affidavit ¶ 2). Petitioner was taken by ambulance to New York Presbyterian Lower Manhattan Hospital where she was admitted and remained until her discharge on April 9, 2024 (id. ¶ 15). On May 16, 2024, Petitioner contacted the Law Office of Cohen & Jaffe about her accident (id. ¶ 17). When initially communicating with the law firm, Petitioner stated that her accident occurred on April 22, 2024, and the firm calendared their deadlines accordingly (id. ¶ 18; NYSCEF Doc No. 1, petition ¶ 13). However, upon subsequent discussions, Petitioner realized that her accident occurred on March 22, 2024, rather than April 22, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc No. 6, Billingsly Affidavit ¶ 19). The firm’s calendar and service deadlines were not properly updated to reflect the March 22, 2024 date (NYSCEF Doc No. 1, petition ¶ 13). On June 27, 2024, Petitioner’s attorney discovered the calendaring error and

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immediately served notices of claim on the City Respondents (id. ¶ 19). The following day, Petitioner served a notice of claim on DASNY (id.). Petitioner now moves for leave to serve late notices of claim, or to deem those notices already served, timely, nunc pro tunc. Only DASNY opposes the motion.

Petitioner argues that the City Respondents and DASNY acquired the essential facts underlying her claims within a reasonable time after the statutory period when she served her notices on the City Respondents and DASNY within eight days of the statutory period’s expiration. Further, Petitioner argues that the City Respondents and DASNY will not be prejudiced by the short delay because a BMCC public safety officer responded to the scene shortly after Petitioner fell, documented evidence, and generated an investigation report.

In opposition, DASNY argues that leave to file a notice against it, or to deem the notice previously served timely, should be denied because DASNY is not a proper respondent. DASNY contends that it does not own, operate, maintain, control, or have any legal or other interest in the property located at 245 Greenwich Street, and as such did not owe Petitioner a duty of care. DASNY further argues that assuming there was a duty of care, actual knowledge of the underlying facts cannot be imputed onto DASNY because BMCC’s investigation into the accident would not have alerted DASNY, and DASNY does not otherwise have a relationship with BMCC or CUNY. Additionally, DASNY argues that the incident report describes a medical condition rather than a defective condition. DASNY further contends that allowing Petitioner to serve a late notice against it would result in substantial prejudice, as DASNY has been improperly named as a party to this proceeding. Permitting the late notice, DASNY asserts, would compel it to incur unnecessary costs in defending claims that have been improperly asserted against it. Finally, DASNY contends that Petitioner’s explanation for the delay is insufficient, as she improperly identified DASNY despite the passage of time, even though DASNY has no legal or other interest in the subject property. In support of its argument, DASNY submits a deed dated January 2, 1994 (NYSCEF Doc No. 17).

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-i, no action sounding in tort may be commenced against a municipality unless a notice of claim was served upon it within ninety (90) days after the subject claim arose (General Municipal Law §§ 50-i [a], 50[e]). “The purpose of the notice of claim is to alert the municipality to the existence of the claim so that it can promptly investigate and preserve any relevant evidence before the passage of time renders such evidence unavailable or lessens its probative value” (Jaime v City of New York, 41 NY3d 531, 539 [2024]). As such, the notice of claim must state “the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose” (General Municipal Law § 50-e[2]). The notice of claim “was not meant to be used as a sword to cut down honest claims, but merely as a shield to protect municipalities against spurious ones” (Goodwin v New York City Hous. Auth., 42 AD3d 63, 66 [1st Dept 2007]. Because of its remedial nature, the statute must be liberally construed (see Camacho v City of New York, 187 AD2d 262 [1st Dept 1992]) and “should not operate as a device to frustrate the rights of individuals with legitimate claims” (Matter of Porcaro v City of New York, 20 AD3d 357 [1st Dept 2005]).

The court, in its discretion, may extend the time to serve a late notice (General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]). “In determining whether to grant or deny leave to serve a late notice of claim, the

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court must consider ‘in particular’ whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within [ninety days of the claim’s accrual] or within a reasonable time thereafter” (Jaime, 41 NY3d at 540, surpra). “Courts are to place ‘great weight’ on this factor [and] the party seeking leave has the burden of establishing [actual knowledge] through the submission of nonspeculative evidence” (id.).

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Bluebook (online)
2025 NY Slip Op 30377(U), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/billingsly-v-city-univ-of-ny-nysupctnewyork-2025.