Billingsley v. Birzgalis
Opinion
After a Wayne County Circuit Court jury found plaintiff not guilty, by reason of insanity, of unlawfully driving away an automobile, 1 he was ordered committed to the Department of Mental Health pursuant to the “automatic commitment statute.” 2 The department placed plaintiff in the Ionia State Hospital where he remained until *281 November, 1968, when be was released on convalescent status. 3
Tbe present appeal arose in June, 1968, after plaintiff’s petition for babeas corpus was denied by tbe Ionia County Circuit Court on tbe ground that tbe existence of a statutorily provided judicial remedy for release from tbe state hospital precluded resort to babeas corpus.
Historically, the function of the great writ of babeas corpus bas been to test the legality of the detention of any person restrained of Ms liberty. Jones v. *282 Cunningham (1963), 371 US 236 (83 S Ct 373, 9 L Ed 2d 285, 92 ALR2d 675), (construing Federal habeas corpus act, 63 Stat 105, 28 USCA § 2241). We do not find Michigan law to be otherwise. An examination of the statute under which plaintiff’s status is now controlled (supra, note 3) convinces us that, he is, in fact, sufficiently restrained of his liberty to prevent dismissal of the instant appeal. We do not find the appeal to be moot as a result of the plaintiff’s release to convalescent status. 4
The statute we are called upon to construe in this case was recently enacted by our legislature. It provides:
“Any person, who is tried for a crime and is acquitted by the court or jury by reason of insanity, shall be committed immediately by order of the court to the department of mental health for treatment in an appropriate state hospital, until discharged in accordance with Act No 151 of the Public Acts of 1923, as amended. The person shall not be released on convalescent care or final discharge without first being evaluated and recommended for release by the center for forensic psychiatry.” MCLA § 767.27b (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 28.966 [12]).
Previously, one acquitted by reason of insanity of a crime other than murder, and committed to the Ionia State Hospital, was expressly provided with the remedy of habeas corpus to test his detention. 5 It is *283 defendant’s contention that the omission of this express remedy in the amended act was an expression of legislative intent as to the procedure one in plaintiff’s position must follow to secure his release. We disagree.
The habeas corpus act, MCLA § 600.4307 (Stat Ann 1962 Bev § 27A.4307), reads in part as follows:
“An action for habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of detention may be brought by or on the behalf of any person restrained of his liberty within this state under any pretense whatsoever.”
A later section of this act defines “prisoner,” as used in connection with habeas corpus as: “the person on Whose behalf the writ is issued, such as an inmate of a * * * mental institution.” 6 This act stands unrepealed and has application to the plaintiff’s case.
Finally, unlike prior practice, the general court rules now expressly provide for sanity hearings upon habeas corpus petitions. GOR 1963, 712.18; cf. In re Springstead (1957), 347 Mich 688. 7
It is clear that both the legislature and the Supreme Court contemplate the use of habeas corpus in a case such as the one at bar.
We therefore reverse and remand the case for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Because of this determination we find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional questions raised by plaintiff.
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174 N.W.2d 17 (Billingsley v. Birzgalis) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.