IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
JOY BILLINGS, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. N14A-03-011FWW ) ) MERIT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS ) BOARD, ) ) Appellee. )
Submitted: November 14, 2014 Decided: February 13, 2015
Upon Appellant’s Appeal of the Merit Employee Relations Board’s Decision: AFFIRMED.
OPINION AND ORDER
Joy Billings, pro se, 89 Pike Creek Road, Apartment 6B, Newark, Delaware 19711, Appellant.
Kevin R. Slattery, Esquire, Delaware Department of Justice, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801; Attorney for the Court of Common Pleas.
WHARTON, J. I. INTRODUCTION
Joy Billings (“Appellant”) filed a Notice of Appeal on March 17, 2014
requesting judicial review of the February 17, 2014 decision of the Merit
Employee Relations Board (“MERB”). Appellant contends that the MERB erred
in upholding her termination and rejecting her hostile work environment claims.
Additionally, Appellant asserts that the MERB erred in making certain evidentiary
rulings, that the process of appeal to the MERB was overly confusing and that a
job post advertising the vacancy at her job position was made prematurely.
In considering the appeal, the Court must determine whether the MERB’s
decision to uphold Appellant’s termination and reject Appellant’s hostile work
environment claims is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.
Upon consideration of the pleadings before the Court and the record below, the
Court finds that there is substantial evidence to support the MERB’s ruling and the
MERB did not err in reaching its decision. Accordingly, the MERB’s decision is
AFFIRMED.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT
Appellant was employed as an Administrative Specialist I with the
Investigative Services Office (“ISO”) in the Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”) of
the State of Delaware from January 2001 until she was terminated on December
2 10, 2012. 1 Prior to 2009, ISO employees did not receive regular performance
reviews 2 but, in November 2009, a new Chief Investigative Services Officer
(“Chief”) was hired and he created performance plans for every ISO employee that
he supervised, including Appellant, and began conducting regular performance
reviews.3 According to Appellant’s first performance plan, her role was to provide
administrative support for the ISO Unit. 4 Appellant’s duties included: maintaining
data and filing systems; composing correspondence; communicating effectively
with staff, employees and the public; and executing instructions from ISO staff. 5
In her 2010 mid-year review, Chief gave Appellant an “unsatisfactory”
rating. 6 Some of the issues Chief documented in the review were that Appellant
could not maintain the filing system, made numerous errors in prepared
correspondence and that other co-workers had not given Appellant work for over
eight months because Appellant’s work product was unacceptable.7 As a result of
that review, Chief sent Appellant to professional skill development courses in May
and June of 2010. 8
1 R. at 766. 2 R. at 478 3 R. at 479. 4 R. at 429. 5 Id. 6 R. at 422. 7 R. at 423-27. 8 R. at 426-27. 3 Appellant also received an “unsatisfactory” rating on her next performance
review which covered May 2010 through September 2010. 9 In that review Chief
noted that Appellant continued to make the same errors.10 Chief directed
Appellant to attend additional professional training courses. 11 Appellant’s next
three performance reviews which covered September 2010 through August 2011
were all “unsatisfactory.” 12 Chief detailed the same type of mistakes being made
and noted that the classes seemed to have no effect on Appellant’s level of
performance. 13 By letter dated November 22, 2011, the Court Administrator
confirmed that Appellant was on a three month period of probation for her poor job
performance beginning October 26, 2011 through January 26, 2012.14
Around the same time, Appellant approached the Court Administrator and
alleged that Chief was creating a hostile work environment. 15 Appellant contended
that Chief was using the performance evaluations to harass her and that she felt she
was not receiving fair evaluations.16 Appellant also alleged that Chief had an
offensive talking doll in his office that he used to harass her and that there were
9 R. at 412. 10 R. at 413-19 . 11 R. at 419. 12 R. at 404; 390; 381. 13 R. at 381-410. 14 R. at 373. 15 R. at 532. 16 Id. 4 offensive cartoons in the break room that contained profanities. 17 The Court
Administrator investigated the incidents and Chief was required to remove the
talking doll from the workplace.18 The Court Administrator also temporarily
reassigned Appellant to the CCP Costs and Fines Unit to work under a different
supervisor in December 2011. 19 Appellant received another “unsatisfactory”
performance review on July 5, 2012 from the Costs and Fines supervisor.20
In July 2012, the Court Administrator transferred Appellant back to the ISO
Unit and Appellant executed a “Last-Chance Agreement” wherein she was given
three months to bring her job performance up to a “meets expectations” standard
and was subject to monthly performance reviews.21 Appellant received three
“unsatisfactory” ratings for each month from July 9, 2012 through October 9,
2012. 22
By letter dated October 17, 2012, Chief recommended that Appellant be
dismissed. 23 A pre-decision meeting was held on November 14, 2012 and the
Court Administrator terminated Appellant’s employment by letter effective
December 10, 2012.24
17 R. at 536-37. 18 R. at 537. 19 R. at 373. 20 R. at 365-66. 21 R. at 292-99. 22 R. at 283; 275; 265. 23 R. at 254-62. 24 R. at 242-52. 5 On January 11, 2013, Appellant filed a merit system grievance appeal to
both the MERB and the Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) Human
Resources Management Section.25 On March 26, 2013, an OMB Hearing Officer
upheld Appellant’s dismissal 26 and Appellant pursued her appeal to the MERB.
The MERB held a hearing on February 6, 2014 and issued its written opinion
upholding Appellant’s termination for just cause and dismissing Appellant’s
hostile work environment claims. 27
A. The Pre-Hearing Conference and Hearing
Prior to the February 6, 2014 hearing, Appellant submitted various
documents to the MERB including a brief totaling over 200 pages that was not
organized.28 In an attempt to clarify the factual and legal issues, a MERB Referee
held a pre-hearing conference with the parties on September 24, 2013. The day
before the pre-hearing conference, Appellant submitted several hundred pages of
additional documents allegedly pertaining to her MERB hearing. 29 The Referee
recommended that the MERB exclude all but thirteen pages of Appellant’s initial
submissions because the Referee found that they were irrelevant. 30 Additionally,
25 R. at 1. 26 R. at 431-36. 27 R. at 765-775. 28 R. at 221. 29 R. at 222. 30 Id. 6 the Referee recommended that the MERB exclude all documents submitted the day
before the pre-trial conference as untimely. 31
The Board accepted the Referee’s recommendations and further limited the
subject matter of the hearing to only those three performance reviews received
after the “Last-Chance Agreement” was executed because the MERB determined
that Appellant’s failure to timely grieve the prior performance reviews precluded
MERB review. 32 The MERB also permitted testimony related to the hostile work
environment claim. 33
At the February 6, 2014 hearing, the Court Administrator and Chief testified
as representatives of the CCP and Appellant testified on her behalf. Appellant had
requested that Arthur Stone, a former CCP colleague, be subpoenaed to testify on
Appellant’s behalf regarding the hostile work environment claim but Stone failed
to appear at the hearing despite being properly subpoenaed. 34 The MERB
determined, after hearing all of the other evidence, that Stone’s testimony would
not aid the MERB in rendering a decision.35 The Court will not recount in its
entirety the testimony that can be obtained from the record but will note some of
the relevant portions related to Appellant’s job performance and hostile work
environment claim. 31 Id. 32 Tr. at 23: 17-23. 33 Tr. at 26: 11-22. 34 Tr. at 15: 19-20. 35 Tr. at 265: 22-24; 266: 1. 7 i. Appellant’s Job Performance
Chief testified that Appellant was under a “Last-Chance Agreement”
beginning in July 2012 when she returned to the ISO Unit.36 He testified that
Appellant was given three monthly reviews under the agreement and that for the
first review, covering July 9, 2012 to August 9, 2012, Appellant earned an
“unsatisfactory” rating because there were multiple areas in which Appellant’s job
performance was deficient.37 Chief recounted incidences of incorrectly maintained
case logs, 38 incorrect statistical reports 39 and major issues with Appellant’s typing
and correspondence skills including numerous typographical errors.40 Chief
testified that he counseled Appellant and provided her opportunities to correct her
mistakes but that Appellant continually submitted “very, very poor work.”41 Chief
testified that he provided the written performance review to Appellant including
samples of some of the issues related to Appellant’s work performance and that
Appellant acknowledged that she had read and understood the performance
review. 42
Chief testified that he issued a second “unsatisfactory” monthly performance
review, covering August 9, 2014 through September 9, 2014, because Appellant
36 Tr. at 32:19-24. 37 Tr. at 34: 1-7. 38 Tr. at 36: 22-24. 39 Tr. at 37:19-22. 40 Tr. at 38: 13-24. 41 Tr. at 39: 3-4. 42 Tr. at 39: 8-19. 8 exhibited similar deficiencies in job performance that Chief had memorialized in
the first monthly performance review. 43 Additionally, Chief testified that the final
monthly review, covering September 9, 2012 through October 9, 2012, was also
“unsatisfactory” for similar reasons contained in the first two monthly performance
reviews.44 He testified that Appellant acknowledged receiving all three monthly
performance reviews 45 and that Appellant did not grieve any of the performance
reviews.46 Additionally, Appellant conceded that she did not grieve the negative
reviews.47
Additionally, Chief testified that the court administration enrolled Appellant
in four professional training classes to assist her in improving her work
performance and simplified her job responsibilities prior to executing the “Last-
Chance Agreement.” 48 He stated that, ultimately, he recommended Appellant’s
termination because he “felt over a two-year period [the court administration]
exhausted every means possible in trying to get [Appellant’s] performance to meet
43 Tr. at 43: 6-15. 44 Tr. at 46: 12-18; 47:6-8. 45 Tr. at 39:8-19; 42:23-24- 43:1; 46:22-23. 46 Tr. at 43: 2-5; 46:24-47:2. 47 See Tr. at 205:6-13. Appellant testified that she did not grieve the negative performance reviews because if someone gives you a really negative performance review, you could imagine you are exhausted. You have to fight for each issue in the performance review. No, I did not because it was a lot of them were in general and offensive, so I did not. I was waiting for [Chief] to write me a single written reprimand on topics… 48 Tr. at 47:14-18. 9 the expectation level, the minimum expectation level for [the ISO] office. It just
wasn’t there.” 49
The Court Administrator testified at the hearing that she had temporarily
placed Appellant in the Cost and Fines Unit prior to Appellant executing the “Last-
Chance Agreement” because “there happened to be an employee out on extended
leave, and so it was an opportunity for [Appellant] to be evaluated, as she had
requested, by an independent evaluator.”50 She testified that Appellant exhibited
the same job performance issues in that unit 51 but that she “wanted to give
[Appellant] every opportunity to show [Court Administrator] that [Appellant]
could do the job.”52 The Court Administrator testified that the decision to
terminate Appellant was reached after a pre-decision meeting with Appellant
because “it was very clear that despite training, despite training classes, on-the-job
training, job shadowing, there didn’t seem to be any method that could be put to
use that effected any change in [Appellant’s] job performance.”53 The Court
Administrator asserted that Appellant’s job performance was so poor that “it was
either have [Appellant] sit downstairs and give her no work to do…or we had to
49 Tr. at 49: 3-7. 50 Tr. at 83: 7-18. 51 Tr. at 85: 6-10. 52 Tr. at 84: 21-23. 53 Tr. at 86: 23; 87:1-3. 10 make the decision that if it wasn’t going to work, that we needed to let her go and
replace her with somebody who was capable of performing the job functions.” 54
ii. Hostile Work Environment Claim
Appellant testified that Chief had a talking doll in his office that played
various sayings including “Silence. I’ll kill you.”55 She testified that Chief played
it when she was nearby and she found the doll offensive because she is from an
island and is not accustomed to people playing pranks on one another.56 Appellant
contended that Chief was harassing her with the doll and that the sayings were
directed at her personally because Chief continued to play the offensive saying
even after Appellant did not laugh, participate or otherwise indicate that she
thought it was funny. 57
Chief testified that he was given the doll as a gift from several co-workers 58
and that he was asked to remove the doll from the workplace in the fall of 2011.59
He testified that the doll played prerecorded statements that rotated and that he had
no control over which statement the doll played when he pressed the button. 60
Chief testified that after he was asked to remove the doll, he replaced the doll with
54 Tr. at 87: 4-10. 55 Tr. at 197: 22-24; 198: 1. 56 Tr. at 198: 21-22. 57 Tr. at 199: 1-5. 58 Tr. at 50: 4-6. 59 Tr. at 51: 12-14. 60 Tr. at 57: 3-9. 11 a picture of the doll.61 He testified that he was asked to remove the picture and he
complied. 62
Appellant also testified that she found a specific cartoon posted in a break
room offensive because it contained a profanity. 63 Appellant admitted that she had
not complained about the cartoon when it was posted in the old courthouse and that
she had never asked for it to be removed despite seeing it since 2003. 64 Chief
testified that the cartoon in the break room that Appellant complained about had
been there when he became Chief and he did not post it. 65 He testified that at no
time prior to lodging a formal complaint had Appellant confronted him about the
doll or the cartoon.66
At the hearing, Appellant referenced several incidents as evidence of an
alleged hostile work environment claims. She testified that Chief made her remove
a religious article from her desk 67 but admitted that the item had scripture written
on it.68 She asserted that a co-worker used a racial slur when relaying a message
from a member of the public in which the person identified Appellant as an
61 Tr. at 51: 19-20. 62 Tr. at 52: 2-5. 63 Tr. at 59: 22-23. 64 Tr. at 61: 8-24; 62:1. 65 Tr. at 53: 13-16. 66 Tr. at 53: 23; 54: 1-5. 67 Tr. at 222: 17-20. 68 Tr. at 228: 16-17. 12 “oriental woman.” 69 Appellant conceded that a member of the public identifying
her as an “oriental woman” is not a racial slur but maintained that it is a “racial
issue.” 70 Appellant also asserted that she was offended by a comment made to
Arthur Stone that he “dresses like a pimp” because it is “a degrading sexual slur.” 71
However, Appellant acknowledged that the comment was not directed at her.72
Appellant also acknowledged that she did not report the incident to management
because she did not know how Stone felt about the remark. 73 Appellant testified
that Chief had distributed inappropriate birthday cards to two employees who
displayed the cards on their desks in their offices. 74 She asserted that the cards
offended her but acknowledged that they were not directed toward her. 75
Appellant contended that management permitted employees to play offensive
music that contained profanities in the workplace but did not assert that the
profanities were directed toward her.76
The Court Administrator testified that in the fall of 2011, Appellant
contacted her and raised the issues of the doll and the cartoon. 77 She testified that
69 Tr. at 230: 19-24; 231: 1-14. 70 Tr. at 232: 9-10. 71 Tr. at 226: 5-6. 72 Tr. at 227: 3-5. 73 Tr. at 15: 19-24; 16:1. 74 Tr. at 134: 8-10. 75 Tr. at 135: 3-4. 76 Tr. at 180: 10-12. 77 Tr. at 88: 18-24; 88: 1-2. 13 Appellant did not raise job performance evaluation issues with her at that time. 78
The Court Administrator testified that she observed the doll and posters in the
workplace and made a recommendation that they be removed. 79 She testified that
they were removed the same day. 80 The Court Administrator asserted that
Appellant did not raise any other issues of harassment until after her pre-decision
meeting when she alleged that various colleagues had sexually harassed her.81
B. The MERB’s Written Decision
In a decision issued on February 17, 2014, by a unanimous vote, the MERB
denied Appellant’s appeal.82 The MERB found that Appellant executed the “Last-
Chance Agreement” with the understanding that failure to raise her performance to
“meets expectations” would result in termination. 83 The MERB also found that
Appellant’s performance review for the period July 9, 2012 through August 9,
2012 was unsatisfactory and that Chief had attached five single-spaced typewritten
pages detailing specific instances of Appellant’s job deficiencies for that period. 84
Additionally, the MERB determined that Appellant’s performance reviews for the
period August 9, 2012 through September 9, 2012 and for the period September 9,
2012 through October 9, 2012 were also unsatisfactory based upon the typewritten
78 Tr. at 89: 3-6. 79 Tr. at 89: 7-17. 80 Tr. at 89: 22-23. 81 Tr. at 90: 3-16. 82 R. at 774. 83 R. at 769. 84 R. at 768. 14 pages attached to the reviews in which Chief detailed Appellant’s job
deficiencies. 85 The MERB found that Appellant acknowledged receiving all three
reviews and noted on the bottom of the last two that her signature did not indicate
that she agreed with the assessment of her performance but the MERB noted that
Appellant did not grieve any of the three reviews. 86
The MERB found that Chief notified Appellant of the intent to terminate her
by letter dated October 17, 2012 for failing to meet the terms of the “Last-Chance
Agreement” and that Appellant requested a pre-decision meeting. 87 The MERB
also found that the pre-decision meeting took place on November 14, 2012 and that
following the meeting, Appellant was notified by letter dated December 10, 2012
that she had been terminated from her position as an Administrative Specialist I
with the CCP for failure to meet the terms of her “Last-Chance Agreement.” 88
Based upon those findings, the MERB concluded that the CCP
administration had just cause to terminate Appellant for an unsatisfactory job
performance pursuant to Merit Rule 12.1. 89 The MERB reasoned that the CCP
85 Id. 86 Id. 87 Id. 88 Id. 89 See R. at 769. 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-12.1 states: Employees shall be held accountable for their conduct. Disciplinary measures up to and including dismissal shall be taken only for just cause. "Just cause" means that management has sufficient reasons for imposing accountability. Just cause requires: showing that the employee has committed the charged offense; 15 administration had spent three years offering Appellant re-training, personal
counseling and transferred her to another unit and that, despite these efforts,
Appellant was unable to complete her job duties which harmed the ISO Unit and
other employees who had to perform additional work to compensate for
Appellant’s deficiencies.90 Moreover, the MERB ultimately concluded that “[t]he
[MERB] believes that the CCP bent over backwards to try to help [Appellant]
improve her job performance. When nothing seemed to work, the agency had just
cause to terminate her.” 91
The MERB also determined that Appellant did not make out a prima facie
hostile work environment claim. 92 The MERB found that Appellant must prove
the following to make out a hostile work environment claim: 1) that Appellant
suffered intentional discrimination because of Appellant’s race, sex or religion; 2)
that the discrimination was pervasive and regular; 3) that the discrimination
detrimentally affected Appellant; 4) that the discrimination would detrimentally
affect a reasonable person of the same sex, race or religion in Appellant’s position;
and 5) that respondeat superior liability existed.93
offering specified due process rights specified in this chapter; and imposing a penalty appropriate to the circumstances. 90 R. at 769-70. 91 Id. 92 Id. 93 Id. 16 The MERB found that although Appellant alleged that other co-workers
made racial slurs toward her, Appellant failed to provide the MERB with dates,
times or names of the offending employees. 94 Regarding Appellant’s claim that
co-workers disrespected her cultural heritage, the MERB determined that an
employee memorializing a complaint in which Appellant was described as an
“oriental woman” by a member of the public was not culturally or racially
motivated.95 Additionally, the MERB found that the “you dress like a pimp”
comment made to Arthur Stone and the allegedly offensive birthday cards given to
two employees were not directed at Appellant and had no particular racial or
sexual stigma attached to them. 96 The MERB also found that the alleged offensive
music played by a co-worker was not directed at Appellant personally and that
Appellant never requested that the music be turned off. 97 Finally, the MERB found
that where Appellant reported incidents to management, the incidents were
investigated and remediated.98
The MERB determined that “[a]t most [Appellant] had shown a few,
isolated incidents of what may have been inappropriate or insensitive conduct in
the workplace by co-workers. The [MERB] does not believe that they were
directed towards [Appellant] to ridicule her race, national origin, gender, or 94 R. at 771. 95 Id. 96 R. at 772. 97 Id. 98 R. at 773. 17 religion.”99 Moreover, the MERB concluded that “[m]ost of the incidents
recounted by [Appellant] were not targeted at her race or sex or religion, or were
not pervasive or regular, or were not brought to the attention of management so
they would have an opportunity to investigate and, if necessary, to take prompt
remedial action.” 100
III. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Appellant characterizes the questions presented on appeal as follows:
A. Whether the Board’s decision was based upon a limited acceptance by Deputy Attorney General, Tupman counsel for Merb only 54 pages of “Written Appeal” testimony from Appellant. Given the Appellant’s full complaint consisted of 248 pages in its totality. ‘A controversy must remain alive through the course of the appellate review.’ Moriarty, 588 A.2d at 1064. ‘ a change in the facts can render an issue or entire case moot.’(quoting Boocock, 553 A.2d at 575 n.3)…
B. Whether the Board erred in their process of ‘method of appeal’ by giving conflicting instructions on the MERB Form.
C. Whether the OMB at the Step 3 process violated merit rules and employment rights with advertising the Administrative Specialist I position, prior to notifying employee of Step 3 decision.
D. Whether the Board applied Merit Rulings accordingly as their guidelines dictate. Whereas, Merit Rule 12.2 states ‘Employees shall receive a written reprimand
99 Id. 100 Id. 18 where appropriate based on specified misconduct, or where a verbal reprimand has not produced the desired improvement.’
E. Whether the Board applied ‘harassment’ law according to applicable case law.101
However, Appellant submitted very few discernable arguments addressing the
issues raised. In addition to these issues, Appellant asserts that the MERB
wrongfully precluded the testimony of Arthur Stone when he failed to appear at the
hearing.102
Counsel for the CCP contends that the MERB’s decision was based upon
substantial evidence and free of legal error. 103 Specifically, Counsel for the CCP
argues that the MERB correctly determined that the CCP had just cause to
terminate Appellant,104 the MERB did not err in considering or applying the prima
facie elements for a hostile work environment claim, 105 the MERB’s evidentiary
rulings are entitled to great deference,106 and that arguments not raised before the
MERB should not be considered by the Court on appeal. 107
101 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 4. 102 Id. at 7. 103 CCP’s Resp. Br. at 14. 104 Id. at 15. 105 Id. at 17 106 Id. at 23. 107 Id. at 22. 19 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The MERB’s decision must be affirmed so long as it is supported by
substantial evidence and free from legal error.108 Substantial evidence is that
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.109
While a preponderance of evidence is not necessary, substantial evidence means
“more than a mere scintilla.” 110 Questions of law are reviewed de novo 111 but
because the Court does not weigh evidence, determine questions of credibility, or
make its own factual findings, it must uphold the decision of the MERB unless the
MERB “acts arbitrarily or capriciously” or its decision “exceeds the bounds of
reason.” 112 Furthermore, “[j]udicial deference is usually given to an administrative
agency’s construction of its own rules in recognition of its expertise in a given
field.”113 Thus, an appellate court will not disturb an agency’s interpretation of its
rules unless the interpretation is “clearly wrong.” 114
IV. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court must address the substance and form of
Appellant’s submissions. Although it has long been recognized that pro se
108 Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. of Dept. of Labor v. Duncan, 337 A.2d 308, 309 (Del. 1975). 109 Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (citing Olney v. Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (Del. 1981)). 110 Breeding v. Contractors-One-Inc., 549 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Del. 1988). 111 Ward v. Dep’t of Elections, 2009 WL 2244413, at * 1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 27, 2009). 112 PAL of Wilmington v. Graham, 2008 WL 2582986, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. June 18, 2008). 113 Div. of Soc. Servs. V. Burns, 438 A.2d 1227, 1229 (Del. 1981). 114 Id. at 1229. 20 litigants should be afforded some leniency in presenting their case to the Court,
there is no different set of rules for pro se litigants to follow. 115 Moreover, “the
[pro se litigant’s] brief at the very least must assert an argument that is capable of
review.” 116 However, the Court prefers to decide cases on the merits where
possible rather than reject submissions for procedural deficiency. 117
Appellant filed a Record on Appeal that consisted of over eight hundred
pages of transcripts and documents. 118 Additionally, Appellant filed a sixty-four
page “Opening Brief” that haphazardly referenced several excerpts from what
appears to be various documents, emails, personal anecdotes, CCP internal
procedures and quotations to case law that allegedly pertain to her appeal. 119 In the
voluminous submissions, Appellant does very little to articulate any discernible
argument. Therefore, in the absence of more concrete assertions but in an effort to
dispose of the case on the merits, the Court construes Appellant’s arguments as
follows: 1) The MERB Form for filing an appeal is confusing; 2) OMB wrongfully
posted a job opening for Appellant’s job position before her termination was
finalized; 3) the MERB erred in affirming Appellant’s termination; 4) the MERB
erred in denying Appellant’s hostile work environment claim; 5) the MERB erred
in accepting the Referee’s recommendations to limit the contents of her appeal 115 Draper v. Med. Ctr. of Del., 767 A.2d 796, 799 (Del. 2001). 116 In re Estate of Hall, 882 A.2d 761, at *1 (Del. 2005)(Table). 117 City of Wilmington v. Flamer, 2013 WL 4829585, at *4 (Del. Super. May 22, 2013). 118 See D.I. 7-8. 119 See D.I. 18. 21 submitted to the MERB; and 6. the MERB erred in concluding that the testimony
of Arthur Stone, one of Appellant’s witnesses, was unnecessary to render a
decision.
A. The Court Must Preclude Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal.
When considering Appellant’s arguments on appeal, the Court is limited to
the record that existed at the time of the MERB’s decision. 120 Therefore, to the
extent than an issue was not previously raised before the MERB, the Court cannot
consider it now on the merits.121
Appellant’s first two arguments, that the MERB appeal form is overly
confusing and that OMB improperly posted a job opening for Appellant’s position
prior to her termination, were not raised before the MERB. Therefore, the Court
declines to address the merits of those two arguments.
B. The MERB’s Decision That the CCP Had Just Cause to Terminate Appellant is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free of Legal Error.
Appellant asserts that she was entitled to receive and did not receive
“reprimands” before being terminated in violation of Merit Rule 12.2. 122 However,
120 See Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 352 A.2d 761, 763 (Del. 1976)(“Upon appeal…the Superior Court is limited to consideration of the record which was before the administrative agency”). 121 Id. 122 Merit Rule 12.2 provides, in relevant part: Employees shall receive a written reprimand where appropriate based on specified misconduct, or where a verbal reprimand has not produced the desired improvement. 22 the Court has previously considered and rejected a similar argument when it
determined that performance-based terminations do not require that the employee
be given progressive discipline.123 Instead, performance-based terminations are
governed by the “just cause” standard which is defined as “legally sufficient reason
supported by job related factors that rationally and logically touch upon the
employee’s competency and ability to perform [her] job duties.”124
Additionally, Merit Rule 12.1 defines “just cause” as “showing that the
employee has committed the charged offense; offering specified due process rights
specified in this chapter; and imposing a penalty appropriate to the
circumstances.”125 The due process requirements regarding performance reviews
are set forth in Merit Rules 13.1, 126 13.2127 and 13.3 128 and the due process
123 Stanford v. MERB and DHSS, C.A. No. N10A-12-009 at 13(Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2011). 124 Vann v. Town of Cheswold, 945 A.2d 1118, 1122 (Del. 2008). 125 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-12.1. 126 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-13.1 provides: “The Director shall provide for systematic performance review to communicate expectations and responsibilities, recognize achievement, and identify areas for skill development and work performance improvement.” 127 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-13.2 provides, in relevant part: “Recognition of effort, accomplishment, improvement or the need for further skill development shall be addressed as needed by verbal discussions, written communication, and/or formal documentation.” 128 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-13.3 provides: When an employee's work performance is considered unsatisfactory, the performance must be documented in writing, and the specific weaknesses must be made known to the employee. The employee shall be given documented assistance to improve by the designated supervisor. An opportunity for re-evaluation will be provided within a period of 3 to 6 months. 23 requirements regarding employee termination are set forth in Merit Rules 12.4, 129
12.5 130 and 12.6. 131
The MERB determined that the CCP had just cause to terminate Appellant
from her job for consistent poor job performance because the MERB found that the
CCP had spent three years offering Appellant re-training, personal counseling and
transferred her to another unit before terminating her.132 The MERB found that,
despite these measures, Appellant was unable to complete her job duties and it was
harmful to the ISO Unit and other employees who had to perform additional work
to compensate for Appellant’s job deficiencies. 133 The MERB noted that “[t]he
129 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-12.4 provides: Employees shall receive written notice of their entitlement to a pre- decision meeting in dismissal, demotion for just cause, fines and suspension cases. If employees desire such a meeting, they shall submit a written request for a meeting to their Agency's designated personnel representative within 15 calendar days from the date of notice. Employees may be suspended without pay during this period provided that a management representative has first reviewed with the employee the basis for the action and provides an opportunity for response. Where employees' continued presence in the workplace would jeopardize others' safety, security, or the public confidence, they may be removed immediately from the workplace without loss of pay. 130 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-12.5 provides: “The pre-decision meeting shall be held within a reasonable time not to exceed 15 calendar days after the employee has requested the meeting in compliance with 12.4.” 131 29 Del. Admin. C. § 5914-12.6 provides: “Pre-decision meetings shall be informal meetings to provide employees an opportunity to respond to the proposed action, and offer any reasons why the proposed penalty may not be justified or is too severe.” 132 R. at 769. 133 R. at 770. 24 Board believes that the CCP bent over backwards to try to help [Appellant]
improve her job performance.” 134
The facts contained in the record support the MERB’s ruling. Based upon
the detailed testimony of Chief and Court Administrator regarding Appellant’s
poor job performance including several poor performance reviews, additional
training opportunities provided to Appellant and a temporary transition to another
unit, there is substantial evidence to conclude that Appellant lacked the job related
factors required for that position. Therefore, the MERB did not err in determining
that the CCP had just cause to terminate Appellant.
Additionally, the Court cannot find that the MERB was “clearly wrong” in
determining that the CCP satisfied the procedural requirements set forth in the
Merit Rules. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings that
Appellant was given several systematic performance reviews pursuant to Merit
Rule 13.1; in administering the performance reviews, CCP administration
documented Appellant’s weaknesses and gave her resources and opportunities to
improve pursuant to Merit Rules 13.2 and 13.3; and Appellant was afforded a pre-
decision hearing consistent with Merit Rules 12.4 through 12.6. Therefore, the
Court finds that the MERB’s decision to uphold Appellant’s termination is
supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.
134 Id. 25 C. The MERB’s Decision to Reject Appellant’s Hostile Work Environment Claims is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Free of Legal Error.
Without being particularly specific, Appellant alleges that the MERB
improperly applied “harassment law.” 135 To establish a prima facie case for a
hostile work environment claim, the employee must show that: 1) the employee
suffered intentional discrimination as a result of her race, sex or religion; 2) the
discrimination was regular and pervasive; 3) the discrimination detrimentally
affected her; 4) that a reasonable person of her likeness would be detrimentally
affected; and 5) the employer is liable under the theory of respondeat superior.136
The Court finds that the MERB appropriately applied the correct legal
standard and determined that “[a]t most [Appellant] had shown a few, isolated
incidents of what may have been inappropriate or insensitive conduct in the
workplace by co-workers. The [MERB] does not believe that they were directed
towards [Appellant] to ridicule her race, national origin, gender, or religion.” 137
The MERB also found that most of the incidents alleged were not brought before
management and that the few reported incidents brought to management’s
attention were properly investigated and remediated.138 The MERB concluded that
Appellant did not make out a hostile work environment claim. 139
135 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 4. 136 Hemphill v. Wilmington, et al., 813 F.Supp.2d 581, 587-88 (D.Del. 2011). 137 R. at 773. 138 Id. 139 Id. 26 The Court finds that the record supports the MERB’s conclusions. The
MERB found that Appellant brought the doll and the cartoon to the attention of
CCP management and that the issues were swiftly remediated.140 Additionally, at
the hearing before the MERB, Appellant conceded that some of the incidents to
which she took offense were not directed at her personally but were aimed at other
co-workers 141 and Appellant admitted that being referred to as an “oriental
woman” by a member of the public was not a racial slur made by the co-worker
who repeated the message as stated to a supervisor. 142 Furthermore, Appellant did
not report any of the incidents to management besides the doll and cartoon until
her pre-decision meeting. 143 Therefore, the MERB did not err in denying
Appellant’s hostile work environment claim and the decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
D. The Court Cannot Disturb the MERB’s Evidentiary Rulings Because There Is Substantial Evidence to Support the MERB’s Decision.
Pursuant to 29 Del. C. § 10125(b)(3), the MERB has the authority to
“[e]xclude plainly irrelevant, immaterial, insubstantial, cumulative and privileged
evidence.” Moreover, it is clear that “[i]n dealing with evidentiary matters on
appeal, this Court does not stand as the trier of fact…and, therefore, it cannot
140 R. at 772-73. 141 See Tr. at 227: 3-5;135: 3-4; 180: 10-12. 142 Tr. at 232: 9-10. 143 Tr. at 90: 3-16. 27 substitute its own opinion for that of the [MERB’s] if there is sufficient evidence to
support the [MERB’s] decision.”144
Appellant asserts that the MERB erred in accepting the Referee’s
recommendations to limit Appellant’s submissions to the MERB and that the
MERB erred in concluding that Arthur Stone’s testimony would not affect the
MERB’s decision. Because the Court finds that the MERB’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence, the Court cannot evaluate evidentiary rulings that are
within the exclusive province of the MERB as the trier of fact.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the MERB’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence and free from legal error. Therefore, the decision of the MERB is hereby
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________ /s/ Ferris W. Wharton, Judge
144 Lopicko v. Del. Dep’t of Servs. For Children, 2003 WL 21976409, at *3 (Del. Super. Aug. 15, 2003). 28