In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-24-00120-CV
BILL WEDDINGTON AND TWIN OAKS ESTATES, INC., APPELLANTS
V.
JON VAUGHAN, STEPHANIE VAUGHAN, GARY VINKLAREK, CALVIN HENRY, AND CLARA HENRY, APPELLEES
On Appeal from the 421st District Court Caldwell County, Texas Trial Court No. 23-O-078, Honorable Chris Schneider, Presiding
July 30, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Appellants Bill Weddington and Twin Oaks Estate, Inc. (collectively, “Weddington”)
bring this interlocutory appeal1 challenging the trial court’s denial of their application for a
temporary injunction.2 They sought to restrain Appellees—Jon Vaughan, Stephanie
1 This appeal was originally filed in the Third Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court by
a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 An interlocutory order granting or refusing an application for a temporary injunction is immediately
appealable. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4). Vaughan, Gary Vinklarek, Calvin Henry, and Clara Henry (collectively, “Vaughan”)—from
denying Weddington access to its property, claiming an easement across the property
that is alleged to have been obtained by estoppel. Finding no abuse of discretion by the
trial court, we affirm its order denying temporary injunctive relief.
Background
The essence of Weddington’s application for injunctive relief centers on its use of
an unpaved road that begins where Farm to Market Road 713 touches the Henrys’
property. From there, the road crosses the Henry, Vinklarek, and Vaughan properties
before reaching the Weddington tract. Weddington claims to have used this road to
access its property for at least seventy years.
At the temporary injunction hearing, 76-year-old Johnny Weddington testified that
he had been using the road since he was 6 or 7 years old. Similarly, 91-year-old O.C.
Grant testified that since his childhood he has crossed what are now the Henry, Vinklarek,
and Vaughan properties to reach the Weddington property.
Vinklarek acquired his property in 2001 and did not prohibit Weddington from using
the road until 2012, when his attorney sent Weddington a letter demanding cessation of
road use. In the fall of 2023, Vaughan and Vinklarek completely restricted Weddington’s
access via the road. Thereafter, Weddington sought temporary and permanent injunctive
relief and a declaratory judgment in the ensuing litigation.
2 Analysis
The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject
matter of a suit pending a final trial on the merits. Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 348
S.W.2d 517, 519 (1961). Consistent with this purpose, an appeal of such an order does
not review the merits of the underlying case; rather, we assess whether the trial court
abused its discretion in determining if the applicant is entitled to injunctive relief pending
trial. Comed Med. Sys., Co. v. AADCO Imaging, LLC, No. 03-14-00593-CV, 2015 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1762, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). To obtain
a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove: (1) a cause of action against
the defendant, (2) a probable right of recovery, and (3) a probable, imminent, and
irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex.
2002) (op. on reh’g). A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and does not
issue as a matter of right. Id.
An order granting or denying an application for temporary injunction is reviewed
for abused discretion. Id. at 204. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to guiding rules and principles. Id. at 211.
In its review of a trial court’s order on a temporary injunction, an appellate court does not
resolve factual disputes. Bright Land & Cattle, LLC v. PG-M Int’l, LLC, No. 07-16-00336-
CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 2083, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 9, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
op.). Instead, conflicting evidence and all legitimate inferences that can be drawn from
the evidence are interpreted in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. Id.
3 At the heart of this appeal is Weddington’s claim of an easement by estoppel. An
easement grants one person the right to use another’s land for a specific purpose. Hubert
v. Davis, 170 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.). The statute of frauds
ordinarily requires a written document to establish an easement. Machala v. Weems, 56
S.W.3d 748, 756 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.). However, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel provides an exception to prevent injustice and protect innocent parties
from fraud. Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979); Machala, 56 S.W.3d at
756. The essence of easement by estoppel is that the owner of a servient estate may be
estopped from denying the existence of an easement when he makes representations
that the owner of the dominant3 estate relies on. Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364
S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tex. 1962).
To establish an easement by estoppel, the owner of the servient estate must say
or do something at the time of the grant to induce acceptance by the dominant estate
owner. Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1988, writ denied). The Third Court of Appeals has held that proving an
easement by estoppel requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) a representation communicated
to a promisee; (2) the communication is believed; and (3) reliance on the communication.
Lakeside Launches, 750 S.W.2d at 871 (citing Storms, 579 S.W.2d at 451). Ten years
later, in Scott v. Cannon, the Third Court revisited its analysis and interpreted from prior
decisions that an easement by estoppel occurs when an owner “mak[es] representations
that are acted upon by a purchaser to his detriment.” 959 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex. App.—
3 The parcel of land owned by the grantor of the easement is the servient estate, and the parcel of
land benefited by the easement is the dominant estate. Staley Family P’ship, Ltd. v. Stiles, 435 S.W.3d 851, 856 n.3 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014), aff’d, 483 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. 2016).
4 Austin 1998, pet. denied).4 The court concluded that “the law requires a vendor/vendee
relationship to establish an easement by estoppel.” Id. at 720.
Since Scott was decided, the Third Court has reiterated that there can be no
easement by estoppel unless a vendor-vendee relationship exists between the plaintiff
and defendant. See Pewitt v. Terry, No. 03-12-00013-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 7867,
at *12–14 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating “this Court has
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In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-24-00120-CV
BILL WEDDINGTON AND TWIN OAKS ESTATES, INC., APPELLANTS
V.
JON VAUGHAN, STEPHANIE VAUGHAN, GARY VINKLAREK, CALVIN HENRY, AND CLARA HENRY, APPELLEES
On Appeal from the 421st District Court Caldwell County, Texas Trial Court No. 23-O-078, Honorable Chris Schneider, Presiding
July 30, 2024 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Appellants Bill Weddington and Twin Oaks Estate, Inc. (collectively, “Weddington”)
bring this interlocutory appeal1 challenging the trial court’s denial of their application for a
temporary injunction.2 They sought to restrain Appellees—Jon Vaughan, Stephanie
1 This appeal was originally filed in the Third Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court by
a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 An interlocutory order granting or refusing an application for a temporary injunction is immediately
appealable. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4). Vaughan, Gary Vinklarek, Calvin Henry, and Clara Henry (collectively, “Vaughan”)—from
denying Weddington access to its property, claiming an easement across the property
that is alleged to have been obtained by estoppel. Finding no abuse of discretion by the
trial court, we affirm its order denying temporary injunctive relief.
Background
The essence of Weddington’s application for injunctive relief centers on its use of
an unpaved road that begins where Farm to Market Road 713 touches the Henrys’
property. From there, the road crosses the Henry, Vinklarek, and Vaughan properties
before reaching the Weddington tract. Weddington claims to have used this road to
access its property for at least seventy years.
At the temporary injunction hearing, 76-year-old Johnny Weddington testified that
he had been using the road since he was 6 or 7 years old. Similarly, 91-year-old O.C.
Grant testified that since his childhood he has crossed what are now the Henry, Vinklarek,
and Vaughan properties to reach the Weddington property.
Vinklarek acquired his property in 2001 and did not prohibit Weddington from using
the road until 2012, when his attorney sent Weddington a letter demanding cessation of
road use. In the fall of 2023, Vaughan and Vinklarek completely restricted Weddington’s
access via the road. Thereafter, Weddington sought temporary and permanent injunctive
relief and a declaratory judgment in the ensuing litigation.
2 Analysis
The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject
matter of a suit pending a final trial on the merits. Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 348
S.W.2d 517, 519 (1961). Consistent with this purpose, an appeal of such an order does
not review the merits of the underlying case; rather, we assess whether the trial court
abused its discretion in determining if the applicant is entitled to injunctive relief pending
trial. Comed Med. Sys., Co. v. AADCO Imaging, LLC, No. 03-14-00593-CV, 2015 Tex.
App. LEXIS 1762, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). To obtain
a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove: (1) a cause of action against
the defendant, (2) a probable right of recovery, and (3) a probable, imminent, and
irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex.
2002) (op. on reh’g). A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and does not
issue as a matter of right. Id.
An order granting or denying an application for temporary injunction is reviewed
for abused discretion. Id. at 204. A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to guiding rules and principles. Id. at 211.
In its review of a trial court’s order on a temporary injunction, an appellate court does not
resolve factual disputes. Bright Land & Cattle, LLC v. PG-M Int’l, LLC, No. 07-16-00336-
CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 2083, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 9, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
op.). Instead, conflicting evidence and all legitimate inferences that can be drawn from
the evidence are interpreted in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. Id.
3 At the heart of this appeal is Weddington’s claim of an easement by estoppel. An
easement grants one person the right to use another’s land for a specific purpose. Hubert
v. Davis, 170 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.). The statute of frauds
ordinarily requires a written document to establish an easement. Machala v. Weems, 56
S.W.3d 748, 756 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.). However, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel provides an exception to prevent injustice and protect innocent parties
from fraud. Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979); Machala, 56 S.W.3d at
756. The essence of easement by estoppel is that the owner of a servient estate may be
estopped from denying the existence of an easement when he makes representations
that the owner of the dominant3 estate relies on. Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364
S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tex. 1962).
To establish an easement by estoppel, the owner of the servient estate must say
or do something at the time of the grant to induce acceptance by the dominant estate
owner. Lakeside Launches, Inc. v. Austin Yacht Club, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1988, writ denied). The Third Court of Appeals has held that proving an
easement by estoppel requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) a representation communicated
to a promisee; (2) the communication is believed; and (3) reliance on the communication.
Lakeside Launches, 750 S.W.2d at 871 (citing Storms, 579 S.W.2d at 451). Ten years
later, in Scott v. Cannon, the Third Court revisited its analysis and interpreted from prior
decisions that an easement by estoppel occurs when an owner “mak[es] representations
that are acted upon by a purchaser to his detriment.” 959 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex. App.—
3 The parcel of land owned by the grantor of the easement is the servient estate, and the parcel of
land benefited by the easement is the dominant estate. Staley Family P’ship, Ltd. v. Stiles, 435 S.W.3d 851, 856 n.3 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014), aff’d, 483 S.W.3d 545 (Tex. 2016).
4 Austin 1998, pet. denied).4 The court concluded that “the law requires a vendor/vendee
relationship to establish an easement by estoppel.” Id. at 720.
Since Scott was decided, the Third Court has reiterated that there can be no
easement by estoppel unless a vendor-vendee relationship exists between the plaintiff
and defendant. See Pewitt v. Terry, No. 03-12-00013-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 7867,
at *12–14 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating “this Court has
held that a vendor/vendee relationship must exist between the party making the
representation and the party claiming to have relied on it” for an easement by estoppel to
arise); Cambridge Holdings, Ltd. v. Cambridge Condos. Council of Owners, No. 03-08-
00353-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 4415, at *51-52 (Tex. App.—Austin June 11, 2010, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (stating, “[t]his Court has held that a vendor-vendee relationship must
exist to establish an easement by estoppel, although some of our sister courts have since
questioned that holding.”).
In its reply, Weddington argues that Scott’s holding is misplaced because it
conflicts with the earlier Supreme Court decisions it purported to interpret, and that other
courts, including this Court,5 have reached contrary conclusions. Nonetheless, Scott’s
holding remains the earliest non-superseded decision from the Third Court on this
question. Because it has not been overturned by the Supreme Court or through en banc
review, it remains the governing authority of the Third Court of Appeals. See Mitschke v.
4 (citing Storms, 579 S.W.2d at 451; Drye, 364 S.W.2d at 209; Harrison & Co. v. Boring, 44 Tex.
255 (1875)). 5 See S. Plains Lamesa R.R. v. Heinrich, 280 S.W.3d 357, 362 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, no pet.)
(holding “that a vendor/vendee relationship is not required to prove that an easement was granted by estoppel . . . .”).
5 Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. 2022) (holding that under principles of horizontal
stare decisis, “three-judge panels must follow materially indistinguishable decisions of
earlier panels of the same court unless a higher authority has superseded that prior
decision.”). Even if we have reason to doubt the validity of the decision, we, as the
transferee court, are “objectively bound” to follow Scott’s instruction. Id. at 258.
In this appeal, there is no evidence of a vendor-vendee relationship between
Weddington and any of the Appellees. While the evidence shows Vaughan occasionally
allowed Weddington to use the road to access its property, such passive acquiescence
does not meet the level of representation required to establish an easement by estoppel.
See Scott, 959 S.W.2d at 721. We conclude that Weddington failed to present evidence
establishing a probable right to the relief sought. It is unnecessary to address
Weddington’s other appellate issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Conclusion
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Weddington’s
application for a temporary injunction. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order and
remand the cause for further proceedings.
Lawrence M. Doss Justice