COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2016COA144
Court of Appeals No. 15CA0765 Weld County District Court No. 13CV30928 Honorable Julie C. Hoskins, Judge
Bill Barrett Corporation and Bonanza Creek Energy, Inc.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants,
and
Noble Energy, Inc.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Sand Hills Metropolitan District, f/k/a Altamira Metropolitan District No. 6; United Water and Sanitation District; and Town of Lochbuie,
Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE FOX Bernard and Richman, JJ., concur
Announced October 6, 2016
Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP, R. Kirk Mueller, Mark E. Champoux, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants
Hogan Lovells US LLP, Scot W. Anderson, Elizabeth H. Titus, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Waas Campbell Rivera Johnson & Velasquez LLP, Darrell G. Waas, Mikaela V. Rivera, Kathryn I. Hopping, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees Collins Cockrel & Cole, Eric C. Jorgenson, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Special District Association of Colorado ¶1 Sand Hills Metropolitan District (the district), United Water
and Sanitation District,1 and the Town of Lochbuie (Lochbuie),
Colorado (collectively Sand Hills) appeal the trial court’s partial
grant of motions for summary judgment filed by Bill Barrett
Corporation and Bonanza Creek Energy, Inc. (collectively
Taxpayers).2 Taxpayers cross-appeal the trial court’s partial grant
of Sand Hills’ motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand to the trial court.
I. Background
¶2 The district was originally organized in 2004 as Altamira
Metropolitan District No. 6 (Altamira District). When organized, the
district’s boundaries were entirely within Lochbuie. On October 6,
2004, Lochbuie approved a proposed service plan (the 2004 plan),
and the Weld County District Court issued an order and decree
organizing the district.
1 United Water and Sanitation District is a special district whose president, Bob Lembke, also owns 70 Ranch, LLC. Lembke is also a member of the Sand Hills Metropolitan District (formerly Altamira District, No. 6) Board of Directors. 2 Noble Energy, Inc. (Noble) was added to the amended complaint as
an involuntary plaintiff and is an involuntary plaintiff-appellee here.
1 ¶3 According to the 2004 plan, the purpose of the district was to
“finance the construction of local and regional public improvements
for the use and benefit of the Altamira Development’s residents and
taxpayers.” The plan also required the district to “provide for
maintenance of certain public improvements.” Specifically, the plan
proposed “the construction, acquisition and installation of local and
regional public improvements, including streets and traffic signals,
and water, sewer, storm drainage and park and recreation
facilities . . . for the Altamira Development.” The Altamira
Development was to include 1496 single family homes and 70,000
square feet of commercial space within Lochbuie’s boundaries. The
development never occurred.
¶4 70 Ranch, LLC (70 Ranch) owns 13,000 acres located
approximately 30 miles northeast of Lochbuie in unincorporated
Weld County. In 2009, the district purported to include the 70
Ranch property within its boundaries. The district’s board of
directors approved the inclusion, and the Weld County District
Court issued an order granting the inclusion on April 29, 2009. In
2010, the district changed its name from the Altamira District to
the Sand Hills Metropolitan District. Then, in 2011, the district
2 excluded from its boundaries all of the land, located in Lochbuie,
that originally comprised the Altamira District. The district’s board
of directors approved the exclusion, and the Weld County district
court issued an order granting the exclusion on April 28, 2011.
Through this sequence of actions, the district relocated itself from
Lochbuie to encompass only the 70 Ranch property. The district
did not give notice to, or seek approval from, the Board of County
Commissioners of Weld County.
¶5 Taxpayers and Noble are oil and natural gas exploration
companies that lease mineral interests at 70 Ranch. 70 Ranch
owns some, but not all, of the subsurface mineral rights below the
70 Ranch property. 70 Ranch leases its mineral rights to
Taxpayers, and Taxpayers also lease subsurface mineral rights
below the 70 Ranch property from other mineral estate owners.
¶6 In 2008, the district’s board of directors approved certification
of a mill levy of 51.118 mills for the district’s general operating
expenses. Since 2009, when 70 Ranch was included, Taxpayers
have paid millions of dollars in ad valorem taxes to the district.
¶7 Despite the district’s 2009 and 2011 actions, it did not prepare
a revised service plan until 2013 (the 2013 plan) to reflect its new
3 location and adjusted purpose. The 2013 plan acknowledges the
district’s 2009 and 2011 geographical shift to the 70 Ranch
property in Weld County and articulates its new purpose to provide
“an important site for water facilities and storage.” The 2013 plan
indicates that the district “will provide for the construction,
acquisition and installation of local and regional public
improvements, including streets and traffic signals, and water,
sewer, storm drainage and park and recreation facilities.” The plan
reiterates an intent to provide for the improvements (costing
approximately $19,315,008.90) as contemplated by the Altamira
District in Lochbuie. The 2013 plan states the district’s intent “to
cooperate with other local governments, authorities and enterprises
to develop infrastructure resources of benefit on a regional basis.”
The plan lists examples of the district’s potential regional reach,
including repairing and reconstructing Lake Henry (in Lochbuie),
constructing various water truck depots in Weld County,
constructing a water pipeline in Weld County, and constructing a
reservoir and recharge site in Weld County. The 2013 plan states,
however, that the district is not obligated to complete any of these
potential improvements.
4 ¶8 Taxpayers sued Sand Hills in 2013 claiming that Sand Hills
exceeded its authority and violated parts of the Special District Act,
§§ 32-1-101 to -1807 (the Act), C.R.S. 2016, and the Colorado
Constitution. Taxpayers moved for partial summary judgment and
Sand Hills cross-moved for summary judgment.
¶9 In a detailed written order, the trial court found:
After April 28, 2011 — when the district unilaterally removed
itself entirely from Lochbuie — the district lost its legal
authority to collect taxes. Thus, the trial court granted
Taxpayers’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect
to any district actions taken after that date.
Taxpayers are entitled to a tax refund for taxes paid for tax
years 2011, 2012, and 2013.
From April 29, 2009, until April 28, 2011 — when the
district’s boundaries included the 70 Ranch property and the
original Altamira District property — the district had the
authority to tax Taxpayers. Thus, as to this time period, the
trial court granted Sand Hills’ motion for summary judgment.
¶ 10 Sand Hills and Taxpayers appeal the adverse components of
the trial court’s order on their respective motions.
5 II. Special District Taxing Authority
¶ 11 Sand Hills contends that the trial court erred in concluding
that the district lost authority to tax when it relocated itself in 2011
to encompass only the 70 Ranch property. On cross-appeal,
Taxpayers argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the
district had authority to impose taxes on their mineral interests
from 2009 until 2011, when the district’s geographic boundary
expanded to include the 70 Ranch property.
A. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶ 12 The parties agree that the relevant arguments were preserved
for appeal.
¶ 13 We review de novo a trial court’s order granting summary
judgment. Lewis v. Taylor, 2016 CO 48, ¶ 13. “Summary judgment
is appropriate only if ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.’” Id. (quoting C.R.C.P. 56(c)).
¶ 14 Additionally, we review questions of statutory interpretation de
novo. Id. at ¶ 14. When construing a statute, we effectuate the
6 intent of the General Assembly by looking to the plain meaning of
the statutory language and considering it within the context of the
statute as a whole. Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 533 (Colo. 2010).
We construe the entire statutory scheme to give consistent,
harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts. Climax Molybdenum
Co. v. Walter, 812 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Colo. 1991). And, we avoid
interpretations that would lead to an absurd result. Crandall v.
City & Cty. of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 662 (Colo. 2010). If the
statutory language is clear, we apply it as written. Specialty Rests.
Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo. 2010). If the statutory
language is ambiguous, we may use other tools of statutory
interpretation to determine the General Assembly’s intent.
Crandall, 238 P.3d at 662.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 15 The Act was enacted “with the intent that special districts
would ‘promote the health, safety, . . . and general welfare’ of their
inhabitants and the state of Colorado.” S. Fork Water & Sanitation
Dist. v. Town of South Fork, 252 P.3d 465, 468 (Colo. 2011) (quoting
§ 32-1-102(1), C.R.S. 2016). Special districts possess only those
powers expressly conferred upon them. Id.
7 ¶ 16 As relevant here, the Act provides:
The board of county commissioners of each county which has territory included within the proposed special district, other than a proposed special district which is contained entirely within the boundaries of a municipality, shall constitute the approving authority under this part 2 and shall review any service plan filed by the petitioners of any proposed special district.
§ 32-1-203(1), C.R.S. 2016. Moreover, sections 32-1-201 to -209,
C.R.S. 2016, apply “except where a petition for the organization of a
special district confined exclusively within the boundaries of any
existing municipality has been approved by a resolution of the
governing body of the municipality.” § 32-1-201.
¶ 17 And, section 32-1-207, C.R.S. 2016, provides the procedures
governing when and how a special district may alter its service
plan. A special district’s governing body may make material
modifications — changes of a basic or essential nature — to its
previously approved service plan only “by petition to and approval
by the board of county commissioners or the governing body of the
municipality.” § 32-1-207(2)(a). The “inclusion of property that is
located in a county or municipality with no other territory within
8 the special district may constitute a material modification of the
service plan.” Id.
C. Analysis
¶ 18 Because this statutory scheme is clear and unambiguous, our
analysis focuses on applying the plain meaning of the Act. Nelson,
231 P.3d at 397.
¶ 19 Section 32-1-207(2)(a) includes a nonexhaustive list of factors
specifying when a district’s modification of its service plan is
considered material and requires a petition to and approval from
the board of county commissioners.
[A]pproval of modifications shall be required only with regard to changes of a basic or essential nature, including but not limited to the following: Any addition to the types of services provided by the special district; a decrease in the level of services; a decrease in the financial ability of the district to discharge the existing or proposed indebtedness; or a decrease in the existing or projected need for organized service in the area. Approval for modification shall not be required for changes necessary only for the execution of the original service plan or for changes in the boundary of the special district; except that the inclusion of property that is located in a county or municipality with no other territory within the special district may constitute a material modification of the service plan[.]
9 § 32-1-207(2)(a).
¶ 20 The relevant facts are not in dispute. We must determine
whether the district modifications at issue here — the 2009
addition of the 70 Ranch property (outside of Lochbuie and within
Weld County) and the 2011 complete geographic shift to the 70
Ranch property (removing all Lochbuie property) along with the
district’s shift from a local focus with the purpose of providing local
necessities for the construction of the Altamira Development to a
regional focus providing services beyond Lochbuie’s boundaries —
exceeded the scope of the 2004 plan and constituted material
modifications requiring the approval of the Board of County
1. The District’s 2011 Actions
¶ 21 We begin by discussing the district’s complete geographic shift
in 2011 when the district removed itself entirely from Lochbuie so
that its geographical area included only the 70 Ranch property —
thirty miles northeast in unincorporated Weld County. Although
that geographic shift alone was a major change to the district, it
was not until 2013 that (1) the district attempted to amend the
2004 plan; and (2) Lochbuie’s Town Board purported to approve the
10 2013 plan, adopting a focus on regional water infrastructure. It is
undisputed that Sand Hills had not built any of the improvements
associated with the Altamira Development described in the 2004
plan.
¶ 22 The trial court concluded that the district’s failure to comport
with the purposes of the 2004 plan along with the district’s
complete geographic overhaul in 2011 constituted a material
departure from the original service plan under section
32-1-207(2)(a). We agree.
¶ 23 First, the district’s shift in purpose, reflected in the 2013 plan,
from a localized district providing for residential and commercial
development in Lochbuie to a regional district reaching beyond
Lochbuie and providing regional benefits to the county constituted
a change to the basic and essential nature of the 2004 plan. See
§ 32-1-207(2)(a); see also Upper Bear Creek Sanitation Dist. v. Bd. of
Cty. Comm’rs, 715 P.2d 799, 800 (Colo. 1986) (stating that
appropriate board of county commissioners was required to approve
a modified service plan). The 2011 geographical shift also
completely altered the area subject to the district’s taxation
authority and changed the basic and essential nature of the 2004
11 plan. See § 32-1-207(2)(a). To adopt such a modification, the
district needed approval from the appropriate governing authority.
Id.
¶ 24 Under section 32-1-203(1), and after the geographical shift to
the 70 Ranch property, the only proper governing authority to
approve the proposed departure from the district’s service plan was
the Board of County Commissioners of Weld County. § 32-1-203;
see also Upper Bear Creek, 715 P.2d at 800. In order to properly
adopt the belated 2013 plan — which, as the trial court noted,
effectively sought retroactive approval for the district’s actions
(including taxation) after the 2011 geographic shift — the district
needed approval from the board of county commissioners of each
county with territory in the district. See § 32-1-203(1). After the
geographical shift away from Lochbuie, the district no longer fell
under the narrow exception in section 32-1-203(1) for a special
district contained entirely within the boundaries of a municipality.
Id. The district’s borders extended outside of Lochbuie and into
Weld County, triggering additional notice and approval
requirements. See §§ 32-1-203, -207. We therefore agree with the
district court that the district’s 2011 geographical shift and its
12 altered purposes, as reflected in the delayed 2013 plan, lacked
approval from an appropriate governing authority under section 32-
1-203(1).
¶ 25 For example, the reference in section 32-1-401(1), C.R.S.
2016, that a county or municipality may file written objection to the
inclusion of territory within a district and similar language in
section 32-1-501(2), C.R.S. 2016 (regarding objections to the
exclusion of territory from a district) — coupled with the
requirement of approval from the board of county commissioners
contained in section 32-1-207(2)(a) — support the proposition that
the legislature intended the county to have notice. After all, how
can the county object to or approve a district’s action if it is not
provided notice of the district’s proposed action? See, e.g., Climax
Molybdenum Co., 812 P.2d at 1173-74 (we must give statutes a
reasonable construction); Upper Bear Creek, 715 P.2d at 800
(invalidating modification that lacked appropriate approval).
¶ 26 The record does not document that the Weld County Board of
County Commissioners ever approved the district’s 2011 material
13 alterations (in purpose or location).3 Accordingly, the purported
changes violated the Act and the 2004 plan.
¶ 27 Sand Hills argues that the inclusion or exclusion of property
within a district cannot impair or affect its organization and that
once formed the district’s status as a legal entity cannot be
challenged. This sort of unbounded power is not contemplated by
the Act. The Act is clear that material modifications of a district’s
service plan can be challenged. See § 32-1-207(2)(a); see also
§ 32-1-209 (requiring districts to report to the board of county
commissioners and allowing the county treasurer to withhold
moneys). To hold otherwise would lead to an absurd result, which
we must avoid. Crandall, 238 P.3d at 662.
¶ 28 Sand Hills further argues that, even if deemed a material
modification of the 2004 plan, the 2011 exclusion of Lochbuie from
the district’s boundary cannot affect the district’s legal status or
authority to conduct business. However this argument conflicts
with the clear language of the Act, which requires the appropriate
3 The briefing reflects that Sand Hills relied only on the Lochbuie Town Council’s approval. But, as soon as the district exceeded Lochbuie’s boundaries, the Town Council ceased to have authority to approve purpose or location changes to the plan.
14 governing authority to approve material modifications to a service
plan. See § 32-1-207(2)(a); § 32-1-209 (reporting requirements and
sanctions authorized).
¶ 29 Sand Hills also argues that the exclusive remedy under the Act
would be to enjoin the faulty material modification, and that based
on Sand Hills’ notice dated April 1, 2009, the time period for
challenges to its 2011 and 2009 actions expired before Taxpayers
filed their original lawsuit. See § 32-1-207(3)(b) (providing that an
action to enjoin the levy of taxes by a special district must be
brought within forty-five days of the special district filing notice of
its intent to undertake the challenged action). But, Sand Hills’ only
notice, which was published in the Brighton Standard Blade
newspaper (located in Adams County), did not meet the statutory
notice requirements needed to include the 70 Ranch property
(located in Weld County) in the district. Section 32-1-207(3)(b)
unambiguously requires that such notice “shall describe the activity
proposed to be undertaken by the special district” and include the
timeframe for actions to enjoin such activity.
¶ 30 Sand Hills’ 2009 publication did not advise that a material
departure from the 2004 plan was proposed or that the operative
15 objection timeline would begin to run. And, Sand Hills has not
cited any portion of the record evidencing that it properly provided
the Weld County Board of County Commissioners with notice of the
2011 or 2009 material departures. Sand Hills’ timeframe argument
fails. Sand Hills’ 2009 notice did not meet the statutory
requirements for notice under section 32-1-207(3)(b).
¶ 31 For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s
grant of Taxpayers’ motions for summary judgment as to the time
period after April 28, 2011.
2. The District’s 2009 Actions
¶ 32 We now focus on the district’s geographic shift in 2009 to
include the 70 Ranch property. For reasons similar to those
articulated above, we conclude that this shift was also a material
modification of the district’s 2004 plan that required, but did not
receive, the approval of the Weld County Board of County
Commissioners.
¶ 33 Section 32-1-207(2)(a) provides examples of changes of a basic
or essential nature. The Act contemplates adding new types of
services, decreasing the level of services, as well as decreases in the
existing or projected need for services in the organized area as
16 potential material modifications to a service plan. Id. The district’s
inclusion of the 70 Ranch property in 2009 changed the district’s
basic or essential nature, because new, substantial acreage (13,000
acres) outside of Lochbuie was proposed for district services.
¶ 34 Sand Hills argues that district boundary changes are not
material modifications. However, when the boundary change, as
here, involved local town-level approval of the inclusion of property
over which a county-level governing body has authority, the Act
protects the county from a special district including land within its
boundaries and imposing tax liability on property without the
county’s knowledge or approval. See § 32-1-207(2)(a). Because
special district action could unfairly burden county land previously
located outside of the special district, the Act requires notice to and
approval from the correct governing authority — here, Weld County.
¶ 35 Adding the 70 Ranch property, with only the Lochbuie Town
Council’s approval and without notice to, or consent from, Weld
County, materially altered the district’s 2004 plan and fell short of
the Act’s requirements. The 2004 plan clearly articulated a
localized effort to fund the Altamira Development. Moreover, the
17 district’s failure to even begin to provide any of the benefits
proposed by the 2004 plan, while imposing a mill levy on Taxpayers
beginning in 2009, exemplifies the sort of district action (or
inaction) that warrants oversight.4 Absent Weld County’s approval,
Sand Hills’ actions violated the Act.
¶ 36 Similarly, by adding the 70 Ranch property, located outside of
Lochbuie, the district could no longer rely on the narrow exception
in section 32-1-203(1) (for districts entirely within a municipality)
and had to get the Weld County Board of County Commissioners’
approval for material modifications to the service plan. See §§ 32-1-
203(1), -207(2)(a). Because the 2009 geographic shift constituted a
material modification of the service plan, the attempted execution of
the geographic inclusion, without approval from the Weld County
Board of County Commissioners, violated the Act. See §§ 32-1-
203(1), -207(2)(a).
4 The county would certainly have an interest in any mill levy imposed and could be concerned with the district’s compliance with other state law, such as the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights Amendment to the Colorado Constitution, see Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(1). Precisely because of these interests, the Act requires reporting to the county and includes potential sanctions for failure to do so. See § 32-1-209, C.R.S. 2016.
18 ¶ 37 In sum, the district’s geographical shifts, in 2009 and in 2011,
the district’s failure to implement the services articulated in the
2004 plan, and the district’s unilateral actions that effectively
expanded the 2004 plan without the appropriate government’s
approval constituted de facto material modifications to the 2004
plan and violated the Act.5 Because of this, the district did not have
taxing authority either between 2009 and 2011 or after 2011. We
therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment as it relates to Taxpayers’
motion for summary judgment for the time period after the 2011
geographical shift, but we reverse the trial court’s judgment as it
relates to Sand Hills’ motion for summary judgment for the time
period from 2009 until 2011.
3. Notice to the Subsurface Mineral Lessees
¶ 38 The parties and the trial court focus much argument and
analysis on whether owners of a subsurface mineral lease are
properly considered fee owners such that their approval is required
5 Sand Hills’ alleged compliance with sections 32-1-401 and -402(1)(d), C.R.S. 2016 (providing how a special district may alter its boundary by the inclusion of more property and stating that a change of boundary shall not affect the special district’s organization), does not justify its noncompliance with section 32-1- 207(2)(a), C.R.S. 2016.
19 for the inclusion of property within a special district pursuant to
section 32-1-401(1)(a). However, because we reach our conclusion
based solely on the fact that the district’s actions in 2009 and 2011
constituted material modifications of the service plan under section
32-1-207(2)(a), we need not determine the breadth of the term “fee
owner.”6 See Laleh v. Johnson, 2016 COA 4, ¶ 9 (a court need not
determine all issues when our resolution of another issues
concludes the matter) (cert. granted Sept. 6, 2016); Robertson v.
Westminster Mall Co., 43 P.3d 622, 628 (Colo. App. 2001) (court
does not render advisory opinions).
III. Appropriate Remedy
¶ 39 Sand Hills contends that the trial court erred by requiring it to
preserve funds paid by Taxpayers. We disagree.
¶ 40 At a status conference in April 2015, the trial court heard
argument about whether Taxpayers should have to pay taxes in
2014 and whether Sand Hills should be forced to hold the funds
6 We need not address the parties’ arguments regarding a court’s ability to dissolve a special district (which the trial court’s order did not do), separation of powers, or the Colorado Constitution. See Tyler v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 177 Colo. 188, 189, 493 P.2d 22, 23 (1972) (“When it is not necessary for the decision to test the constitutional questions raised, we do not so do.”).
20 they received pending the outcome of the case on appeal. At that
hearing, counsel for Sand Hills stated, with regard to taxes paid for
2014 and going forward,
[W]e understand the plaintiff’s concern and we are fully willing to hold these funds in a segregated account, and agree not to spend it, and agree to your entry of an order that directs us not to spend those funds . . . that is the solution that we think is the best one . . . we don’t object to Sand Hills holding those funds in a segregated account, pursuant to the order of the Court.
We therefore conclude that, as to taxes paid for 2014 and after,
Sand Hills acquiesced to the trial court’s action and failed to
properly preserve their argument. See Berra v. Springer &
Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 41 As to the preservation of funds relating to taxes paid for 2011
through 2013, Sand Hills preserved their objection in their written
motion.
¶ 42 After the court granted summary judgment in favor of
Taxpayers for the time period after April 28, 2011, the parties filed
written briefs on Taxpayers’ motion to preserve funds and assets
from tax years 2011 through 2013. The trial court ordered that,
“[t]o the extent the funds collected from the [Taxpayers] exist, the
21 Court orders that the funds be preserved.” Sand Hills argues that
this order amounted to a prejudgment writ of attachment. We agree
with Taxpayers that this order amounts to a stay of judgment
pending appeal; thus, we review for an abuse of discretion. See
Romero v. City of Fountain, 307 P.3d 120, 122 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 43 Having affirmed the trial court’s judgment as it related to the
2011 through 2013 tax years, we also conclude that the trial court’s
order preserving funds received for tax years 2011 through 2013 (to
the extent such funds existed) was not manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or contrary to law. Dickinson v. Lincoln Bldg.
Corp., 2015 COA 170M, ¶ 7. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. Id.
IV. Noble and Other Taxpayers
¶ 44 Noble was joined as an involuntary plaintiff in Taxpayers’
amended complaint below. Noble filed pleadings in the trial court
and a brief on appeal. It argues that it is similarly situated to
Taxpayers and that any relief granted to Taxpayers on appeal
should also extend to taxes paid by Noble. We agree.
¶ 45 From the beginning of this litigation, Noble has held itself out
as being similarly situated to Taxpayers — Noble paid taxes
22 following Sand Hills’ inclusion of the 70 Ranch property within the
district’s borders. However, the trial court’s summary judgment
order focused only on Taxpayers and did not mention Noble, other
than including it as an involuntary plaintiff on the order’s caption
page. We conclude that because Noble was involved throughout the
litigation below as a party similarly situated to Taxpayers, the relief
granted to Taxpayers applies to Noble. On remand, the trial court
shall consider Noble similar to Taxpayers and shall make rulings
accordingly.
¶ 46 However, nothing in the record indicates that other taxpayers
agreed to be represented in this litigation. See Prinster v. Dist.
Court, 137 Colo. 393, 397, 325 P.2d 938, 940 (1958) (generally, a
court avoids adjudicating the rights of parties not before it).
¶ 47 Accordingly, our conclusions here and the trial court’s rulings
apply to Bill Barrett Corporation, Bonanza Creek Energy, Inc., and
Noble Energy, Inc. as parties to this case.
V. Conclusion
¶ 48 The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The
case is remanded to the trial court to order the release of the
preserved funds for the 2011-2013 period and to enter a judgment
23 for funds collected from April 29, 2009, until April 28, 2011,
consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE BERNARD and JUDGE RICHMAN concur.