THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 BILAL JAMIL, et al., CASE NO. C24-1585-JCC 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER 11 v. 12 WINDERMERE REAL ESTATE SERVICES COMPANY, INC., et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ collective motions to dismiss (Dkt. 16 Nos. 20, 31). Having thoroughly considered the briefing and the relevant record, the Court 17 GRANTS the motions and DISMISSES Plaintiffs amended complaint (Dkt. No. 9) without 18 prejudice for the reasons explained herein. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 This case follows the termination of Plaintiffs’ home rental. According to the amended 21 complaint (Dkt. No. 9), which incorporates portions of Plaintiff’s originally filed complaint (Dkt. 22 No. 1), they rented a home from Defendant Windermere Real Estate Services Company, which 23 was managed by Defendant Christy Rice. (See Dkt. No. 9, at 4, 7.) While the complaint largely 24 contains conclusory statements of law, making key facts hard to discern, it would appear, at a 25 minimum, that Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in the following conduct: (1) failed to make 26 1 timely repairs to the property, (2) demanded that Plaintiffs vacate the property during Ramadan, 2 and (3) failed to return Plaintiffs’ entire rental security deposit. (Id. at 4, 10, 18.) Windermere 3 and Ms. Rice now move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) on the basis that Plaintiffs did not 4 timely serve them with either complaint. (See Dkt. Nos. 20, 31.)1 5 II. DISCUSSION 6 A plaintiff must effectuate service on a defendant within 90 days after filing the 7 complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1991). 8 And that service must be demonstrated through an affidavit (or “proof”) of service. Fed. R. Civ. 9 P. 4(l). If a defendant is not served within this period, the Court, on motion or on its own after 10 notice to the plaintiff, must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or (in its 11 discretion) order that service be made within a specified time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 12 Here, Plaintiffs first named Ms. Rice as a defendant on October 1, 2024. (See generally 13 Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Rice was then served on October 2, 2024, at 210 Summit 14 Ave. E. in Seattle, WA 98102. (Dkt. No. 28 at 1.) But the proof of service (which Plaintiffs only 15 recently filed) is dated much later: September 22, 2025. (Id. at 7.) Thus, even if service was 16 proper, the affidavit is untimely.2 See N.W. Laborers Employers Health & Sec. Tr. v. Pro Clean 17 NW LLC, 2024 WL 5075179, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2024). Nor would it appear that service 18 on Ms. Rice was proper. 19 To serve a defendant in their individual capacity, a plaintiff must effect service in 20 accordance with state law or through one of the following procedures: (1) delivering a copy of 21 the summons and complaint to the individual personally; (2) leaving a copy of each at the 22 1 Alternatively, Windermere moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), although the motion is 23 devoid of argument in support. (See generally Dkt. No. 31.) Because, as discussed below, the Court finds insufficient service of process as to each defendant, it will not address Windermere’s 24 alternative request. 25 2 See also Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that a failure to timely submit proof of service may be part of district court’s consideration in granting Rule 4 26 extensions). 1 individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode; or (3) providing a copy of each to an agent 2 authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1)–(2). 3 And under Washington law, a defendant can be served either personally or by leaving a copy of 4 the summons at the defendant’s usual abode with “some person of suitable age and discretion 5 then resident therein.” RCW 4.28.080(14). According to the affidavit, delivery of the summons 6 and complaint on Ms. Rice was made “to a person of suitable age” at Windermere’s “property 7 management office.” (Dkt. No. 28 at 7.) Meaning, it is not Ms. Rice’s abode but, perhaps, her 8 work. Thus, it needed to be served personally. Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th 9 Cir. 1987). And it was not. Accordingly, Ms. Rice was never properly served. Thus, service on 10 Ms. Rice is inadequate. 11 As to Windermere, Plaintiffs assert that they served the company at its “Property 12 Management[] business office” at 210 Summit Ave. E. in Seattle, Washington, 98102. (Dkt. No. 13 32 at 2.) But as Windermere points out, neither its corporate officers nor registered agent are 14 located where Plaintiffs attempted service. (Dkt. No. 33 at 2.) In support, Windermere provides a 15 screenshot of the Washington Secretary of State website illustrating that neither it nor its 16 statutory agent is located at the address where service was made.3 (Dkt. No. 33-1 at 5.) 17 To serve a corporate defendant, a plaintiff must comply with Federal Rule of Civil 18 Procedure 4(h). It provides that a plaintiff can affect service by delivering a copy of the 19 summons and complaint to an “officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent” 20 authorized by law. Fed R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). And under Washington law, in addition to personal 21 service on an officer, corporate service may also be made on a registered agent. RCW 22 23
24 3 Windermere requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Washington State Secretary of State website. This request is GRANTED because the Secretary of State website is not subject to 25 reasonable dispute. See, e.g., L’Garde, Inc. v. Raytheon Space and Airborne Sys., 805 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“A court must take judicial notice if a party requests it and 26 supplies the court with the requisite information.”). 1 23.95.450(1). Plaintiffs have failed to do any of the above as to Defendant Windermere. Thus, 2 service on Windemere is also inadequate. 3 Separately, Plaintiffs respond that Defendants, by entering a limited appearance here and 4 so moving for dismissal, waived their service of process defense. (See Dkt. No. 32 at 2.) Indeed, 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1) provides that a defense to insufficient service is waived 6 when a party appears and (1) raises the defense in a subsequent motion when it could have been 7 raised earlier; or (2) fails to make a motion under Rule 12 raising the defense. But neither applies 8 here—Defendants made only limited appearances. (See Dkt. Nos. 20 at 1, 31 at 1.) Nevertheless, 9 say Plaintiffs, Defendants waived service requirements by “extensively participating” in 10 litigation, including filing motions, declarations, proposed orders, a notice of appearance, and 11 substituting counsel. (See Dkt. No. 32 at 2.)4 None of these represent a general appearance. See 12 Martens v.
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THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 BILAL JAMIL, et al., CASE NO. C24-1585-JCC 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER 11 v. 12 WINDERMERE REAL ESTATE SERVICES COMPANY, INC., et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ collective motions to dismiss (Dkt. 16 Nos. 20, 31). Having thoroughly considered the briefing and the relevant record, the Court 17 GRANTS the motions and DISMISSES Plaintiffs amended complaint (Dkt. No. 9) without 18 prejudice for the reasons explained herein. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 This case follows the termination of Plaintiffs’ home rental. According to the amended 21 complaint (Dkt. No. 9), which incorporates portions of Plaintiff’s originally filed complaint (Dkt. 22 No. 1), they rented a home from Defendant Windermere Real Estate Services Company, which 23 was managed by Defendant Christy Rice. (See Dkt. No. 9, at 4, 7.) While the complaint largely 24 contains conclusory statements of law, making key facts hard to discern, it would appear, at a 25 minimum, that Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in the following conduct: (1) failed to make 26 1 timely repairs to the property, (2) demanded that Plaintiffs vacate the property during Ramadan, 2 and (3) failed to return Plaintiffs’ entire rental security deposit. (Id. at 4, 10, 18.) Windermere 3 and Ms. Rice now move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) on the basis that Plaintiffs did not 4 timely serve them with either complaint. (See Dkt. Nos. 20, 31.)1 5 II. DISCUSSION 6 A plaintiff must effectuate service on a defendant within 90 days after filing the 7 complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1991). 8 And that service must be demonstrated through an affidavit (or “proof”) of service. Fed. R. Civ. 9 P. 4(l). If a defendant is not served within this period, the Court, on motion or on its own after 10 notice to the plaintiff, must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or (in its 11 discretion) order that service be made within a specified time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 12 Here, Plaintiffs first named Ms. Rice as a defendant on October 1, 2024. (See generally 13 Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiffs assert that Ms. Rice was then served on October 2, 2024, at 210 Summit 14 Ave. E. in Seattle, WA 98102. (Dkt. No. 28 at 1.) But the proof of service (which Plaintiffs only 15 recently filed) is dated much later: September 22, 2025. (Id. at 7.) Thus, even if service was 16 proper, the affidavit is untimely.2 See N.W. Laborers Employers Health & Sec. Tr. v. Pro Clean 17 NW LLC, 2024 WL 5075179, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2024). Nor would it appear that service 18 on Ms. Rice was proper. 19 To serve a defendant in their individual capacity, a plaintiff must effect service in 20 accordance with state law or through one of the following procedures: (1) delivering a copy of 21 the summons and complaint to the individual personally; (2) leaving a copy of each at the 22 1 Alternatively, Windermere moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), although the motion is 23 devoid of argument in support. (See generally Dkt. No. 31.) Because, as discussed below, the Court finds insufficient service of process as to each defendant, it will not address Windermere’s 24 alternative request. 25 2 See also Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that a failure to timely submit proof of service may be part of district court’s consideration in granting Rule 4 26 extensions). 1 individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode; or (3) providing a copy of each to an agent 2 authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1)–(2). 3 And under Washington law, a defendant can be served either personally or by leaving a copy of 4 the summons at the defendant’s usual abode with “some person of suitable age and discretion 5 then resident therein.” RCW 4.28.080(14). According to the affidavit, delivery of the summons 6 and complaint on Ms. Rice was made “to a person of suitable age” at Windermere’s “property 7 management office.” (Dkt. No. 28 at 7.) Meaning, it is not Ms. Rice’s abode but, perhaps, her 8 work. Thus, it needed to be served personally. Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th 9 Cir. 1987). And it was not. Accordingly, Ms. Rice was never properly served. Thus, service on 10 Ms. Rice is inadequate. 11 As to Windermere, Plaintiffs assert that they served the company at its “Property 12 Management[] business office” at 210 Summit Ave. E. in Seattle, Washington, 98102. (Dkt. No. 13 32 at 2.) But as Windermere points out, neither its corporate officers nor registered agent are 14 located where Plaintiffs attempted service. (Dkt. No. 33 at 2.) In support, Windermere provides a 15 screenshot of the Washington Secretary of State website illustrating that neither it nor its 16 statutory agent is located at the address where service was made.3 (Dkt. No. 33-1 at 5.) 17 To serve a corporate defendant, a plaintiff must comply with Federal Rule of Civil 18 Procedure 4(h). It provides that a plaintiff can affect service by delivering a copy of the 19 summons and complaint to an “officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent” 20 authorized by law. Fed R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). And under Washington law, in addition to personal 21 service on an officer, corporate service may also be made on a registered agent. RCW 22 23
24 3 Windermere requests that the Court take judicial notice of the Washington State Secretary of State website. This request is GRANTED because the Secretary of State website is not subject to 25 reasonable dispute. See, e.g., L’Garde, Inc. v. Raytheon Space and Airborne Sys., 805 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“A court must take judicial notice if a party requests it and 26 supplies the court with the requisite information.”). 1 23.95.450(1). Plaintiffs have failed to do any of the above as to Defendant Windermere. Thus, 2 service on Windemere is also inadequate. 3 Separately, Plaintiffs respond that Defendants, by entering a limited appearance here and 4 so moving for dismissal, waived their service of process defense. (See Dkt. No. 32 at 2.) Indeed, 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1) provides that a defense to insufficient service is waived 6 when a party appears and (1) raises the defense in a subsequent motion when it could have been 7 raised earlier; or (2) fails to make a motion under Rule 12 raising the defense. But neither applies 8 here—Defendants made only limited appearances. (See Dkt. Nos. 20 at 1, 31 at 1.) Nevertheless, 9 say Plaintiffs, Defendants waived service requirements by “extensively participating” in 10 litigation, including filing motions, declarations, proposed orders, a notice of appearance, and 11 substituting counsel. (See Dkt. No. 32 at 2.)4 None of these represent a general appearance. See 12 Martens v. Winder, 341 F.2d 197, 200 (9th Cir. 1965) (“Appellant contends that if in fact 13 appellee’s defense of improper service is meritorious, he has nevertheless waived his objection 14 by proceeding to contest the suit by filing motions for more definite statements, motions to 15 dismiss on grounds other than a lack of in personam jurisdiction, and by directing interrogatories 16 to the appellant. But such a contention ignores the express language and purpose of Rule 12 . . . 17 .”) (italics added). And because neither Defendant has made a general appearance, they have not 18 waived Rule 4’s service requirements. Plaintiffs’ waiver argument is meritless. 19 Finally, Plaintiffs also ask that, even if service was imperfect, the Court should extend the 20 time for service pursuant to Rule 4(m). (Dkt. No. 32 at 1.) Indeed, the Court must “grant an 21 extension of time if good cause is shown.” Mann v. Am. Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090 n.2 (9th 22
4 In support, Plaintiffs rely on Benny v. Pipes and Jackson v. Hayakawa, but neither of these 23 authorities stand for the proposition advanced by Plaintiffs. (See id. at 4) (citing 799 F.2d 489 24 (9th Cir. 1986); 682 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1982)). In Benny, the Ninth Circuit held that general appearances (such as requesting additional time to respond to plaintiff’s complaint) can waive an 25 objection to service under Rule 4. 799 F.2d at 492. And the court in Jackson held that voluntary general appearances (including filing an answer to the plaintiff’s complaint) waive objections to 26 service. 682 F.2d at 1347. But that is not what happened here. 1 Cir. 2003). But it is a plaintiff’s burden to establish good cause. Tucker v. City of Santa Monica, 2 2013 WL 653996 slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. 2013). And Plaintiffs here fail to do so here.5 3 III. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(5) motions (Dkt. 5 Nos. 20, 31) and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Dkt. No. 9) without prejudice. 6 7 DATED this 12th day of February 2026. A 8 9 10 John C. Coughenour 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
25 5 The Court considered the following in making this determination: (1) a statute of limitations bar; (2) prejudice to the defendants; (3) actual notice of the action; and (4) eventual service. Efaw 26 v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).