Bigge Equipment Co. v. Maxpeed Int'l Transport Co.

229 F. Supp. 2d 977, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21380
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedFebruary 6, 2002
DocketC 01-3011 MJJ. No. C 01-1071 MJJ
StatusPublished

This text of 229 F. Supp. 2d 977 (Bigge Equipment Co. v. Maxpeed Int'l Transport Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bigge Equipment Co. v. Maxpeed Int'l Transport Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 977, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21380 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

Opinion

*978 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MARINE TERMINAL CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JENKINS, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

• Before- the Court is Defendant Marine Terminal Corporation’s (“MTC”) motion for summary judgment to limit its liability to $500. The motion requires the Court to determine whether Plaintiffs Bigge Equipment Co. and Dongbu Insurance Co., Ltd. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are subject to the limitation of liability of $500 for damages allegedly caused to cargo, in part, by MTC. For the reasons stated below, MTC’s motion is GRANTED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Link-Machinery Co., Ltd. (“Link”) sold Plaintiff Bigge Equipment Co. (“Bigge”) one 1987 Samsung-Todano truck crane, model CX300R. The cargo was delivered to Defendant Maxpeed International Transport Co., Ltd. (“Maxpeed”), a non-vessel operating common carrier (“NVOCC”) 1 who issued a bill of lading to Link. See Complaint, Exh. 1 (“Maxpeed BOL”). Bigge was the consignee of the Maxpeed BOL. Maxpeed then delivered the cargo to Defendant Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd. (“Hanjin”), the entity which would actually transport the cargo across the ocean. At that time, Hanjin-issued a bill of lading to Maxpeed. See Declaration of Laura Davis In Support of MTC’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 1 (“Hanjin BOL”). It is undisputed that Bigge is not expressly named in the Han-jin BOL.

On or about October 7, 2000, the cargo was shipped from Pusan, Republic of Korea for delivery by sea to Oakland, California, to Bigge in the same good order and condition. It was, however, damaged and Plaintiffs brought suit seeking damages in the amount of $144,422.50 against, among others, MTC as bailee, warehouseman, and terminal operator. See Complaint at 2.

MTC now moves for summary judgment on the issue of damages, claiming that liability for damage to cargo is limited to $500 per package, 2 and that the liability extends to MTC as the bailee, warehouseman and terminal operator. MTC relies on two sources to support its position that Lability is limited: (1) the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (“COGSA”), 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 1300 et seq.; and (2) the express terms of the Hanjin BOL. See generally 46 U.S.C.App. § 1304(5); 3 see Hanjin BOL at section 16(b)(ii). 4 This limitation applies, according to MTC, unless *979 the nature and value of the cargo was declared in writing before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading. See id. MTC contends that here Bigge made no such declaration on the case of the Hanjin BOL. See Hanjin BOL at 1 (showing a blank space following the terms “optional declared value for increased foreign charges to avoid package limitation: US$_”)• MTC further contends that both COGSA and the Hanjin BOL cover MTC as the bailee, warehouseman, and terminal operator through a provision in the Hanjin BOL, known as the Himalaya Clause, which extends all limitations of liability in the bill of lading to others. See Hanjin BOL at section 6(a) (stating “every servant, agent and subcontractor ... and the agents of each shall have the benefit of all provisions herein for the benefit of the Carrier as if the provisions were expressly for their benefit .... ”).

Plaintiffs oppose MTC’s motion, arguing that the Maxpeed BOL, as opposed to the Hanjin BOL, applies. The basis for the application of the Maxpeed BOL is that Hanjin accepted cargo from Maxpeed, knowing and bound to the terms of the Maxpeed BOL. As a result, according to Plaintiffs MTC, as a subcontractor hired by Hanjin, is also bound. This is significant because the Maxpeed BOL contains a provision limiting liability to “2 SDR per kilo of gross weight of the goods lost or damages, 5 unless, within the consent of the Freight Forwarder, the Merchant has declared a higher value for the goods .... ” See Salentine Deck, Exh. 4 (“Terms and Condition of Maxpeed BOL”) at section 8.3. Plaintiffs, in making their argument, concede that the limitations of liability in the Maxpeed BOL extend to MTC as the bailee, warehouseman, and terminal operator. 6 See Opposition at 6 (citing Terms and Conditions of Maxpeed BOL (stating that “[servants and sub-contractors] shall be entitled to avail himself of the defences [sic.] and limits of liability which [Max-peed] is entitled to invoke under these Conditions.”)).

MTC retorts that it does not matter which bill of lading applies, only that COG-SA applies to impose a $500 limitation on liability for damage. Moreover, MTC contends that Plaintiffs are bound by the terms of the Hanjin BOL, having sued pursuant to its terms, and because Plaintiffs claim to be third party beneficiaries to the Hanjin BOL, expressly named as a third party through the BOL’s use of the term “merchant,” which is defined as including the “shipper, consignor, consignee, owner and receiver of the goods and their agents.” See Hanjin BOL at section 1.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If *980 the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains may be discharged by demonstrating that “there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). Nor must the moving party support his or her own motion with evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. See id.

To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact in dispute. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
229 F. Supp. 2d 977, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21380, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bigge-equipment-co-v-maxpeed-intl-transport-co-cand-2002.