Biggans v. Buchannan
This text of Biggans v. Buchannan (Biggans v. Buchannan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
KIMBERLY BIGGANS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) C.A. No. N25C-11-058 FWW v. ) ) TRACY BUCHANNAN claims adjuster ) and DOUGLAS T. WALSH, ) ) Defendants. )
Submitted: January 2, 2026 Decided: March 18, 2026
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss GRANTED
ORDER
Kimberly Biggans, 2204 Jamaica Drive, Wilmington, DE 19810, Plaintiff, pro se.
Aaron E. Moore, Esquire, MARSHALL DENNEHEY, P.C., 1 Righter Parkway, Suite 301, Wilmington, DE 19803, Attorney for Defendant Douglas T. Walsh.
WHARTON, J. This 18th day of March, 2026, upon consideration of the Motion to Dismiss
of Defendant Douglas T. Walsh (“Walsh”), 1 Kimberly Biggans’ (“Biggans”)
Response, 2 and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:
1. On November 10, 2025, Biggans filed her handwritten pro se
Complaint naming Walsh and Tracy Buchannan (“Buchannan”) as defendants.3
Buchannan is identified as a claims adjuster in the caption of the Complaint. The
Complaint appears to be a follow-on to prior litigation in which Biggans was the
Plaintiff. In that case, Kimberly Biggans v. T & F Logistics et al.,4 Biggans, who
was represented by counsel initially, alleged that she had been injured by the
defendants when they negligently lost control of a refrigerator they were removing
from her residence causing it to fall on her.5 Apparently, Biggans and her attorney
had a falling out and he was allowed to withdraw.6 Biggans was unable to find
substitute counsel.7 Ultimately, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of
1 Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 10. 2 Pl.’s Resp., D.I. 11. 3 Complaint, D.I. 1. 4 N17C-11-062 DCS. 5 Id. at D.I. 1. 6 Id. at D.I. 36, 42. 7 Id. at D.I. 52. 2 the defendants due to Biggans inability to procure a liability expert.8 Walsh
represented the defendants in that case. 9
2. The current Complaint rehashes some of that history.10 The Complaint
mentions that Walsh had expressed a desire to Biggans’ then-attorney to have his
own liability expert view the site of the incident, but never followed through with
that.11 Instead, he moved for summary judgment when Biggans failed to produce a
liability expert.12 The Complaint concludes with Biggans stating that “to my
knowledge ‘I never gave consent on filing a claim,”’ and ‘“Suing’ is against ‘my
morals.’” 13 Nowhere in the Complaint does Biggans offer a theory of liability or a
claim for damages.
3. Walsh moves to dismiss under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. 14 Walsh interprets the Complaint as one for legal malpractice
and cites authority in support of dismissal.15 The Court is not so sure, but it is as
good an interpretation of the Complaint as any. The thrust of Walsh’s argument is
the common sense proposition that an attorney cannot be liable for legal malpractice
8 Id. at D.I. 67. 9 Id. at D.I. 7. 10 D. I. 1. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 D.I. 10. 15 Id. at ⁋⁋ 11-16. 3 for a claim made by someone the attorney never represented. 16 In her Response,
Biggans claims she is attempting to collect a debt, but the Response appears to be
just a more expansive recitation of what transpired in the earlier case.17
4. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Superior
Court Rule 12(b)(6) will not be granted if the “plaintiff may recover under any
reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof under the
complaint.”18 The Court's review is limited to the well-pled allegations in the
complaint.19 In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “must draw all reasonable
factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.” 20 Dismissal is
warranted “only if it appears with reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could not
prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief.”21
5. The pleading standards governing a motion to dismiss in Delaware are
minimal.22 Delaware is a notice pleading jurisdiction, and a complaint need only
16 Id. 17 Pl.’s Resp., D.I. 11. Biggans identifies the case as a debt action on the Civil Case Information Sheet, D.I. 1. 18 Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949, 950 (Del. 1990). 19 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005). 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 See Central Mort. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mort. Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 536 (Del. 2011). 4 “give general notice as to the nature of the claim asserted against the defendant in
order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim.”23
6. The Complaint here fails to meet even that low bar. It makes no legally
cognizable claim in contract, tort, debt, or any other cause of action by which claims
may be brought in this Court. It literally fails to state a claim of any sort. Superior
Court Civil Rule 8(a) provides, that a claim for relief “shall contain (1) a short and
plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief and (2) a demand
for judgment for the relief to which the party deems itself entitled.”24 Biggans
Complaint does neither.
THEREFORE, Defendant Douglas T. Walsh’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton Ferris W. Wharton, J.
23 Nye v. Univ. of Del., 2003 WL 22176412, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2003); see also Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a)(1). 24 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a). 5
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