Bigelow v. Igwe

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedApril 14, 2021
Docket2:19-cv-05496
StatusUnknown

This text of Bigelow v. Igwe (Bigelow v. Igwe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bigelow v. Igwe, (D. Ariz. 2021).

Opinion

1 WO SH 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Roy Bigelow, No. CV 19-05496-PHX-MTL (ESW) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Dorothy Igwe, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Plaintiff Roy Bigelow, who is currently confined in Arizona State Prison Complex- 16 Florence, East Unit, brought this civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On 17 screening the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court 18 determined that Plaintiff stated Eighth Amendment medical claims against Defendants 19 Igwe and Starling in their individual capacities, Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) 20 Director Shinn in his official capacity, and against private healthcare contractors Corizon 21 and Centurion. (Doc. 8.) The Court directed these Defendants to answer and dismissed 22 the remaining claims and Defendants. (Doc. 8.) 23 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 24 (Doc. 78), which Defendants oppose (Doc. 89). 25 I. Legal Standard 26 “A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should 27 not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’” 28 Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 1 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 2 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted) (“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 3 never awarded as of right”). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show that 4 (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm without 5 an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) an injunction is in the 6 public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “But if a plaintiff can only show that there are 7 ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the 8 merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips 9 sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Shell 10 Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance 11 for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). Under this serious 12 questions variant of the Winter test, “[t]he elements . . . must be balanced, so that a stronger 13 showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Lopez, 680 F.3d at 14 1072. 15 Regardless of which standard applies, the movant “has the burden of proof on each 16 element of the test.” See Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 17 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Further, there is a heightened burden where a plaintiff seeks a 18 mandatory preliminary injunction, which should not be granted “unless the facts and law 19 clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th 20 Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 21 The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements on prisoner 22 litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials and requires that 23 any injunctive relief be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct 24 the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2); see Gilmore v. People of the State of Cal., 220 F.3d 987, 25 999 (9th Cir. 2000). 26 . . . 27 . . . 28 . . . 1 II. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 2 A. Parties’ Contentions 3 In his Motion, Plaintiff seeks an Order directing Defendants to provide him with 4 anti-viral medications to treat his Hepatitis C and to stop interfering with his specialist’s 5 recommendations for surgical repair of Plaintiff’s gallbladder leak. (Doc. 78.) Plaintiff 6 asserts that the ADC’s “Hepatitis C Protocol deliberately delays treatment for Hepatitis C 7 through the administration of [anti-viral drugs]” by “bar[ring] those without vast fibrosis 8 or cirrhosis from being approved for treatment with [anti-viral] medications.” (Id. ¶¶ 15– 9 16.) Plaintiff also asserts that “delaying treatment for patients until they develop advanced 10 liver disease leads to significant suffering, increased risk of cancer, need for liver 11 transplants, and death.” (Id. ¶ 25.) 12 Plaintiff states that he suffers from the following Hepatitis C-related symptoms: 13 fatigue, exhaustion, stomach aches, kidney pains, liver pain, anxiety, muscle weakness, 14 constipation, and “poison-like symptoms.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff also states that several 15 Incident Command System (ICS) emergencies have been activated after he has been found 16 unresponsive, delirious, suffered a seizure, and he has been bed-ridden for months. (Id. ¶ 17 28.) Plaintiff asserts that he was taken to the hospital on January 31, 2020 and was advised 18 that his “gallbladder was leaking due to a large hole” and that he would be transferred to 19 another hospital for emergency surgery, but the surgery was cancelled by Centurion. (Id. 20 ¶¶ 29–30.) 21 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants denied him treatment for Hepatitis C “pursuant to 22 policy, not because of any medical exclusions.” (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff argues that he “has 23 fibrosis and was denied [anti-viral] medications because he does not have cirrhosis or vast 24 fibrosis. (Id. at 8.) 25 In response, Defendants present the following evidence of Plaintiff’s medical 26 treatment. (See Doc. 89-1 at 2–6 (Orm Decl.).) On July 1, 2019, Centurion became the 27 contracted healthcare provider for ADC prisons. (Id. ¶ 5.) The determination for treatment 28 prioritization for ADC prisoners diagnosed with Hepatitis C is made according to the 1 prisoner’s fibrosis score. (Id. ¶ 8.) Prisoners with fibrosis scores of F3 and F4 are 2 prioritized for treatment. (Id.) Prisoners with fibrosis scores of F1 or F2 may also be 3 considered for treatment if there is a co-infection, such as Hepatitis B or HIV or other co- 4 morbid condition, which increases health risk or may hinder or complicate future treatment 5 of either condition. (Id.) 6 Prisoners who are deemed a high priority for treatment based on fibrosis score will 7 also undergo further workup to assess for underlying cirrhosis, so that a safe and 8 appropriate treatment recommendation can be made. (Id. ¶ 9.) Additionally, Centurion 9 has a Hepatitis C Specialist who advises regarding testing and treatment of the higher 10 priority patients as well as a Hepatitis C Committee to additionally review and assess 11 Hepatitis C infected patients. (Id. ¶ 10.) 12 Centurion follows the ADC Hepatitis C Guidelines, which are consistent with the 13 American Association for the Study of Liver Diseases and Infectious Diseases Society of 14 America (AASLD/IDSA) Guidelines. (Id.

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