Bigelow v. Gillott

123 Mass. 102, 1877 Mass. LEXIS 219

• Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
• Decided: July 3, 1877
• Status: Published

Opinion

Morton, J.

The presiding justice who heard this case has found as facts, that the testator erased the sixth and thirteenth clauses of his will after its execution, and that such erasures were made with the intention of revoking the said clauses, but with no intention of revoking or defeating the other provisions of the will. These findings were clearly justified by the evidence. We need not consider the evidence in detail, as the appellants do not contend that the findings were erroneous, the only questions raised by them being as to the legal effect of such erasures.

The statute provides that “ no will shall be revoked, unless by burning, tearing, cancelling or obliterating the same, with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some person in his presence and by his direction; or by some other will, codicil or writing, signed, attested and subscribed, in the manner provided for making a will.” Gen. Sts. a. 92, § 11. This provision is a reenactment of the Rev. Sts. a. 62, § 9, with merely unimportant verbal changes. The Rev. Sts. made material changes in the law as to wills, doing away with the distinctions between wills affecting real, and wills affecting personal, property, and putting all upon the same footing. The St. of 1783, e. 24, § 2, permitted the revocation of a devise of land, “ or any clause thereof,” in the manner pointed out in the statute, which was the same manner now provided for the revocation of a will.

We see nothing to indicate that the Legislature, in the revision of 1836, intended to change the law in this respect and to limit the power of revocation to a revocation of the whole will. The power to revoke a will includes the power to revoke any part of it. If we were to hold that under this provision a testator could not revoke a part of a will by cancelling or obliterating it, we should be obliged by the same rule of construction to hold that he could not revoke a part by a codicil, which would be against the uniform practice in this Commonwealth, sanctioned by numerous decisions.

We are therefore of opinion that, in this case, the cancellation by the testator of the sixth and thirteenth clauses of his will, by drawing lines through them, with the intention of revoking them, was a legal revocation of those clauses.

The remaining question is as to the effect of this revocation upon the property affected by the revoked clauses. The appellants contend that the property devised and bequeathed therein is to be treated as intestate property, which goes to the heirs at law or distributees ; and the executors and trustees contend that t passes to them under the residuary clause of the will.

It is a clearly settled rule of law that, in a will of personal property, a general residuary bequest carries to the residuary legatee all the personal property of the testator which is not otherwise disposed of by the will, including all lapsed legacies and all void legacies. And in this Commonwealth, since the passage of the Rev. Sts. in 1836, the same rule applies to wills of real estate. Thayer v. Wellington, 9 Allen, 283, and cases úted. It is true that if a special bequest in a will lapses or fails for any reason, the sum bequeathed will not pass to the residuary legatee if it appears from the will that it was the ini ention of the testator to exclude it from the residuary clause In Thayer v. Wellington, ubi supra, the court say: “We take the rule to be that a general residuary clause passes all the estate of the testator not otherwise disposed of, unless it is manifestly contradictory to the declared purpose of the testator, as found in other parts of the will. There must be a clear intention that in no event it shall pass to the residuary devisee.”

In this case, there is nothing to indicate an intention on the part of the testator that the property covered by the revoked clauses should not go to the residuary devisees. The residuary clause is expressed in the broadest terms. “ I give, bequeath and devise all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate of every description, of which I shall die seised and possessed.” The intention of the testator is clear, to give all his property, not otherwise disposed of by the will, to the trustees named therein, for the support of the charity established by the nineteenth clause. He revoked the sixth and thirteenth clauses, and purposely and intelligently left the other provisions to stand as his will. The only fair inference is that he intended that the property covered by those clauses, and which by his revocation became undisposed of by the other clauses of the will, should fall within the residuary clause. We are of opinion that this case ■falls within the general rule, and that the property in question passes to the residuary devisees.

The argument of the appellants, that this view is in conflict with the provisions of law which require that a will disposing of property should be executed in the presence of three witnesses, is not sound. It is true that the act of revocation need not be done in the presence of witnesses ; but such act does not dispose of the property. It is disposed of by the residuary clause, which is executed with all the formalitieá required in the execution of a testamentary disposition of property.

Decree of Probate Court affirmed.