Big Four Implement Co. v. Keyser

161 P. 592, 99 Kan. 8
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedNovember 11, 1916
Docket19,958
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 161 P. 592 (Big Four Implement Co. v. Keyser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Big Four Implement Co. v. Keyser, 161 P. 592, 99 Kan. 8 (kan 1916).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Johnston, C. J.:

This was an action by creditors to subject a fund to which they had contributed to the payment of their claims.

J. F. Keyser and his sons, W. D. and W. O. Keyser, were engaged in the hardware business at Wakefield. On July 22, 1911, J. F. Keyser died, leaving as his only heirs his widow, Maggie Keyser, the two sons mentioned, and two daughters who had not yet reached majority. On August 5, 1911, the widow was appointed administratrix of the estate, and on August 28, 1911, W. D. Keyser qualified as surviving partner, giving bond with G. A. Siemers and D. H. Faulkner as sureties. The property of the deceased consisted of little more than his interest in the partnership business. W. D. Keyser had put into the business about $700, and W. O. Keyser had contributed nothing except his services in carrying on the business for which wages were paid. The invoice of the stock of goods taken after the death of J. F. Keyser, showed that there were goods on hand of the value of $8342.22, cash $1378.03, notes aggregating $1173.50, and open accounts due the firm $1876.56, the entire stock and assets of the firm amounting to $12,770.31. The firm was then indebted to the extent of $6072.44. Sometime after W. D. Keyser took charge of the stock he paid off this indebtedness, but instead of selling the stock in bulk he conducted the business substantially as it had been done prior to the death of his father, and his brother W. O. Keyser continued to assist in carrying on the business as he had formerly done. Some new goods were purchased from time to time to take the place of those that were sold, and in transacting the business checks and other documents were signed sometimes in the old firm name and sometimes as Keyser & Sons. Mrs. Keyser and her daughter as well as the families of both sons were supported from the proceeds of the store. In July, 1913, W. D. Keyser gave notice that he would *10 make a settlement of the partnership estate, and did file what purported to be a final account of his administration; but shortly afterwards he disappeared and settlement was not made. Mrs. Keyser, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, also gave notice of a final settlement of the estate, which was not made. After the abandonment of the business by W. D. Keyser, Mrs. Keyser and her son W. O. Keyser executed an assignment of all the stock and assets of the firm to William Jevons as trustee for the creditors, and this instrument was signed by “W. O. Keyser,” “Maggie Keyser” and “Keyser & Sons by Maggie Keyser, a member of said partnership.” Under the assignment Jevons took possession of the store, sold goods, bought some new goods, and also collected outstanding accounts and paid debts. After he had been in possession of the property about two months the probate court directed the administratrix to take charge of the store and the assets of the estate, and thereupon Jevons surrendered possession of the goods and all of the assets of the business to her. An inventory was then made and a little later a sale of the goods was effected, the proceeds from which, with the cash on hand and open accounts, amounted to . $4851.60. From this amount the administratrix was directed to make a payment of $513.20 (but whether it was upon claims or fees is not disclosed) , leaving a balance of $4348.40. She was about to distribute this balance among the heirs of the deceased when this action was brought.

G. A. Siemers and D. H. Faulkner intervened in the action, claiming the rights of creditors. The surviving partner had induced them to sign a note with Keyser & Sons upon the representation that he desired to pay off the claims of the minor heirs. Instead of doing that, it is alleged that the surviving partner placed the money obtained upon the note in his banking account and drew it out from time to time in carrying on the hardware business. The Wakefield bank, in which the $1500 was deposited and from which it was drawn, also intervened with a view of obtaining an allowance for the same claim.

Upon the testimony the court, after allowing the claims of the creditors, held that the fund derived from the sale of the goods should be subjected to the payment of the creditors, and *11 a receiver was appointed to make distribution. The claims of Siemers and Faulkner as well as that of the bank of Wakefield were denied; and these intervenors and the Keysers appeal from the judgment rendered.

It is contended that the surviving partner and those associated with him could not bind the estate for the goods purchased and the liabilities created after the death of J. F. Keyser. It is true, as the defendants contend, that death works a dissolution of the partnership, but the community of interest subsists in a way for the time necessary to wind up the partnership business. In section 344 of the seventh edition of Story on Partnership, it is said:

“Although, as to future dealings the partnership is determined by the death of one partner, yet for some purposes it may be said to subsist, and the rights, duties, powers and authorities of the survivors remain; so far as is necessary to enable them to wind up and settle the affairs of the partnership.”

The settlement of the partnership estate devolves primarily on the surviving partner where he' elects to undertake it, and if he does not, .then upon the administratrix of the estate. (Gen. Stat. 1909, § 3467.) It was the duty of the surviving partner who assumed the task in this case to wind up the business within a reasonable time and in the way most advantageous to those interested in the estate, and after paying the debts and the expenses of winding up the business, to distribute the assets among the surviving partners and the representative of the deceased partner. The surviving partner is vested with some discretion as to the manner of closing the business and the time to be taken for that purpose. He may continue the business long enough to close it up without sacrificing the assets and long enough to make an advantageous disposition of the stock. (Frey v. Eisenhardt, 116 Mich. 160.) The statute contemplates that considerable time may be necessary, as the bond required of the surviving partner provides that the partnership business shall be wound up and the debts paid and the surplus fund distributed within two years, unless a longer time is allowed by the court. (Gen. Stat. 1909, § 3468.) In some cases a bulk sale of merchandise may be the better method, while in others a sale of the goods in the usual . course of trade may be to the advantage of the interested par *12 ties. In the latter case some articles may be purchased and added to the stock in order to make it more salable and to facilitate an advantageous disposition of the whole. When this is done in good faith the goods purchased as well as the reasonable expenses incurred in carrying on and winding up the business may be paid from the funds derived from the sale. (Central Trust & Safe Deposit Co., &c. v. Respass, 112 Ky. 606; Calvert v. Miller, 94 N. Car. 600; Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
161 P. 592, 99 Kan. 8, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/big-four-implement-co-v-keyser-kan-1916.