Bien v. Hess

102 F. 436, 42 C.C.A. 421, 1900 U.S. App. LEXIS 4567
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedMay 28, 1900
DocketNo. 28
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 102 F. 436 (Bien v. Hess) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bien v. Hess, 102 F. 436, 42 C.C.A. 421, 1900 U.S. App. LEXIS 4567 (2d Cir. 1900).

Opinion

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge.

There is no disputé as to the lease, assignment, rent, etc.; the only questions arise upon breach of covenant to keep the premises in proper repair.

In directing the verdict the trial judge said:

“1 am of the opinion that the lessor under the lease was hound to keep the premises in proper repair, to render them tenantable for the uses and purposes for which, by the lease, it was contemplated they would be occupied. The covenant of the lease in this respect is somewhat vague, and there is some reason, perhaps, for the position taken by the plaintiff in this case, that the terms were not such as to compel the lessor to make ihe repairs. However, from that view I differ. But: I am of the opinion that there is not sufficient compel out evidence to enable the jury to ascertain what the damages were. The only damages which the law recognizes in such a case is the extent of the diminution of the value of (ho leased premises during the time when the repairs were not made, and we are given no filing here liy which we may determine how much that was. The lessee claims that, because his landlord has not repaired the premises according to the covenant of Ms lease, he can recover for all damages to his business, consequential and remote. But he cannot recover such damages. The law does not recognize that rule of damages. It would open the door to too many uncertainties altogether. If the repairs are of a trilling nature, then the lessee has a right to make them, and deduct the cost from the rent; if they are of a serious nature, then he is entitled i.o recover for the impaired rental value of the premises during the time of the existence of the breach. That is too measure of damages, and no other, and there is no evidence in ibis case by which wo can determine that; so I direct the jury to lind a verdict for the plaintiff.”

Many of the matters originally in dispute are, upon this review, to be taken as decided in favor of the defendant. Thus, it will be assumed that the lessor was bound to keep the premises in repair and tenantable; that for part of the time he failed to do so as to a substantial portion of the premises; and that the repairs were not of such a trifling character as to warrant the restriction of recovery for damages to the cost of making them.

The measure of damages adopted by the circuit judge, viz. the impaired rental value of the premises during the time of the existence [438]*438of the breach, is sanctioned by the authorities quoted by both sides. In Cook v. Soule, 56 N. Y. 420, the leaky roof of a stable was held a breach of the covenant to repair. Evidence was given tending to show the value of the use of the premises in the condition they were, and what they would have been worth if in good repair, and also (under exception) further evidence showing that because of the leaks wagons and harness were injured. The general term (1 Thomp. & C. 116) sustained the admission of the evidence excepted to on the ground that the. jury might allow as damages either the difference in value of the use of the premises or the injury to the tenant’s property, but the court of appeals repudiated such a rule, although they held the evidence admissible on other grounds. “The only rule of damages given to the jury * * * was the difference in value of the use of the premises as they were and as plaintiff agreed to put them. * * * That the rule of damages is correct was determined by this court in Myers v. Burns, 35 N. Y. 269.” In the case last referred to there was a lease of hotel property. During some portion of the time four rooms, through a defect in the flues of the chimney, were of no use to defendant. The court of appeals approved a charge that defendant was entitled to counterclaim “the fair value of the use of such rooms for the time they were unoccupied:” In Hexter v. Knox, 63 N. Y. 561, the lessee of the Prescott House, a hotel property, brought an action to recover damages for .breach of contract to complete a new building and for failure to make repairs, by reason whereof certain rooms were untenantable. It was held that the lessee was entitled to the rental value of the rooms for hotel purposes during the time he was deprived of them by the default of the lessor, and that as to such of the rooms for which plaintiff had furniture he was entitled to damages based upon the value of their use as furnished rooms.

Two questions, therefore, are presented: First, whether there was evidence in the case from which the jury might determine the value of the use of the premises as they were and the value as they would have been had they been kept in proper repair, or, in other words, what was the rental value, for the purposes of the manufacturing business which defendant carried on, of that part of the premises of which, by reason of the lessor’s neglect, it temporarily lost the use; and, second, whether evidence was improperly excluded from which, with that already in the case, the jury might have determined such value.,

The theory of defendant is shown by the request to go to the jury with which it supplemented the exception to direction of verdict for plaintiff:

“That the defendant in this action has proved that he was deprived front the use and possession of the premises between December, 1896, and May, 1897, at least twenty per cent., and that, the rent being fixed by the terms of the'lease, the jury have the right to determine the amount of damages during that time.”

There is some evidence in the record as to an interference with the enjoyment of the premises while certain construction work (the placing of new girders and trusses) was going on; but this was [439]*439prior to tlie assignment to Hess, and it is stated in ilie brief of plaintiff in error that no claim is made for it. The breach of covenant upon which defendant relies was the failure of the landlord to repair or to prevent a break in the cement floor of the cellar under the water-tight compartments behind the boilers. Water flowed in through the break. The effect of the influx of water is best described by the engineer (Loftus):

“The flow of water had the effect of retarding the draft to the point that we could not got the combustion in the combustion chamber to get the amount of steam to run the engines to the proper capacity. ⅜ ⅞ * The water it gradually comes and raises, and I have seen it raising from one inch to eleven inches, and going down as it raises, during a period of time that I did not take data of. * * * In December, 1896, and the three following months, 1 had trouble with it. The water appeared there from December, 1896, to Hay, 1897. In order to absorb this water, I had io be there, and get steam up with a dead lire, to. siphon the water out — pump it out — to the best of my ability; and then I couldn’t get it all out against; the regular time, and the energy of the boilers — what pressure I had raised when I started the engine to give power to the plant — would die right down. During the time of this trouble the same power iha.t was given prior thereto — before That time — couldn’t he given. s ⅞ * The water entered the asli box, and rose to in the neighborhood of about six inches from the grate liars. ⅛ 9 * I was during the trouble absorbing the water as fast as I could to prevent, it reaching the fire.”

The witness English, employed in the press room, explains the effect of the reduction of steam pressure as follows:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
102 F. 436, 42 C.C.A. 421, 1900 U.S. App. LEXIS 4567, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bien-v-hess-ca2-1900.