Bien-Aime Damus v. Jackson North Medical Center

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedSeptember 18, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-24187
StatusUnknown

This text of Bien-Aime Damus v. Jackson North Medical Center (Bien-Aime Damus v. Jackson North Medical Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bien-Aime Damus v. Jackson North Medical Center, (S.D. Fla. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-24187-ELFENBEIN

ODIANNA BIEN-AIME DAMUS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JACKSON NORTH MEDICAL CENTER,

Defendant. _________________________________________/

ORDER TO AMEND THIS CAUSE is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Odianna Bien-Aime Damus’s Complaint (“Complaint”), ECF No. [1], and her Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”), ECF No. [3]. After reviewing the pleadings, record, and relevant law, the IFP Motion, ECF No. [3], is GRANTED. Based upon the Court’s review of the Complaint, Plaintiff must amend the Complaint, ECF No. [1], consistent with this Order pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(ii). I. BACKGROUND The Complaint, which is contained on the Court’s “Complaint for a Civil Case” form, sues Jackson North Medical Center (the “Defendant”) in the case caption and indicates that the basis for jurisdiction is a federal question. See ECF No. [1] at 1-2. In the section where Plaintiff must give the basis for federal question jurisdiction, however, Plaintiff wrote nothing. See ECF No. [1] at 3. It appears that Plaintiff attempts to state an employment discrimination claim against Defendant as she includes allegations that her manager harassed her at work and took steps to have her fired, and that because her union counsel did not properly represent her, she lost her job. See ECF No. [1] at 4. Along with the Complaint, Plaintiff attached a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in which she made a claim for discrimination based on her national origin. See ECF No. [1] at 7-8. II. LEGAL STANDARDS In most situations,1 a plaintiff who initiates a civil action in this District must pay a filing

fee of $405. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Flannery v. USAA Gen. Indem. Co., No. 24-cv-14390, 2024 WL 5485793, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2024); Court Fees, U.S. Dist. Ct. for S.D. Fla., https://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/court-fees (last visited July 16, 2025). A plaintiff can avoid paying the filing fee by including along with the complaint a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915; Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff moving to proceed IFP must submit “an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets” the plaintiff possesses, a statement “that the person is unable to pay” the filing fees, “the nature of the action,” and the “affiant’s belief that” he or she “is entitled to redress.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).2 If a plaintiff files a motion to proceed IFP and submits the required affidavit, the court must

first determine whether “the statements in the affidavit satisfy the requirement of poverty” such that the “affidavit is sufficient on its face to demonstrate economic eligibility.” See Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (quotation marks omitted). An “affidavit addressing the statutory language should be accepted by the court, absent a serious misrepresentation, and need not show that the litigant is absolutely destitute to qualify for indigent status under § 1915.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

1 For an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the filing fee is $5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

2 Though the plain language § 1915 appears to make its provision applicable only to prisoners, “the affidavit requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1306; see also Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Reasonable access to the courts is provided to indigent claimants by the in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1915 et seq., which allows commencement of suits without payment of fees and court costs by a person who makes an affidavit that he is unable to pay the costs.”). “Such an affidavit will be held sufficient if it represents that the litigant, because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Id. (footnote omitted). If the affidavit is facially sufficient, the court should “docket the case and then proceed to

the question of whether the asserted claim is frivolous.” Id. (alteration adopted, quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(i) (instructing that a court must dismiss the case if the court “at any time . . . determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious,”). A claim is frivolous if it “realistically has no better than a slight chance of success” or “lacks an arguable basis” in law or “in fact, for example, [by] asserting fantastic facts.” Clark v. State of Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990). Section 1915(e) also requires the court to dismiss a complaint that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(ii). To state a claim for relief, a pleading “must contain” three substantive parts: (1) “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” (2) “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and (3) “a demand for

the relief sought.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Those substance requirements are aimed at ensuring that a complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,” see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), to both “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007) (alteration adopted, quotation marks omitted). Finally, § 1915(e) requires the court to dismiss a complaint that “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(iii). And, of course, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003). “Still, once a pro se IFP litigant is in court, he is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon, 863 F.2d at 837. And while “pro se pleadings are liberally construed and federal courts should look beyond the label of the pleadings to determine whether they are properly characterized, a court may not serve as de

facto counsel for a party or rewrite a pleading.” United States v.

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