Bieluch v. Ayres, No. Cv01 0186099 S (May 8, 2002)

Connecticut Superior Court

Bieluch v. Ayres, No. Cv01 0186099 S (May 8, 2002)

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 5896

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedMay 8, 2002

DocketNo. CV01 0186099S

StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 5896 (Bieluch v. Ayres, No. Cv01 0186099 S (May 8, 2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bieluch v. Ayres, No. Cv01 0186099 S (May 8, 2002), 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 5896 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

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Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Background

This two count action has been brought by the plaintiff, William C. Bieluch, Jr., Esq., against Steven E. Ayres, Esq., sounding in defamation and "blackmail," ¶ 18 of 2^nd count of the complaint. At the heart CT Page 5897 of the action is a letter the defendant sent on 8/20/01, which the plaintiff alleges is defamatory and a form of "blackmail." The letter was issued by the defendant as a consequence of his representation of Richard Mazza in a prior probate proceeding. The defendant was previously appointed by the Probate Court to represent Mazza in place of the plaintiff, who had originally represented Mazza.

Law

There is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings. Peytan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). A motion to strike a complaint will be granted if the complaint does not state sufficiently a cognizable cause of action. Mora v. Aetna,13 Conn. App. 208, 211, 535 A.2d 390 (1988).

Discussion

It is clear from the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint that the letter of 8/20/01 was made in the context of a prior judicial proceeding. For this reason, the letter is absolutely privileged. Therefore, count one is stricken because it has failed to state sufficiently a cause of action sounding in defamation.

Count two is to be stricken as well. The plaintiff references "blackmail" in this count and seems to claim something akin to tortious interference in the second count. However, there is no civil cause of action for blackmail in Connecticut. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not pleaded nor has he proven, the necessary allegations for tortious interference. Hi-ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 32-33,761 A.2d 1268 (2000). For these preceding reasons, the plaintiff has failed to state sufficiently a cause of action recognized in Connecticut or a cause of action sounding in tortious interference.

Conclusion

The complaint, counts one and two, is stricken.

So Ordered.

THE COURT

DOWNEY, J. CT Page 5901

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[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Background

This two count action has been brought by the plaintiff, William C. Bieluch, Jr., Esq., against Steven E. Ayres, Esq., sounding in defamation and "blackmail," ¶ 18 of 2^nd count of the complaint. At the heart CT Page 5897 of the action is a letter the defendant sent on 8/20/01, which the plaintiff alleges is defamatory and a form of "blackmail." The letter was issued by the defendant as a consequence of his representation of Richard Mazza in a prior probate proceeding. The defendant was previously appointed by the Probate Court to represent Mazza in place of the plaintiff, who had originally represented Mazza.

Law

There is an absolute privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings. Peytan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). A motion to strike a complaint will be granted if the complaint does not state sufficiently a cognizable cause of action. Mora v. Aetna,13 Conn. App. 208, 211, 535 A.2d 390 (1988).

Discussion

It is clear from the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint that the letter of 8/20/01 was made in the context of a prior judicial proceeding. For this reason, the letter is absolutely privileged. Therefore, count one is stricken because it has failed to state sufficiently a cause of action sounding in defamation.

Count two is to be stricken as well. The plaintiff references "blackmail" in this count and seems to claim something akin to tortious interference in the second count. However, there is no civil cause of action for blackmail in Connecticut. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not pleaded nor has he proven, the necessary allegations for tortious interference. Hi-ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 32-33,761 A.2d 1268 (2000). For these preceding reasons, the plaintiff has failed to state sufficiently a cause of action recognized in Connecticut or a cause of action sounding in tortious interference.

Conclusion

The complaint, counts one and two, is stricken.

So Ordered.

THE COURT

DOWNEY, J. CT Page 5901

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2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 5896, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bieluch-v-ayres-no-cv01-0186099-s-may-8-2002-connsuperct-2002.

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