Bianco v. Board of Trustees of Local 816 Labor & Management Pension Trust

494 F. Supp. 206, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12436
District Court, E.D. New York·Decided July 17, 1980·No. 78 C 601·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

*207 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NEAHER, District Judge.

Plaintiff in this action brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, 1 was employed successively between 1952 and 1975 under the respective jurisdictions of the three local unions of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters whose pension funds are sued as defendants herein. He seeks pension payments from the date of his retirement due to disability and a declaration of entitlement to payments until the end of his disability or his death. The action is now before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment based upon a set of stipulated facts and the plans of the three defendant pension funds. The parties have also submitted the National Reciprocal Agreement of the Eastern Conference of Teamsters (“National Reciprocal Agreement”) and the Local Reciprocal Agreement between the Local 816 Pension Fund and the Local 202 Pension Fund (“Local Reciprocal Agreement”).

Summary judgment may be rendered only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), F.R.Civ.P. Pursuant to the 1963 amendments, Rule 56(e) provides that when a motion for summary judgment is supported by proper affidavits, “an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court “cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 388 F.2d 272, 279 (2d Cir. 1967), quoted in SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978). It must accept as true factual statements in the opposing party’s affidavits, draw all permissible inferences in that party’s favor, Hill v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1976), and resolve any doubts in favor of the latter, American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., supra. “The very mission of the summary judgment procedure [however] is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Adv.Com. Note to Proposed Amendments to Rule 56(e), 31 F.R.D. 648 (1962). See generally Donnelly v. Guion, 467 F.2d 290, 292 (2d Cir. 1972); Applegate v. Top Associates, Inc., 425 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1970).

After a careful examination of the stipulated facts and documents submitted on the instant motions, it is the court’s view that there exist no genuine issues of material fact that could forestall a grant of summary judgment and that plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

It is undisputed that plaintiff, who is now 55 years of age, worked under the jurisdiction of Local 816 from July 1,1952, through September 30, 1965, earning 123/4 years of pension credits; that he worked under the jurisdiction of Local 852 from August 24, 1965, through March 30, 1975, earning nine and two quarters years of pension credits; and that he earned an additional two quarters of pension credit while working under the jurisdiction of Local 202 from April 1, 1975 until November 8 of that year, when he became disabled due to coronary thrombosis. It is also stipulated that since the day he was last employed, plaintiff has *208 been, and continues to be, totally disabled, and has been certified as totally disabled by the Social Security Administration. For 11 months immediately following his thrombosis plaintiff received disability income insurance benefits provided by the Local 202 Welfare Fund. Finally the parties have stipulated that all defendants are participants in the National Reciprocal Agreement.

An understanding of the role of the Reciprocal Agreements is important to the disposition of this case. The National Reciprocal Agreement, signed by the pension funds of local unions of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, has as its purpose the provision of pensions for union members who remain within the international union but work under the jurisdictions of two or more local unions. Although such workers enjoy continuous membership in the international union, they may not have accrued sufficient work credit under the plan of any one local pension fund to entitle them to the full benefits they would receive had they not transferred from one local to another. To effect this purpose, each signatory fund agrees to incorporate into its pension plan Exhibit A to the National Reciprocal Agreement, which embodies the eligibility and other provisions governing what are termed “partial pensions.” The plans of the Locals 816 and 852 funds have adopted Exhibit A verbatim as, respectively, Article II B and Article III A. The Local 202 fund plan has substantially similar, although not identical, provisions in its Article IV A, which is entitled “Pro Rata Pensions.” 2 The Local Reciprocal Agreement, signed by the pension funds of Local 816 and 852, has the similar purpose of providing pensions to members whose employment was split between the jurisdictions of the two parties to that agreement.

Each defendant has denied plaintiff’s application for a partial or pro rata pension. It is agreed, therefore, that the sole issue before the court is whether, under the terms of defendants’ plans, plaintiff is entitled to a pension to be paid proportionately by defendants based on his disability and his periods of employment under the jurisdictions of Locals 816, 852 and 202.

Since the eligibility provisions pertaining to partial pensions in the plans of Locals 816 and 852 are identical, they may be considered together. Under both plans, an employee must first show that he would be eligible for one of that plan’s pensions if his “combined service credits” were treated as service credits under the plan. Local 816 plan Art. II B, § 5(a); Local 852 plan Art. Ill A, § 5(a). Combined service credit is defined as the total of an employee’s service credit earned directly under a given plan plus service credit accumulated under one or more “related plans.” Local 816 plan Art. II B, §§ 3,4; Local 852 plan Art. Ill A, §§ 3, 4. Pursuant to § 1 of the National Reciprocal Agreement, each signatory recognizes the plans of other signatories as related plans, and this is confirmed by provisions in both plans. Local 816 plan Art. II B, § 2; Local 852 plan Art. Ill A, § 2. Therefore, under the two plans/plaintiff has accumulated 22V4 years of combined service credits.

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Bianco v. Board of Trustees of Local 816 Labor & Management Pension Trust, 494 F. Supp. 206, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12436 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).

494 F. Supp. 206 (Bianco v. Board of Trustees of Local 816 Labor & Management Pension Trust) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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