Bi-Rite v. Button Master

578 F. Supp. 59, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14621
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 15, 1983
Docket81 Civ. 5642 (ADS), 81 Civ. 5840 (ADS)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 578 F. Supp. 59 (Bi-Rite v. Button Master) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bi-Rite v. Button Master, 578 F. Supp. 59, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14621 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SOFAER, District Judge.

In an opinion dated January 14, 1983, 555 F.Supp. 1188, and at a subsequent hearing on damages, the Court required the parties to submit affidavits and any other available evidence to establish the extent of defendants’ liability to the various plaintiffs for infringing plaintiffs’ right of publicity. The resulting submissions have done little to ease the Court’s burden of arriving at a measure of damages that will fairly and adequately compensate plaintiffs. All the defendants recorded their sales on a total inventory basis; they did not itemize the sales volume for each individual button title they distributed and therefore cannot accurately state the profits they realized from sales of buttons and other merchandise with the plaintiffs’ trademarks, names, logos or likenesses (“marks”). In addition, none of the parties has submitted information that might tend to establish any lawful sales of buttons with authorized marks made possible by the sale of buttons with popular but unauthorized marks.

Plaintiffs suggest that the value of the licenses misappropriated from each plaintiff, with the merchandising rights they confer, provides a reasonable alternative formula to estimate damages in lieu of sales data. Although the value of a license, whether real or hypothetical, may in some instances provide a fair measure of damages, it is an inappropriate measure for computing the liability of defendants in this case. The cost of a license generally represents prepaid royalties on anticipated sales of the licensed merchandise during the license term. The price of the license will vary depending on whether it provides exclusive or nonexclusive merchandising rights and on the range of the merchandising rights it conveys. The economic advantages defendants appropriated by their use of plaintiffs’ marks were analogous to nonexclusive licenses for the merchandising of *60 buttons, square patches and key tags — low cost items compared to T-shirts and posters — and did not include the right to sell the goods involved at concerts.

Plaintiffs have suggested a range of values, with formulas to support their computations, for each license misappropriated. Factual controversy surrounds each of these estimates, however, and precludes their use in assessing damages. Plaintiffs rely on two different sources to value these hypothetical licenses. First they look to the value defendant Button-Up allegedly placed on a nonexclusive one-year button license from Iron Maiden, Judas Priest and Molly Hatchett. They use the offer to Judas Priest as a base license value from which to compute the value of the other hypothetical licenses, dividing the total sales for the subject group by the total sales for Judas Priest, and then multiplying the quotient by the alleged $3,000 offer price. For example, Button-Up’s sales data show that it sold 3.5 times more Pat Benatar merchandise than Judas Priest merchandise. Accordingly, the estimate for a Pat Benatar license is $3,000 x 3.5 = $10,-500. Plaintiffs claim that estimates based on this formula represent minimum license values. They posit maximum values based on the offers actually made to, or the licenses actually granted by, the plaintiff performers.

All of plaintiffs’ estimates are flawed. As to the minimum license values, defendant Button-Up denies having ever made a dollar offer. It claims, through the sworn affidavits of its president, Douglas Blunden, and of its agent who negotiated the nonexclusive licenses, Ken Czar, that Ira Sokoloff, who manages the commercial affairs of the relevant groups in the United States, placed the monetary value on the licenses. It claims that, although Button-Up had not responded to the offer before Mr. Sokoloff retracted it when he learned that Mr. Czar was affiliated with Button-Up, his adversary in litigation, Button-Up claims they considered the $3,000 offer extravagant and would never have accepted the licenses on those terms. This dispute, through sworn affidavits, as to who originated the $3,000 offer, undercuts the utility of that figure as a basis for assessing damages, although it does indicate what plaintiffs would have accepted from a bidder, though not what one would actually have paid.

Plaintiff’s alternative basis for valuing the licenses is also flawed. The actual licenses they have produced, and in some instances their potential licensees, are too vague to serve as a basis for computing damages. For example, plaintiffs offer Bi-Rite’s $50,000 license with The Who as the value of the license defendants misappropriated from The Who. Bi-Rite’s license with The Who is exclusive, however, and covers a broader range of merchandise than that distributed by defendants. None of the licenses presented by plaintiffs duplicates the goods distributed by defendants. Finally, the sales data offered by Button-Up show that it manufactured buttons for some of the plaintiffs for only a brief six-week period before plaintiffs initiated suit and gained an injunction. Thus, the value of a one-year license would exaggerate the losses that these plaintiffs suffered.

Although defendants have not, and apparently cannot, itemize their sales and distribution of items bearing the individual plaintiffs’ marks, defendants Button-Up and Kraftwerk have provided an accounting of their sales sufficiently detailed to provide some assistance in establishing at least a minimum level of damages. In addition, the remedial provisions of the federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1976), lend further assistance in evaluating the extent of defendants’ liability in this case; while plaintiffs’ evidence may be insufficient to justify granting the full values they seek, that evidence, along with the flagrant weaknesses in defendants’ contentions, makes reliance on an analogous, national legislative guideline appropriate.

Defendant Button-Up claims that it filled the bulk of its orders with a random assortment of buttons, and that only a small fraction of its customers specified particular buttons. Button-Up states that it pro *61 vided for the popularity of a particular group by manufacturing a proportionately greater number and variety of buttons bearing its mark. By this means it satisfied its customers’ desire to purchase more buttons with the marks of popular groups. Button-Up kept records of the number of titles it printed for each group and employed this information, along with its randomized selection process for filling orders, to compute the total sales for the relevant period, and to estimate the proportion of those sales attributable to an individual plaintiff. It then arrived at a profit figure by multiplying the per-group sales by eight percent, the profit margin claimed to have been made on its sales.

Kraftwerk also proposed an estimate of its liability to the individual plaintiffs. Kraftwerk manufactured key tags with the marks of four of the plaintiffs — The Who, Pink Floyd, Pat Benatar, and Styx — and has estimated the profits these sales generated. In addition, it purchased pre-packs of buttons from button manufacturers, including Bi-Rite, which it then sold to retailers; it has assigned a uniform profit value from buttons for each plaintiff. Defendant Button Master has made no effort to itemize its profits.

The Court has broad discretion in arriving at a figure that will adequately compensate plaintiffs,

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Bluebook (online)
578 F. Supp. 59, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bi-rite-v-button-master-nysd-1983.