B.H. v. Superior Court CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: October 13, 2025
• Docket: E086456
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 10/13/25 B.H. v. Superior Court CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

B.H.,

Petitioner, E086456

v. (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2300362)

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF OPINION RIVERSIDE COUNTY,

Respondent;

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,

Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Walter H. Kubelun,

Judge. Petition Denied.

Raymond Ribaya for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

1 Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, and Teresa K.B. Beecham and Julie Jarvi, Deputy

County Counsel for Real Party in Interest.

I.

INTRODUCTION

B.H. (Father) petitions for extraordinary relief pursuant to rule 8.452 of the

California Rules of Court seeking to set aside the orders of the juvenile court at the 18-

month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a Welfare and

Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing as to his 16-year-old daughter K.H. and 13-

year-old son D.H. Father claims the juvenile court erred in finding the Riverside County

Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) provided him with reasonable reunification

services. Father asks this court to issue a writ directing the juvenile court to vacate its

orders, terminating his reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing and to

order an additional six months of reunification services for him. We find no error and

deny the petition.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The family came to the attention of DPSS on September 19, 2023, after an

immediate response referral was received with allegations of general and severe neglect

of then 14-year-old K.H. and 11-year-old D.H. It was reported that Mother’s home was

“ ‘disgusting’ ” and there was a roach infestation due to garbage and rotting and leftover

1 All statutory references herein are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.

2 food scattered around the apartment. Mother was unwilling to improve the conditions in

the home. The social worker observed pictures of the home which showed that the

laundry room had no way of walking into it due to large trash bags, clothes, and hangers.

The kitchen had boxes piled up high towards the ceiling and there were items and trash

cluttered throughout the house. The living room had piles of clothes and trash bags

approximately three to four feet high. One bathroom could not be entered due to piles of

trash, stacked boxes, and broken shelving. Mother had refused the landlord, pest control

and police to access the home. In addition, the children were not enrolled in school and

their medical needs were being neglected by Mother. Following DPSS’s investigation,

the children were placed into protective custody. Law enforcement had to climb over

trash after opening the front door to retrieve the children as there was no space on the

ground to walk. The children were eventually placed with their paternal grandmother.

Father had been incarcerated since 2018 on charges of murder, attempted murder,

domestic violence, attempted robbery, discharging a firearm, using a firearm, and

discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury. Father’s next criminal court hearing

was in November 2023, and the trial readiness hearing was set for April 5, 2024. Father

had no tentative release date. The social worker met with Father at the West Valley

Detention Center. Father did not agree with the children’s removal, and stated that the

children would be “ ‘good’ ” if they were given vitamins. He said he had daily

communication with Mother and the children, and no one had notified him of anything.

He argued with the social worker that nothing was wrong with where the children resided

3 and appeared to be frustrated towards the end of the conversation “further making

threats.”

On September 26, 2023, a petition was filed on behalf of the children pursuant to

section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (g) (no provision for support). The

children were formally detained the following day at the detention hearing and the

parents were provided with supervised visits and services pending the jurisdictional and

dispositional hearing. A first amended petition was filed on November 3, 2023.

The social worker met with Father again on October 11, 2023. Father’s attorney

did not authorize Father to be interviewed as to the allegations. Father, however,

presented as cooperative and forthcoming with information pertaining to the children’s

medical and educational needs. Father reported that he was no longer in a relationship

with Mother, and upon his release he did not plan on maintaining a relationship with her.

On November 3, 2023, at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile

court found true the allegations in the amended petition as modified, declared the children

dependents of the court, and provided the parents with reunification services and

supervised visits. Father’s case plan consisted of parenting education and individual

counseling and visitation upon his release from jail.

By the six-month review hearing, DPSS recommended continuing Father’s

services for an additional six months. Father was still incarcerated with an unknown

release date and had been unable to complete any services. Mother had limited contact

with DPSS. Meanwhile, the children had remained stable with their paternal

4 grandmother and had developed a healthy attachment to her. The children reported

feeling safe and secure in their grandmother’s home.

On May 3, 2024, at the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court continued

reunification services for Mother and Father.

On July 24, 2024, Father in pro per filed a motion to dismiss the case and release

the children to Mother based on alleged due process violations. The court denied the

motion following a hearing on August 23, 2024.

By the 12-month review hearing, DPSS recommended the court continue Mother

and Father’s reunification services. Father remained incarcerated with an unknown

release date. During this reporting period, DPSS submitted a correspondence parenting

referral on behalf of Father. The West Valley Detention Center, where Father was

incarcerated, did not return any of the social worker’s calls regarding services offered in

the facility. Upon Father’s release, services would be submitted on his behalf. The social

worker reported that the West Valley Detention Center had been on lockdown multiple

times prohibiting any in-person visits. Father, however, had telephonic visits with the

children. DPSS contacted Father to address his case plan progress, concurrent planning,

and services and needs on August 30, September 11, 18, and 25, and October 2, 2024.

Mother completed her case plan, she had limited contact with DPSS and remained

unhoused. Meanwhile, the children continued to thrive in their paternal grandmother’s

home who had provided them with a stable and nurturing environment. The children

were reported to be making significant progress in their physical, emotional, educational,

and social development.

5 At the November 19, 2024, 12-month review hearing, the juvenile continued

reunification services for Father and Mother.

In March 2025, DPSS reported that it was verified that the West Valley Detention

Center did not offer services. The children had no contact with Father during the

reporting period. A correspondence-based referral had been submitted on Father’s behalf,

but DPSS had been unable to confirm whether Father received the packet.

In June 2025, the children reported that phone contact with Father had resumed.

The paternal grandmother had discussed the children’s concerns with telephonic visits

with Father and following that conversation Father’s behavior changed. The children

expressed their willingness to participate in phone visits with Father. When the children

chose not to engage in conversation with Father, they would communicate their wishes to

either Father or the paternal grandmother.

By the 18-month review hearing, DPSS recommended terminating services. The

18-month review hearing was held on July 2, 2025. At that time, the juvenile court

found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents failed to participate regularly

and make substantive progress in their court-ordered treatment program, and there was no

substantial probability that the children would be returned if given another six months of

services. The court found that reasonable services were provided and set a section 366.26

hearing to select the most appropriate permanent plan for the children.

On July 23, 2025, Father filed a notice of intent to file writ petition. In his

petition, he declared that he continued to be detained at the West Valley Detention Center.

6 III.

DISCUSSION

Father contends the juvenile court erred in finding DPSS provided him reasonable

services. Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree.

Section 361.5 expressly requires reunification services to be provided to

incarcerated parents, absent a finding on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that it

would be detrimental to the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) “That section reflects a public

policy favoring the development of a family reunification plan even where a parent is

incarcerated.” (Christopher D. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 60, 69; accord,

Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1011-1012, superseded by statute

on another ground as indicated in Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490,

1504.) The consequences of failing to provide such services are inevitable: “If a parent

cannot avail himself or herself of reunification services because of incarceration, it is a

fait accompli that the parent will fail to comply with the service plan.” (In re Brittany S.

(1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1402 (Brittany S.).)

“The focus of California’s dependency system during the reunification period is to

‘preserve the family whenever possible.’ ” (Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244

Cal.App.4th 397, 420 (Patricia W.).) Accordingly, “ ‘[c]ourts may not initiate

proceedings to terminate parental rights unless they find adequate reunification services

were provided to the parents, even when the parents are incarcerated.’ ” (In re Maria S.

(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1039 (Maria S.).) “ ‘ “The effort must be made to provide

suitable services, in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success.’ ” ”

7 (Ibid.) “While ‘use a gun, go to prison’ may well be an appropriate legal maxim, ‘go to

prison, lose your child’ is not.” (In re Brittany S., supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1402.)

When a child is removed from a parent’s custody, the social services department

must make a good faith effort to develop and implement reasonable family reunification

services responsive to the needs of that family. (In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d

234, 254.) “The adequacy of a reunification plan and of the department’s efforts are

judged according to the circumstances of each case. . . . ‘The effort must be made to

provide suitable services, in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of

success. [Citation.]’ . . . ‘[T]he record should show that the [department] identified the

problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those

problems, maintained reasonable contact with the [parent] during the course of the

service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the [parent when] compliance proved

difficult . . . .’ ” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1362.)

At the permanency review hearing held within 18 months after the date the child

was originally removed from the physical custody of their parent, “the court shall order

the return of the child to the physical custody of their parent or legal guardian unless the

court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to their parent

or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or

physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) In addition,

“[t]he court shall determine by clear and convincing evidence whether reasonable

services have been offered or provided to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.22,

subd. (a)(3).) Moreover, “The court shall not order that a hearing pursuant to

8 Section 366.26 be held unless there is clear and convincing evidence that reasonable

services have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.22,

subd. (b)(3)(C)(iii).) Services for an incarcerated parent may include, but shall not be

limited to, the following: “(A) Maintaining contact between the parent and child through

collect telephone calls. (B) Transportation services, when appropriate. (C) Visitation

services, when appropriate. (D)(i) Reasonable services to extended family members or

foster parents providing care for the child if the services are not detrimental to the child.”

(§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1).) Furthermore, “[a]n incarcerated . . . parent may be required to

attend counseling, parenting classes, or vocational training programs as part of the

reunification service plan if actual access to these services is provided.” (§ 361.5,

subd. (e)(1)(D)(ii).)

We review the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were offered and

provided for substantial evidence. (Patricia W., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 419; Maria

S., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1039.) “ ‘All reasonable inferences must be drawn in

support of the findings and the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

juvenile court’s order.’ ” (Maria S., at p. 1039.) If substantial evidence supports the

juvenile court’s finding, we will not disturb it. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th

538, 545.) Moreover, under our review, services need not be perfect to be reasonable.

Rather, the “standard is . . . whether they were reasonable under the circumstances.”

(Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) Since Father bears the

burden of demonstrating error on appeal, he must show that the juvenile court’s

9 reasonable services finding is not supported by substantial evidence. (Angela S. v.

Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.)

Here, Father has not met his burden to overcome the presumption we must make

as a reviewing court. There is substantial evidence to support the finding that the services

that were provided to Father were reasonable. The juvenile court correctly considered the

reasonableness of DPSS’s efforts concerning services offered to Father while he was

incarcerated at West Valley Detention Center.

Father’s case plan consisted of parenting education and individual counseling.

The record demonstrates as to what services were available and offered to Father. A

correspondence parenting referral was submitted on Father’s behalf and Father’s counsel

acknowledged that the correspondence parenting class was sent to Father. However,

Father’s detention facility did not offer services. Because Father’s facility did not offer

services, and because initially the facility did not return any of the social worker’s calls

regarding services offered in the facility, the social worker reported that services would

be provided to Father upon his release.

Father was in custody awaiting trial on serious criminal charges, including murder

and attempted murder. Father had been incarcerated for years, remained incarcerated

throughout the entire dependency matter, and had no confirmed release date. Father had

been incarcerated since 2018. At the 18-month review hearing, Father’s counsel

informed the juvenile court that Father’s release date was unknown. In addition,

visitation was provided to Father. Although for a period of time the children had no

contact with Father, by June 2025, the children reported to the social worker that phone

10 contact with Father had resumed, and they expressed their willingness to participate in

phone visits with Father.

Father made no argument below, nor introduced any evidence, that services were

available in the detention facility, or that DPSS in any way hindered his ability or efforts

to obtain services. So, we cannot second-guess the juvenile court on this question and

say on the limited record before us DPSS acted unreasonably.

Father relies on Maria S., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, in which the appellate

court reversed termination of parental rights. In Maria S., the mother gave birth to her

daughter while she was in prison. Her service plan stated that she would begin the

reunification process after her release from custody, and noted because of her

incarceration, many of the services contemplated would have to await her release. (Id. at

pp. 1038-1040.) After she was released, she was deported, but she continued to maintain

regular contact with the social worker and attempted to obtain a visa so that she could

attend the permanency planning hearing. (Id. at p. 1038.)

Here, in contrast, there is evidence in the record as to what services were available

and offered to Father. Furthermore, unlike Maria S., the evidence here shows that

Father’s detention facility did not offer services. As such, the social worker reported that

services would be provided to Father upon his release. In Maria S., there was no

evidence as to why the agency planned to wait until the mother was released from

incarceration to provide her with services. Moreover, unlike Maria S. where the mother

was to be deported upon her release, there was no evidence in this case to show that the

plan was for Father to be deported upon his release from incarceration. Also, unlike

11 Maria S., Father here had been incarcerated for years, remained incarcerated throughout

the entire dependency matter, and had no confirmed release date. Maria S. is not helpful

to his position.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile

court’s findings by preponderance of the evidence that reasonable services were offered

or provided to Father. Because of Father’s actions that resulted in his incarceration for

years, he was unable to participate in services or make progress with his court-ordered

service plan. Considering DPSS’s limited ability to provide services in this case, the

services that it provided were reasonable under the circumstances. Father has not shown

that the juvenile court erred in setting a section 366.26 hearing.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON Acting P. J. We concur:

FIELDS J.

MENETREZ J.