Bezalel Grossberger v. Robert M. Cormack

• Court: District Court, D. New Jersey
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-08182
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BEZALEL GROSSBERGER, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24-8182 (MAS) (JTQ) . MEMORANDUM ORDER ROBERT M. CORMACK, Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Bezalel Grossberger’s (‘Plaintiff’) Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 10) of this Court’s April 24, 2025, Memorandum Order (“April 2025 Order’)! (ECF No. 9). The Court has carefully considered Plaintiff’s submission and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1.7 For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. In support of his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff reiterates the allegations in his Complaint (see Compl. 6-7, ECF No. 1) that 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and N.J. Star. ANN. § 2C:21-22a provide private causes of action for his claims (Mot. for Recons. 1-2, ECF No. 10). Plaintiff submits that because N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-22a provides a private cause of action, and because Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “pretends to be authorized to appear in Federal Court” when he is

! The Court’s April 2025 Order granted Plaintiff's IFP application, screened and dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint, and provided Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. (See generally Mem. Order, ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint. Plaintiff, rather, filed this Motion for Reconsideration. * All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Local Civil Rules.

not, “‘[t]he Federal Court is directly injured,” and “this private cause of action confers sufficient jurisdiction upon the . . . Court to proceed with the underlying [C]omplaint .. . , based on this count alone.” Ud. at 3.) Plaintiff makes five additional arguments in support of reconsideration: (1) the Complaint does not make claims based on criminal allegations, but merely cited them to prove the existence of racketeering activity; (2) the criminal allegations in the Complaint, when construed as true, are sufficient to support a claim of racketeering; (3) the allegations in the Complaint sufficiently allege that Defendant was a state actor for the purposes of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) the allegations in the Complaint properly assert a deprivation of “[p]roperty [rlights” claim against Defendant because Defendant “prevent[ed] [Plaintiff] from accessing the court to protect those [rlights[;]” and (5) Defendant deprived Plaintiff of “[Jlife and liberty[] through the court [|] by issuing Orders to harass and defame him[, and through] threats of arrest followed by [a] warrant.” (/d. at 2-3.) Plaintiff contends that these allegations amount to a prima facie claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ud. at 3.) Plaintiff further asserts that he has no recourse in state court, and that this Court must therefore “assume jurisdiction of the [s]tate claims.” (/d.) In the District of New Jersey, Rule 7.1 governs motions for reconsideration. Morton v. fauver, No. 97-5127, 2011 WL 2975532, at *1 (D.N.J. July 21, 2011) (citing Bowers v. NCAA, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001)). Reconsideration under Rule 7.1 is an extraordinary remedy that is rarely granted. Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 482, 507 (D.N.J. 2002). A motion for reconsideration may be based on one of three separate grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence not previously available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent manifest injustice. /d. It is not an opportunity to raise new matters or arguments that could have been raised before the original

decision was made. See Bowers, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 613. Nor is a motion for reconsideration an opportunity to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought through. See Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 507. “Rather, the rule permits . . . reconsideration only when ‘dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law’ were presented to the court but were overlooked.” Id. (quoting Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992)). Reconsideration is not warranted here. First, Plaintiff presents nothing to suggest that there has been an intervening change in controlling law. (See generally Mot. for Recons.) Second, Plaintiff presents nothing to suggest that there is new evidence that was not previously available. (See generally id.) Third, Plaintiff presents nothing to suggest that there is a need to correct a clear error of law or fact to prevent manifest injustice. (See generally id.) Plaintiff, instead, asks the Court to rethink what it has already thought through in its April 2025 Order. (See generally Mem. Order.) The Coutt is satisfied that it thoroughly addressed Plaintiff’s 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and N.J. STAT. ANN, § 2C:21-22a claims in its April 2025 Order. (See id. at 4-5.) The Court is also satisfied that it thoroughly addressed Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in its April 2025 Order. (See id. at 2-4.) For the sake of completeness, however, the Court notes that Defendant is an attorney who was acting as private counsel, and therefore, Defendant does not qualify as a state actor for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Williams v. Dark, 844 F. Supp. 210, 213 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (collecting cases) (noting that “[p]rivate attorneys acting on behalf of their clients are not state actors”); Wright v. Loftus, No. 09-1305, 2009 WL 4051244, at * 3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims because, inter alia, they were brought “against private actors working as attorneys in private firms”); Smith v. Finckenauer, No. 08-4839, 2008 WL 4890139, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. Nov. 13, 2008) (stating that the defendant, “as an attorney, is not a state actor for purposes of [42 U.S.C. §] 1983”); Mondelli v. Berkeley Heights

Police Dept, No. 14-6196, 2015 WL 12840948, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against attorney defendants because attorneys acting as private counsel “are simply not acting under color of state law”). Accordingly, IT IS, on this IT ay of October 2025, ORDERED as follows: 1. The Clerk shall reopen this matter for consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. 2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 10) is DENIED. 3. The Clerk shall close this matter.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE