Beyond Building, Inc. v. Fiss
This text of Beyond Building, Inc. v. Fiss (Beyond Building, Inc. v. Fiss) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
SUPER|OR COURT oF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
VlleN L. MEDlNlLLA LEoNARD L. WlLLlAl\/ls JusTlcE CENTER JuDGE 500 NoRTH KlNG STREET, SulTE 10400
WlLMlNGToN, DE 19801-3733
TELEPHONE (302) 255-0626
February 11, 2019
Douglas A. Shachtman, Esquire Arthur D. Kuhl, Esquire
The Shachtman LaW Firrn Reger Rizzo & Darnall LLP 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue Brandywine Plaza East
Suite 302 1523 Concord Pike, Suite 200 Wilmington, Delaware 19806 Wilmington, Delaware 19803
Christopher H. Lee, Esquire Cooch and Taylor, P.A.
The Brandywine Building 1000 West Street, 10th Floor Wilrnington, Delaware 19801
Re: CONSOL’D Beyond Building, Inc. et al., v. Mark Fiss, et al. C.A. No.: N16L-09-081 VLM
Dear Counsel:
This is the Court’s ruling on John E. Steele, Jr., Inc. (“Steele”)’s Motion for Surnmary Judgment. For the reasons stated below, Steele’s Motion is DENIED.
Procedural and F actual Background
This action arises from a consolidated case dealing With claims for a mechanics’ lien and breaches of contract arising from a home renovation project. Mark F iss and Marissa Schnelle (“Fiss” and “Schnelle” or collectively “Owners”) hired Beyond Building, Inc. (“BBI”) as the general contractor for the additions and renovations of their home at 108 Augustine Cut-off, Wilmington, DelaWare 19803 (“Property”). The Owners and BBI entered into a contract and Work began in October 2014.
On or about September 16, 2015, BBI subcontracted With John E. Steele, Jr., lnc., for Steele to perform Work at the Property, including the installation of roofing, gutters, and siding.l This contract provides “Payment: on completion of the above completed Work.”2 On or about October 27, 2015, Steele and BBI modified the contract to change the type of gutters to be used for the project. Steele invoiced BBI in the amounts of $27,090 and $6,633, on April 1, 2016 and June 22, 2016, respectively, for Work it performed under the contract3 BBI has not paid the invoices for the Work Steele performed, Which totals 51333,720.4 Steele alleges BBI breached the contract by not paying for the roofing Work it performed on the construction proj ect.
On August 18, 2016, Steele filed its Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas. On September 21, 2016, BBI filed its statement of Mechanics’ Lien and Complaint for breach of contract claim against OWners. On October 21, 2016, Steele’S Complaint against BBI Was transferred from the Court of Common Pleas to the Superior Court. On March 24, 2017, the two cases Were consolidated into this matter. On November 29, 2018, Steele filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.5 The response and reply to this motion Were filed by January 9, 2019. The Court held oral arguments on January 22, 2019 and it requested additional submissions from both parties regarding the applicability of 6 Del. C. § 3501 et seq.6 On January 30, 2019, both parties filed their supplemental submissions and the matter is now ripe for revieW.
Standard of Review
The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment falls on the moving party to demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of laW.”7 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party must sufficiently establish the
1 John E. Steele Jr., Inc.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 11 8 [hereinafter Steele Mot. for Summ. J.].
2 Steele Mot. for Summ. J. 11 8, at Ex. A.
3 Id. 11 9.
4 Id. 11 10.
5 The parties filed additional motions for summary judgment, including two filed by BBI and one filed by Fiss and Schnelle. The Court ruled upon these other motions during oral arguments held on January 22, 2019. The Court denied both of BBI’s motions for summary judgment, and Fiss and Schnelle’s motion for partial summary judgment Was Withdrawn.
6 6 Del. C. § 3501 et seq.
7 super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(@).
“existence of one or more genuine issues of material fact.”8 Summary judgment Will not be granted if there is a material fact in dispute or if “it seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances.”9 “All facts and reasonable inferences must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”10
Discussion
Steele argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on breach of contract and the Construction Prompt Payment Act (the “Act”), 6 Del. C. § 3501 et seq. ,1‘ Which is intended to protect contractors from owners or general contractors Who fail to make timely payments12 Steele argues that under various provisions of 6 Del. C. § 3501 et seq., it is entitled to payment for the unpaid invoices plus interest, as Well as reasonable attorney’s fees.13 Steele initially argued that 6 Del. C. §§ 3507, 3508, and 3509 apply to the case at bar.14 In light of supplemental submissions from the parties, both sides agree that the “penalty and attorney’s fee provisions of §§ 3507 and 3509 do not apply to this situation.”15 The Court Will not apply these provisions to its analysis of Steele’s motion.
Steele argues relief is Warranted because BBI did not contest the invoices and the Owners Were satisfied, after inspection, that Steele’s renovations Were done in a Worl 8 Qualily Elec. C0., Inc. v. E. States Const. Serv., Inc., 663 A.2d 488, 1995 WL 379125, at *3-4 (Del. 1995). See also Rule 56(e); Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 681 (Del. 1979). 9 Ebersole v_. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469-70 (Del. 1962). 10 Nutt v. A.C. & S. C0., Inc., 517 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. 1986) (citing Mechell v. Plamer, 343 A.2d 620, 621 (Del. 1975); Allstate Auto Leasing Co. v. Cala'well, 394 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. Super. 1978)). 116 Del. C. § 3501 et seq. 12 Steele Mot. for Summ. J. 11 1. 13 See generally id. 14 The Court requested additional information from the parties regarding the applicability of these statutory provisions. These supplemental submissions Were filed by January 30, 2019. 15 See Supplemental Letter submitted on behalf of John E. Steele, Jr., Inc., dated January 30, 2019 [hereinafter Steele Letter]. See also Supplemental Letter submitted on behalf of Beyond Building, lnc., dated January 30, 2019 [hereinafter BBI Letter]. 16 Steele Mot. for Summ. J. 11 11. 17 ld., at EX. E. plus 18% APR interest18 Steele further argues that BBI’s principals were at the Property to inspect it, and did not then mention any deficiencies in Steele’s work.19 Finally, Steele maintains that it is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees under 6 Del. C. § 3506(e), arguing that BBI’s withholding payment demonstrates a lack of good faith for a reasonable cause.20 Relying primarily on the application of §§ 3502, 3504, and 3506, this Court finds there is no entitlement to damages or attorneys’ fees at this juncture because there are still material issues of genuine fact regarding the breaches that occurred with this contract, and whether Steele completed the project that would trigger payments due under the Act.
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Beyond Building, Inc. v. Fiss, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beyond-building-inc-v-fiss-delsuperct-2019.