Beyl v. Capper Publications, Inc.

305 P.2d 817, 180 Kan. 525, 1957 Kan. LEXIS 230
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJanuary 12, 1957
Docket40,276
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 305 P.2d 817 (Beyl v. Capper Publications, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beyl v. Capper Publications, Inc., 305 P.2d 817, 180 Kan. 525, 1957 Kan. LEXIS 230 (kan 1957).

Opinion

*526 The opinion of the court was delivered by

Price, J.:

This is an action to recover damages for an alleged libel. Count one of the petition is based upon defendant’s publication of an article in The Topeka Daily Capital on May 26, 1954. Count two is based upon publication of a news story concerning the contents of the article over radio and television.

Defendant’s demurrer to the petition on the ground that neither count thereof states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action was sustained, and plaintiff has appealed.

The petition and newspaper article are set out in full as an appendix to this opinion. The article, as published, was two columns wide and included a picture purporting to be that of plaintiff. The picture was one column wide and three and one-half inches long, and underneath was the name “Keith R. Beyl.” Across the chest of the man pictured was a card or plaque with the following notation on it:

“Sheriffs Office Green River Wyo A 637 2 10 54”

In support of their respective positions both parties make numerous contentions, but, as we view the case, the question involved is relatively quite narrow.

On the face of things the article in question obviously is a news story based upon an interview by defendant with the attorney general relative to the operations of an alleged grain theft ring in Kansas. Much of the article directly quotes the attorney general, and the remainder summarizes the information given by that official.

We consider it unnecessary to attempt a lengthy discourse on the law of libel, the freedom and liberty of the press, or the rights and liabilities of a newspaper with respect to the many and vailed circumstances in which the question may arise. For a scholarly and basic discussion of the general subject we direct attention to the leading case of Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281, 130 Am. St. Rep. 390, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 361. We will attempt to confine ourselves to what we consider to be the precise question presented.

The rule is well established that it is within the qualified privilege of a newspaper to publish in good faith as current news all matters *527 involving open violations of law which justify police interference, and matters in connection with and in aid of the prosecution of inquiries regarding the commission of crime, even though the publication may reflect on the individuals concerned and tend to bring them into public disgrace. (33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 167, p. 161.)

By this is not meant that a newspaper is possessed of free rein and immunity to print unfounded and unwarranted scurrilous, unscrupulous and defamatory statements about a citizen, but it is entitled, in the public interest and dissemination of news, within good faith limitations of fair comment, to publish the news pertaining to such matters as are involved here, particularly'when, as here, the source of information is the highest law-enforcement officer of the state.

Where facts are not in dispute, and on demurrer they of course are admitted, the question whether a publication complained of is privileged is a question of law to be decided by the court. (Stone v. Hutchinson Daily News, 125 Kan. 715, 266 Pac. 78, 58 A. L. R. 718; Faber v. Byrle, 171 Kan. 38, 229 P. 2d 718, 25 A. L. R. 2d 1379.) There can be no doubt but that under the facts here alleged the defendant has what is known and referred to in the law of libel as a qualified or conditional privilege.

The fact of the privilege appearing on the face of the petition, it may be taken advantage of by demurrer. (Klover v. Rugh, 99 Kan. 752, 162 Pac. 1179.)

In the Coleman case, supra (p. 741), it was held that if the publication be conditionally privileged the plaintiff must prove malice —actual evilmindedness, or fail. In the Stone case, supra (Syl. 6), it was said that malice cannot be inferred and is not to be presumed from a publication that is held to be qualifiedly privileged. In Steenson v. Wallace, 144 Kan. 730, 734, 62 P. 2d 907, it was said that with respect to a publication conditionally privileged a plaintiff is obliged to allege and must prove express malice. In the Faber case, supra (Syl. 6), it was held that there is no liability on a conditionally privileged communication, absent the existence of malice, and that in such a case the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish malice. In other words, when a qualified or conditional privilege exists with respect to a publication one seeking to recover damages therefor must allege and prove actual malice.

Applying the foregoing rules to the facts before us it is clear *528 that count one of the petition is fatally defective in that it fails to charge defendant with actual malice — that is, evilmindedness and an intent to injure. The most that can he said is that it charges the published statements were false. It is not even alleged that defendant published the article with knowledge of its falsity.

And neither can plaintiff’s contentions with respect to the headline of the article and the accompanying picture be sustained. The headline and body of the article must be read and considered together. The headline in question is a fair index of what follows in the article, and even though it might be said to exaggerate the character or conduct of the matter described in the article, such fact would not in itself show express malice and prevent the defendant from interposing the defense of conditional privilege. (Jerald v. Houston, 124 Kan. 657, 261 Pac. 851; Steenson v. Wallace, supra [p. 734.]) What has been said also applies substantially with reference to the picture accompanying the article. It is clear that under the facts and circumstances the publication of the picture also was conditionally privileged. Plaintiff himself does not deny its authenticity, but merely alleges that if it is his picture it was taken by a Wyoming sheriff at a time when he was arrested and fined on a misdemeanor charge.

For the reasons stated, as to count one of the petition the demurrer was properly sustained.

Count two of the petition is allegedly based on negligence and the provisions of G. S. 1955 Supp. 60-746a. As pertinent here, that statute, in substance, provides that the owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations shall not be liable in damages for any defamatory statement or matter published or uttered as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast by one other than such owner, licensee or operator, or their agents or employees, unless the complaining party shall allege and prove that such owner, licensee, operator, or such agent or employee, failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance of such statement or matter in such broadcast.

A short answer to plaintiff’s contention is that nowhere in either count of the petition is it alleged that this defendant published or caused to be published by radio or television the matter complained of.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kemmerly v. The Wichita Eagle
Court of Appeals of Kansas, 2022
Hanrahan v. Horn
657 P.2d 561 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1983)
Hein v. Lacy
616 P.2d 277 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1980)
Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc.
593 P.2d 511 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1979)
Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co.
531 P.2d 76 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1975)
Suchomel v. Suburban Life Newspapers, Inc.
228 N.E.2d 172 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1967)
Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc.
214 N.E.2d 746 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1966)
O'NEAL v. Tribune Company
176 So. 2d 535 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1965)
Kennedy v. Mid-Continent Telecasting, Inc.
394 P.2d 400 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1964)
Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corporation
340 P.2d 396 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1959)
Clark Lumber Co. v. Passig
339 P.2d 280 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1959)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
305 P.2d 817, 180 Kan. 525, 1957 Kan. LEXIS 230, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beyl-v-capper-publications-inc-kan-1957.