Beyard v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union

District Court, E.D. California·Decided February 21, 2025·No. 1:21-cv-01063·Unknown

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 DENISE BEYARD, et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-01063-KJM-SAB

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFFS 13 v. FROM USING EXPERT TESTIMONY; MODIFYING SCHEDULING ORDER FOR 14 PENTAGON FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, LIMITED PURPOSE

15 Defendant. (ECF Nos. 77, 83, 88)

16 17 Currently before the Court is Defendant Pentagon Federal Credit Union’s motion to 18 preclude Plaintiffs Denise Beyard, Caroline Cardoza, and Calvin James (collectively, 19 “Plaintiffs”) from using expert testimony in connection with any motion, including any motion 20 for class certification, or at trial. (ECF No. 77.) The motion was referred to the undersigned 21 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 22 A hearing was held in this matter on February 19, 2025. (ECF No. 104.) Counsel Taras 23 Kick and Tyler Dosaj appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs. Counsel Michael Graziano appeared on 24 behalf of Defendant. Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the arguments 25 made at the February 19, 2025 hearing, as well as the Court’s record, for the reasons explained 26 herein, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiffs from using expert testimony 27 and modifies the scheduling order for the limited purpose of deposing Plaintiffs’ expert and Defendant’s rebuttal expert. 1 I. 2 LEGAL STANDARD 3 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the disclosure of expert 4 witnesses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). Unless stipulated by the parties or otherwise ordered by the 5 Court, the party’s expert disclosure must be accompanied by a written report, which has been 6 prepared and signed by the witness. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). The witness’s “report must 7 contain: (i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and 8 reasons for them; (ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them; (iii) any 9 exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; (iv) the witness’s qualifications, 10 including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years; (v) a list of all other cases in 11 which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and 12 (vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case.” Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 14 Rule 37(c)(1) gives teeth to the expert disclosure “requirements by forbidding the use at 15 trial of any information required to be disclosed by Rule 26(a) that is not properly disclosed.” 16 Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 37 17 provides that a party is not allowed to use information or witnesses that are not disclosed or 18 supplemented as required by Rule 26(a) or (e) unless the failure was substantially justified or 19 harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). “The Advisory Committee Notes describe [this] as a ‘self- 20 executing,’ ‘automatic’ sanction to ‘provide[] a strong inducement for disclosure of 21 material. . . .’ ” Yeti by Molly, Ltd., 259 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Rule 37 advisory committee’s 22 note (1994)). District courts have discretion in determining whether to issue sanctions under 23 Rule 37(c)(1). Id. 24 The burden is on the party seeking to admit the evidence to demonstrate that the failure to 25 disclose was substantially justified or harmless. Id. at 1107. “Among the factors that may 26 properly guide a district court in determining whether a violation of a discovery deadline is 27 justified or harmless are: (1) prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is 1 trial; and (4) bad faith or willfulness involved in not timely disclosing the evidence.” Lanard 2 Toys Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 F. App’x 705, 713 (9th Cir. 2010). 3 II. 4 DISCUSSION 5 A scheduling order issued in this action on December 12, 2023. (ECF No. 43.) The 6 scheduling order provided, in pertinent part, that the parties were to disclose expert witnesses by 7 February 9, 2024; all supplemental experts were to be disclosed by June 21, 2024; and that the 8 parties were to complete expert discovery by November 8, 2024. (Id. at 2-3.) The order 9 expressly stated that “written designation of retained and non-retained experts shall be made 10 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2), (A), (B) and (C) and shall include all information 11 required thereunder. Failure to designate experts in compliance with this order may result in 12 the Court excluding the testimony or other evidence offered through the experts that are not 13 properly disclosed in compliance with this order.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) 14 On February 9, 2024, Plaintiffs identified Arthur Olsen as an expert witness, identified 15 the subject matter on which he was expected to testify, and attached his curriculum vitae and a 16 list of representative matters in which he had testified. (Decl. of Tyler Dosaj, Ex. 11, ECF No. 17 84-11.) Plaintiffs’ written disclosure did not include a statement of all Mr. Olsen’s opinions, the 18 basis for those opinions, the facts or data considered, or any exhibits that will be used to 19 summarize his opinions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Plaintiffs did not provide a 20 report containing that information until October 30, 2024. (ECF No. 83 at 10.) Defendant 21 therefore requests that Mr. Olsen be stricken due to Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the 22 scheduling order and the requirements of Rule 26.1 Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating 23 that their failure to disclose on February 9, 2024 was substantially justified or harmless. Yeti by 24 Molly, Ltd., 259 F.3d at 1107. 25 Plaintiffs primarily argue they are substantially justified in their non-compliance with the 26 disclosure deadline because the parties purportedly entered an agreement at the scheduling 27 1 Defendant does not seek—and the Court therefore does not address—any lesser sanction than complete exclusion 1 conference that Defendant would not attempt to enforce the February 9, 2024 expert disclosure 2 deadline if the class transaction data necessary for Mr. Olsen to write his report had not been 3 produced by February 9, 2024. (ECF No. 83 at 11.) Defendant argues no such agreement was 4 entered at the scheduling conference. The Court agrees. The Court does not set illusory 5 deadlines in Rule 16 scheduling orders. The parties proposed a February 9, 2024 expert 6 disclosure deadline (ECF No. 40) and the Court directed the parties to disclose all expert 7 witnesses pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) by February 9, 2024. (ECF No. 43 at 2-3.) 8 Plaintiffs were required to make expert disclosures at the time and in the sequence that the Court 9 ordered. See Goodman v. Staples The Office Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 827 (9th Cir. 10 2011).

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Related

Lanard Toys Limited v. Novelty, Inc.
375 F. App'x 705 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Goodman v. Staples the Office Super-Store, LLC
644 F.3d 817 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Hoffman v. Construction Protective Services, Inc.
541 F.3d 1175 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Yeti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp.
259 F.3d 1101 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)