BEY v. BROOKS

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedJanuary 17, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-00006
StatusUnknown

This text of BEY v. BROOKS (BEY v. BROOKS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BEY v. BROOKS, (M.D. Ga. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

KENYA WARD GAMBLE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-cv-2 (MTT) ) Deputy BROOKS et al., ) ) Defendants. ) __________________ ) ORDER Plaintiff Kenya Ward Gamble1 filed this pro se action and contemporaneously moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Docs. 1; 2. As discussed below, Gamble satisfies the requirements of poverty, and his motion to proceed IFP (Doc. 2) is GRANTED. Along with granting Gamble IFP status, the Court must also screen his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). After screening, the Court concludes that Gamble’s complaint is deficient. Accordingly, within twenty-one days of the entry of this order Gamble is ORDERED TO AMEND his complaint as stated in this order. Failure to fully and timely comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action. Further, pursuant to Local Rule 3.4, the Clerk is DIRECTED to transfer this case to the Athens Division where the defendants reside.

1 Gamble styled his complaint as “Kirin Rogi Bey ex rel. Kenya Ward Gamble.” It is apparent that Kenya Ward Gamble is the actual party. I. DISCUSSION 2 A. Financial Status When considering a motion to proceed IFP filed under § 1915(a), “[t]he only determination to be made by the court … is whether the statements in the affidavit

satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004). To show poverty, the plaintiff need not show that he is “absolutely destitute.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338-40 (1948)). Instead, the affidavit must demonstrate that the plaintiff, “because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307. Where a plaintiff demonstrates economic eligibility to file IFP, the court should docket the case and then “proceed to the question ... of whether the asserted claim is frivolous.” Id. Here, Gamble’s financial affidavit states that he is unemployed with an average

monthly income of $0.00. Doc. 2 at 1-2. Accordingly, the Court finds that Gamble is unable to pay the costs and fees associated with this lawsuit, and his motion to proceed IFP (Doc. 2) is GRANTED.

2 Motions to proceed IFP are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a) provides: [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004). B. Frivolity Review Along with granting Gamble IFP status, the Court must review and dismiss his complaint if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it “has little or no chance of success,” meaning that it appears “from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). “A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard as a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”3 Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App’x 508, 509 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)). Gamble filed this lawsuit against Deputy Brooks and the “Oglethorpe County Sheriffs.” Docs. 1; 1-1. Gamble alleges that on December 12th,4 Deputy Brooks, who

is allegedly employed by the Oglethorpe County Sheriff’s office, interrupted his travels and forced him out of his vehicle, or “conveyance,” without justification. Doc. 1-2 at 1. Deputy Brooks allegedly searched Gamble’s vehicle unlawfully and discovered a natural plant assumed to be an illegal drug. Id. Gamble also alleges Deputy Brooks transported him to a facility described as poorly funded, where he was placed in a

3 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain specific factual matter to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 843 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.4 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)).

4 Gamble does not provide the year the alleged incidents occurred. holding cell with an individual showing symptoms of heroin withdrawal, resulting in unsanitary conditions (i.e., the presence of fecal matter). Id. Last, Gamble alleges Deputy Brooks slandered him by referring to him as a “black man” and refused to acknowledge his claimed nationality. Id. In his prayer for relief, Gamble requests

$1,000,000, claiming his name and reputation has been slandered. Doc. 1 at 4. The only potential claims raised in Gamble’s complaint are for unlawful search and seizure. But Gamble’s allegations fail to provide sufficient information to support either claim. See, e.g., Adams v. Off. of Governor, 818 F. App'x 887, 888-89 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing pleading requirements for claims of unlawful search and seizure). The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and seizure. U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).

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BEY v. BROOKS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bey-v-brooks-gamd-2025.