BEY-COUSIN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania·Decided November 9, 2021·No. 2:19-cv-01906·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MUADHDHIN BEY-COUSIN, Case No. 2:19-cv-01906-JDW

Plaintiff,

v.

OFFICER ERNEST POWELL, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Vincent Van Gogh summarized an artist’s inspiration: “You must start by experiencing what you want to express.” But while many artists base their art on experience, they also embellish, change, or distort their experience for purposes of their craft. The question before the Court is whether a party to a lawsuit can use an artist’s expressions against him as evidence of the truth. And the Court’s answer is, “Not always.” In a society that treasures First Amendment expression, courts should start with a presumption that art is art, not a statement of fact. To rebut that presumption, the party offering the evidence must demonstrate that the art is the artist’s attempt to tell a factual story. The mere fact that an artistic expression resembles reality is not enough because holding otherwise would risk chilling the free expression that our society holds dear. Muadhdhin Bey-Cousin is one such artist. As a budding hip/hop rap artist, he released an album called “Busted by Da Fedz Vol. 1” while facing gun possession charges. Now, Defendants Ernest Powell and Phillip Cherry want to use Mr. Bey- Cousin’s lyrics against him. But Officers Powell and Cherry have not put before the Court enough facts to rebut the presumption that Mr. Bey-Cousin’s lyrics are art. The Court will therefore exclude them from the trial in this case.

I. BACKGROUND Late in the evening on March 28, 2016, two officers in the Philadelphia Police Department heard a call for back-up which included a description of a 160-170 pound, 21-year-old, light-skinned African American man with minimal facial hair who was wearing dark blue pants and a red hooded sweatshirt (or red jacket). In response to that call, those officers, Defendants Ernest Powell and Phillip Cherry, stopped Mr. Bey-Cousin, a 200 pound, 32-year-old, dark-skinned African American man with a

long beard who was wearing black sweatpants and a red puffer jacket. That stop led to an arrest and conviction in federal court for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Mr. Bey-Cousin remained incarcerated from March 28, 2016, until December 2018, when the Third Circuit vacated the conviction. Mr. Bey-Cousin alleges that Officers Powell and Cherry planted a firearm on him during the arrest. In his Complaint, he asserts violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution and malicious use and

abuse of process. Mr. Bey-Cousin had an inchoate music career at the time of his arrest. Following his arrest, he released “Busted By Da Fedz Vol. 1,” which includes songs titled “Busted by Da Fedz,” “Gun Talk,” and “Court Apparance” [sic] and an album cover that depicts Mr. Bey-Cousin handcuffed in federal court during the prosecution. Mr. Bey-Cousin has filed a motion to exclude any evidence of his lyrics. Officers Powell and Cherry assert the songs describe the facts at issue and suggest that the Court permit them to cross-examine Mr. Bey-Cousin about the lyrics. Officers Powell and Cherry also argue that the jury should hear Mr. Bey-Cousin’s lyrics to assess Mr.

Bey-Cousin’s claim for damages based on harm to his career. II. LEGAL STANDARD The Federal Rules of Evidence contain no express authority for motions in limine. Regardless, both case law and practice recognize these motions. See, e.g., Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 (2000). The key function of a motion in limine is to “exclude prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 (1984). A ruling on a motion in limine is essentially

a preliminary ruling which the Court can reconsider during trial. See id. at 41. III. ANALYSIS A. Relevance Of The Lyrics To Liability Under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), a court must decide any preliminary question about whether evidence is admissible. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

Fed. R. Evid. 401(a). When the relevance of evidence depends “on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist.” Fed. R. Evid. 104(b). The Parties have not identified, and the Court has not found, a case that sets forth a rule to determine when artistic expression is relevant. In determining whether an artistic expression is relevant, the Court finds guidance in Federal Rule of Evidence 102, which directs courts to construe the Rules of Evidence “so as to administer every proceeding fairly . . . to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination. Fed. R. Evid. 102. These rules require the Court to start with a presumption that artistic

expression is not factual, for two reasons. Artists might base their work on real life, but they take creative liberties that blur the line between fact and fiction. Embellishment and fictional elements pervade, even when the artist draws on real world experience for inspiration. Thus, the introduction of artistic expression as a party admission will often not further the end of ascertaining the truth. In addition, if artists or budding artists know that their expression might put them in legal jeopardy, they might put down their pens, pocket their paintbrushes, or bite their

tongues. As a society, we encourage that type of expression. A rule that discourages it would not be just, either to the parties or to the broader public. The Court recognizes that starting with a presumption that artistic expression is not a factual admission might in some cases lead to the exclusion of admissible evidence. But the First Amendment requires no less. To overcome that rule, the proponent of evidence must offer some preliminary

indicia that the artistic expression is a truthful narrative, like the inclusion of factual detail that is not publicly available. In an effort to meet that burden, Officers Cherry and Powell point to the “seemingly autobiographical details involving the arrest and prosecution at issue in this case.” (ECF No. 52 at 3.) But their own words betray them: a “seemingly” autobiographical work is not necessarily autobiographical. First, it is not enough just to show that an artist used the first person. Artists use the first-person as a tool of creative expression, sometimes to describe themselves, sometimes to describe a fictionalized version of themselves, and sometimes to

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Related

Luce v. United States
469 U.S. 38 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Ohler v. United States
529 U.S. 753 (Supreme Court, 2000)