Bewick v. State
Opinion
Bewick appeals his felony conviction on two counts of driving while intoxicated (D.W.I.) causing serious bodily injury, section 316.1931, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984),1 and the sentence of imprisonment resulting from those convictions. He moved to dismiss the information on the ground that he could only be convicted of felony D.W.I. under subparagraph (2)(b)3 if his previous drunk driving conviction involved damage to the person or property of another. He admitted a previous D.W.I. conviction without injury or damage. When his motion to dismiss was denied, he entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal the denial of that motion. We affirm.
Where language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resort to the rules of statutory construction or interpretation. The statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. State v. Stuler, 122 So.2d 1 (Fla.1960). Here the legislature has clearly expressed its intent to punish a second drunk driving conviction more severely where the second incident involves damage to the person or property of another, even if the first one did not.
Subsection (1) of section 316.1931 makes it unlawful for a person to drive, operate or be in control of a vehicle when under the influence of alcoholic beverages or certain drugs to the extent that such person has been deprived of full possession of his or her faculties. It thus describes the prohibited conduct. This subsection also provides that a previous conviction for violation un[74] der section 316.193 or former section 316.-028 shall be considered a previous conviction for violation of subsection (1). Thus, a person violates subsection (1) who has previously been convicted of any drunk driving offense.
Subsection (2) says that any person who is convicted of driving while intoxicated and who by reason of the operation of the vehicle causes serious bodily injury to another, and who has previously been convicted of violating subsection (1) (and thus any drunk driving offense) is guilty of a felony of the third degree. This is clearly what the statute says and what it means.
The trial court read the statute correctly and properly denied the motion to dismiss.
AFFIRMED.
Footnotes
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501 So. 2d 72 (Bewick v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.