Bevins v. Damron

118 S.W.2d 136, 274 Ky. 74, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 226
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedJune 7, 1938
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 118 S.W.2d 136 (Bevins v. Damron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bevins v. Damron, 118 S.W.2d 136, 274 Ky. 74, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 226 (Ky. 1938).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Baird

Affirming.

Appelllant, J. Mont Bevins, and appellees, A. R. Damron and Lilly Damron, owned adjoining tracts of land situated in Pike County, Kentucky.

On the 25th day of April, 1934, appellees filed their joint petition in equity in the Pike circuit court alleging that they were the owners and in the actual possession of a tract of land describing it by metes and bounds; that appellant was giving out in word and speech that he had a claim on a part of their land and was thereby casting a cloud upon their title which depreciated the value thereof and deterred prospective purchasers from buying same; that he entered upon their land and tore down and removed a part of their fencing and caused to be exposed their orchard and garden to the public and removed the division line between the two farms. They asked that the cloud be removed and that Bevins be adjudged to have no right, title or interest in the land claimed by him; and, for a permanent injunction restraining and enjoining him from entering upon their land and interfering in any manner with their peaceful possession. Appellant by answer and counter-claim denied the material allegations of their petition, and further, after describing his land by metes and bounds, alleged that he was the owner of a small strip of land that appellees claimed to own along where their land joins “about 30 feet wide at the creek, about 100 feet wide at the public road, and about 400 feet in length; ’ ’ that appellees were estopped upon certain grounds hereinafter more particularly referred to from claiming the line to be as set out in their petition. Based on the proof and pleading, the chancellor rendered the following judgment:

“It is therefore adjudged by the court that the true line between the parties hereto, beginning at a set stone at Bent Branch indicated by the letter ‘A’ on the said map; thence running up the hill to a walnut tree; thence continuing up the hill to a hickory corner in old fence line indicated on the Picklesimer map by the letter ‘B\
*76 “It is further adjudged by the court that the defendant and any person acting under him is hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from interfering and molesting the plaintiff in the maintenance of said fence and/or interfering or molesting the plaintiffs and those holding under them in the possession or occupancy of plaintiffs’ land below said fence line.”'

The action involves primarily the location of the true division line between their respective lands. It is practically agreed that more than fifty years before the institution of this action, that Billie Hinkle, the immediate vendor of Bevins, owned the farm now owned by him; and that Dan Harrison, the remote grantor of appellees, owned the land now owned by the Damrons; that while the farms were owned by them, the dividing line between the two farms was agreed upon and established, and a marked stone planted showing the true corner of the two farms. A fence was built by them along the agreed line and maintained by their successors in title to the institution of this action. Appellees contend that about ten years before this action was instituted, appellant wrongfully mutilated and destroyed the marked corner stone that was planted when the agreement between Hinkle and Harrison was made and wrongfully planted another stone further down the public road. Bevins is now claiming that the true line between the farms begins on that stone; and, that the line running from that stone across appellees’ line, includes the strip of land now claimed by him (appellant). Appellant denied that the corner stone was mutilated or changed by him or that it had ever been changed, wrongfully or at all, but it is now and has been maintained at the same place, where it was planted by Hinkle and Harrison. Appellant by his counter-action, further alleged that appellees were estopped to claim the division line to be other than the one claimed by him, because in an action instituted in the Pike Circuit Court against him by Mrs. B. L. Curry et ah, a daughter of Dan Harrison who after his death obtained title to the land, under the laws of inheritance, that is now owned by appellees; that by the suit instituted against this appellant claiming the line between her (Mrs. Curry et al.) and that of appellant was adjudicated to be the same line that was established by the agreement of Hinkle and Harrison; and that the land now owned *77 by appellees was formerly owned by the Currys et al., who sold it to W. M. Stanley, the vendor of appellees. But it was admitted in appellant’s counter-action that Stanley was not a party to that action; that the line between the land that he owned and sold to these appellees did not divide the farm of appellant and the farm of Mrs. B. L. Curry et al.; but appellant did allege that Stanley manifested an active interest in the success of the Curry lawsuit, while it was being prepared for trial, and was a witness for them as was also one of his sons; that the final judgment in that action was in favor of appellant, which judgment has never been set aside, modified or appealed from. Because Stanley was the vendor of appellees, and because the line in that litigation was a portion of the division line now in controversy, he alleged that appellees are estopped to deny or question the line which appellant now claims to be the true boundary between their farms. As before stated, Stanley, the vendor of the Damrons, was not a party to that action, nor were Stanley or the Damrons in any way effected by the result of that lawsuit. The establishment of the boundary line between the land owned by Mrs. B. L. Curry et al., and the land owned by appellant, by that judgment, could not and did not estop or preclude Stanley or his vendees, the Damrons, from claiming the true boundary to be where they now contend it is in this action. There is no merit in that contention. Bush et al. v. Chenault’s Ex’r, 175 Ky. 598, 194 S. W. 777; Mentz’s Assignee v. Mahoney et al., 150 Ky. 409, 150 S. W. 503.

Appellees pleaded that when they purchased the land they now own from "W. M. Stanley, the line as now claimed by them was shown by a fence that then existed and which had been built and rebuilt at the same place for fifty years continuously; that the fence was on the line claimed to be the division line by them when purchased and conveyed to them by Stanley; that this division line was claimed by him and their vendors and all those under whom they claimed, for more than fifty years, and that they since their purchase, and those under whom they claimed, have been in the quiet, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession to that line fence, holding, using and claiming it as their own continuously for more than fifty years.

Appellant traversed appellees’ allegations and alleged that he and his immediate vendors had owned, *78 used, held and claimed the strip of land continuously, and had been in the peaceful, adverse and continuous possession thereof to the line where he claims the fence should be for more than thirty years, claiming it all the time as his own. This is denied by appellees.

On this issue the proof pro and con was taken.

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174 S.W.2d 726 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1943)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
118 S.W.2d 136, 274 Ky. 74, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 226, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bevins-v-damron-kyctapphigh-1938.