Beverage Hill Realty v. Zoning Bd. of Review, Pawtucket, 95-4198 (1996)

CourtSuperior Court of Rhode Island
DecidedFebruary 13, 1996
DocketC.A. No. 95-4198
StatusPublished

This text of Beverage Hill Realty v. Zoning Bd. of Review, Pawtucket, 95-4198 (1996) (Beverage Hill Realty v. Zoning Bd. of Review, Pawtucket, 95-4198 (1996)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beverage Hill Realty v. Zoning Bd. of Review, Pawtucket, 95-4198 (1996), (R.I. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

DECISION
Before the Court is an appeal from a June 6, 1995 decision of the Zoning Board of Review of the City of Pawtucket (Board), denying an application of Beverage Hill Realty, LLC and Mannolini Realty, Inc. (together plaintiffs) for a dimensional variance. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1991 (1991 Reenactment)45-24-69.

Facts/Travel
Mannolini Realty, Inc. owns the subject property, presently a vacant lot, described as Lot number 402 on Tax Assessor's Plat 38. Said lot is situated in a Manufacturing Open Zone (MO). In a MO Zone, the minimum required lot size is 20,000 square feet with a lot frontage of one hundred feet with setback requirements of twenty feet front, side, and rear. Lot number 402 is 17,250 square feet, 2,750 feet less than required. Mannolini Realty, Inc., together with Beverage Hill Realty, LLC, filed an application with the Board for a dimensional variance with respect to the property.

A hearing was held May 30, 1995 at which Stephen E. Choquette (Choquette), principal of Beverage Hill Realty, LLC, testified as to the need for the variance. Choquette stated that he intends to move his current businesses, Beverage Hill Realty, LLC and Choquette Development Corp., from their present location to the subject property, Choquette characterizing the business as landscaping, construction site work, residential and commercial building.

The plans submitted by the plaintiffs include two buildings. The larger of the two buildings is intended to house the essential equipment of the businesses, including vehicles, as well as an office from which the businesses are run. The smaller building is intended to be used for the retail sale of plant materials and garden supplies. Both buildings would cover approximately one-third of the property, the remaining portion to be used for supply and equipment storage, as well as customer parking.

Also submitted at the hearing was the Advisory Opinion of the Pawtucket Department of Planning and Redevelopment (Department). The Department found that the lot is non-conforming by dimension. Viewing the size and configuration of the lot in conjunction with the minimum area and frontage requirements, the Department found that almost any structure would be in violation of the twenty foot side requirements but that the proposed application would be in agreement with the City's Comprehensive Plan. Accordingly, the Department recommended the Board approve plaintiffs' request for a dimensional variance as the narrow rectangular lot prevents any applicant from building any normal size structure.

At a June 6, 1995 meeting, the Board denied plaintiffs' application for the dimensional variance. Article 9-9(F) (3) of the Pawtucket Zoning Ordinance requires a concurring vote of four of the five sitting board members in favor of a variance before it will grant an applicant's request. In its written decision, however, the Board noted that only three of the Board's members voted in favor of granting the variance. The remaining two members of the Board voted to deny the application, finding that although the proposed use of the land is acceptable and compatible with the area in question, the size and design of the building is against the public interest. The plaintiffs appealed that decision to this Court.

On appeal, plaintiffs present essentially four arguments: (1) the written decision is inconsistent with the record; (2) plaintiffs submitted sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirements of a dimensional variance; (3) the Board's decision is an abuse of discretion not based on the evidence; and, (4) the decision was made on unlawful procedure.

Standard of Review
Superior Court review of a zoning board decision is controlled by G.L. 1956 (1991 Reenactment) § 45-24-69 (D) pursuant to which the court may affirm, reverse or modify the decision of a zoning board if substantial rights of an appellant have been prejudiced because its findings are: in violation of law; in excess of its authority; made upon unlawful procedure or affected by an error of law; clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, substantial evidence in the record; or is arbitrary and capricious or evidences an unwarranted abuse of discretion.

When reviewing a decision of a zoning board, a Justice of the Superior Court may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the zoning board if he or she conscientiously finds that the board's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Apostolouv. Genovesi, 120 R.I. 501, 507, 388 A.2d 821, 825 (1978). "Substantial evidence as used in this context means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance." Caswell v. George Sherman Sandand Gravel Co., Inc., 424 A.2d 646, 647 (R.I. 1981). On review, the Supreme Court examines the record to determine whether "competent evidence" supports the Superior Court judge's decision. R.J.E.P. Associates v. Hellewell, 560 A.2d 353, 354 (R.I. 1989).

Plaintiffs first argue that the Board's decision should be reversed because the written decision is inconsistent with the record. The Board maintains that the decision sets forth definite statements of the Board's findings of fact and therefore, the decision should be affirmed.

It is the obligation of a zoning board of review to decide cases before it so that the content of the decision meets minimal requirements. The board's findings must be factual rather than conclusionary, and the application of the legal principles must be something more than the recital of a litany. The findings should pinpoint the specific evidence upon which such findings are based and disclose the reasons upon which the ultimate decision is based. If the board does not comply with these [directives], they run the risk of reversal. Hopf v. Board ofReview of Newport, 102 R.I. 275, 230 A.2d 420 (1967).

In the instant proceedings, the written decision states that "although the proposed use of the land is acceptable and compatible with the area in question, the dissenting Board members find that the size and design of the building is againstthe public interest." (Emphasis added.) The only references in the record to the size and design of the building, however, regard the two foot setback in the rear of the property and its effect on the means of egress, as well as the drainage system initially proposed by the plaintiffs. Which concerns were addressed by the plaintiffs prior to the June 6, 1995 meeting. Plaintiffs increased the rear setback from two feet to three feet six inches, creating a second legal egress, and agreed to install a new drainage system which would prevent the overflow onto the adjacent property. Moreover, the two dissenting Board members rejected the application not because of the size and design defects, but because the intended business purposes are not permitted:

"In the findings, use as stated is not a proper use . . . that's the reason why I voted no." Transcript of June 6, 1995 meeting at 17-18.

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Related

Mongony v. Bevilacqua
432 A.2d 661 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1981)
Hopf v. Board of Review of City of Newport
230 A.2d 420 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1967)
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co.
424 A.2d 646 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1981)
R.J.E.P. Associates v. Hellewell
560 A.2d 353 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1989)
Apostolou v. Genovesi
388 A.2d 821 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1978)
Bamber v. Zoning Board of Review
591 A.2d 1220 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1991)
Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority
586 A.2d 1055 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1991)

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Beverage Hill Realty v. Zoning Bd. of Review, Pawtucket, 95-4198 (1996), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beverage-hill-realty-v-zoning-bd-of-review-pawtucket-95-4198-1996-risuperct-1996.