Betty Sue Stanley v. General Foods Corporation, Maxwell House Division, Defendant-Third-Party v. Allied Food Workers District Union 103, Third-Party

508 F.2d 274, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2862, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 16074
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedFebruary 17, 1975
Docket274
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 508 F.2d 274 (Betty Sue Stanley v. General Foods Corporation, Maxwell House Division, Defendant-Third-Party v. Allied Food Workers District Union 103, Third-Party) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Betty Sue Stanley v. General Foods Corporation, Maxwell House Division, Defendant-Third-Party v. Allied Food Workers District Union 103, Third-Party, 508 F.2d 274, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2862, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 16074 (3d Cir. 1975).

Opinion

*275 PER CURIAM:

Betty Sue Stanley appeals from the judgment of the district court which found her union had not breached its duty of fair representation. We think the court was correct, and therefore, affirm.

The facts which gave rise to this dispute began in December, 1971, when Stanley was discharged for failure to comply with General Foods’ Absentee and Lateness procedure. The validity of that procedure, then undergoing arbitrator scrutiny, was upheld under the existing contract as a reasonable factory rule. Stanley challenged the fairness of the procedure, charging that it was administered unfairly. When the union refused to arbitrate her claim, she sued General Foods, requesting the court to compel arbitration. Her union, Allied Food Workers (AFL-CIO) was eventually drawn into the suit, and defended on the ground that it had not breached its duty of fair representation, the threshold issue below. We agree.

A review of the record shows that Stanley did not contest the correctness of the points assessed against her. Furthermore, her prior record showed three previous suspensions for absenteeism, falsification of records and negligence on the job. Although the union requested that she remain on the job, the company refused. The matter proceeded to a Step III grievance meeting but the company continued to refuse her reinstatement. When the validity of the absence procedure was eventually upheld in a separate arbitration proceeding, the union felt that a further pursuit of Stanley’s case would be meritless. Stanley’s contention that her discharge resulted from sex discrimination did not become clear until trial and is belied by the record below. During the grievance procedure itself, nothing concerning such discrimination was voiced and the union proceeded on its belief and Stanley’s initial assertion that the absentee procedure was unreasonable.

Under the circumstances, it appears the union met their obligation of fair representation by pursuing her grievance to a point where further action would have been fruitless. The union is not under an absolute duty to pursue a grievance through arbitration and a breach of duty is not established merely by proof that the underlying grievance was meritorious. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Turner v. Air Transport Dispatchers’ Association, 5 Cir., 1972, 468 F.2d 297, 299-300. We cannot say that the union’s conduct here was discriminatory or unfair.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
508 F.2d 274, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2862, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 16074, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/betty-sue-stanley-v-general-foods-corporation-maxwell-house-division-ca3-1975.