Betty Morano v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Lp

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: July 1, 2026
• Docket: A26A0191
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOURTH DIVISION MCFADDEN, P. J., WATKINS and PADGETT, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

June 11, 2026

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0191. MORANO v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP.

MCFADDEN, Presiding Judge.

Betty Morano appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Wal-

Mart Stores East, LP in this slip-and-fall action. The sole issue on appeal is whether

a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Morano had equal or superior

knowledge to Wal-Mart of the hazard, a substance on the floor that she slipped in

while shopping at a Wal-Mart store. Because we agree with Morano that a question

of fact exists on that issue, we reverse.

1. Facts

“On appeal from a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, [we] conduct[]

a de novo review, viewing the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” SMG Constr. Servs. v. Cook,

322 Ga. 819, 820 (922 SE2d 76) (2025) (citation modified). So viewed, the evidence

shows that on June 21, 2020, a customer in a Wal-Mart store dropped a container of

hair product on the floor, spilling some of the product. The spilled substance was a

light color that blended in with the tile floor. The customer picked the container back

up, replaced its lid, and put it back on the shelf.

About thirty minutes later another customer, Morano, entered the aisle where

the hair product remained on the floor. Without seeing the spilled substance, she

stepped into it while browsing items on the shelves. Morano realized that she was

standing in a substance, turned and began to warn another customer of it, then shortly

thereafter slipped and fell to the floor. Morano was injured in the fall.

2. Analysis

“Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces

or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in

damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in

keeping the premises and approaches safe.” OCGA § 51-3-1. “[T]he fundamental

basis for an owner or occupier’s liability [is] that party’s superior knowledge of the

2 hazard encountered by the plaintiff.” Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 736(1) (493

SE2d 403) (1997). As our Supreme Court has explained,

to recover for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an invitee must prove (1) that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier. However, the plaintiff’s evidentiary proof concerning the second prong is not shouldered until the defendant establishes negligence on the part of the plaintiff — i.e., that the plaintiff intentionally and unreasonably exposed [her]self to a hazard of which the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known.

Id. at 748-49(2)(b). See also Williams Inv. Co. v. Girardot, 354 Ga. App. 762, 763-64

(841 SE2d 436) (2020).

Wal-Mart does not challenge the existence of a genuine issue of material fact

with regard to the first prong of this analysis: whether it had actual or constructive

knowledge of the spilled substance. Likewise, Wal-Mart does not challenge the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Morano, in the exercise of

ordinary care, should have known of the spilled substance.

Instead, Wal-Mart argues that Morano had actual knowledge of the spilled

substance that was equal or superior to Wal-Mart’s own knowledge. But as Wal-Mart

3 concedes in its appellate brief, Morano “discovered and saw the substance on the

floor after she stepped in it[.]” (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, Wal-Mart argues that

it is entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed evidence shows that

Morano, after seeing the substance, “interact[ed]” with it by moving her foot in it and

then “walk[ing] back through” it before falling.

Knowledge of a hazard gained after the invitee has already been exposed to it

but immediately before the invitee falls does not satisfy the requirement articulated

in Robinson that the plaintiff must have “intentionally and unreasonably exposed

[her]self to a hazard of which [she] knew[.]” Robinson, 268 Ga. at 749(2)(b). And

viewed most favorably to Morano, the evidence does not compel a finding that she

intentionally and unreasonably “walked back through” the substance after realizing

that it was there. Morano testified in her deposition: “I stepped on something. I

turned to [the other customer], and I told her to be careful. I think there’s something

on the floor. And I think I didn’t even get to finish my sentence when I went down.

I’m — I guess, I took another step. And that’s when I — it just went out from under

me.” When asked if she had moved her foot around in the substance before falling,

Morano testified: “I don’t think so. I could have, but I don’t think so.”

4 The record contains a surveillance video recording of the incident that Wal-

Mart argues resolves this issue in its favor. A court may, on summary judgment,

disregard a party’s description of an incident if it is blatantly contradicted by a video

recording of the incident. See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, 330 Ga. App. 340,

348(2)(b)(ii) (765 SE2d 518) (2014) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380(III)(A)

(127 SCt 1769, 167 LE2d 686) (2007)). But the video recording in this case does not

clearly show what occurred. It shows Morano entering an aisle; stopping to look at

something on a shelf; looking down at her feet; moving around a bit; turning to speak

to someone; and then slipping and falling onto the floor approximately 25 seconds

after she first looked at her feet. Due to the angle and distance of the camera, as well

as the placement of Morano’s shopping cart in front of her, however, the video

recording does not provide a clear view of Morano’s feet or the substance itself.

Importantly, it does not show whether Morano stepped out of the substance and then

back into it before she fell.

Wal-Mart’s 30(b)(6) representative deposed that it appeared from the video

recording that Morano did move her foot in the substance, and Morano agreed in her

deposition that the video could be viewed that way. But it is reasonable to infer from

5 this testimony that Morano was trying to remove herself from the hazard, not to

further expose herself to it. Simply put, the record — including the surveillance video

— does not contain plain, palpable, and undisputed evidence that Morano

intentionally and unreasonably exposed herself to the hazard after becoming aware of

it. See generally Robinson, 268 Ga. at 748(2)(b) (routine issues of premises liability,

such as whether a plaintiff intentionally and unreasonably exposed herself to a known

hazard, “are generally not susceptible of summary adjudication, and ... summary

judgment is granted only when the evidence is plain, palpable, and undisputed”).

The authorities cited by Wal-Mart do not require a different conclusion. As to

the two cases on which the parties particularly focus in their appellate briefs, in P&D

Ole Times v. McCray, 369 Ga. App. 270, 271-72, 275 (893 SE2d 171) (2023), the

plaintiff entered the restroom of a restaurant, saw an overflowing trash can and paper

towels on the floor, used the restroom and washed his hands, then slipped on a paper

towel as he walked to the door to leave. And in Martin v. Consolidated Stores Corp., 248

Ga. App. 812, 813-14 (547 SE2d 380) (2001), the plaintiff entered a store restroom,

saw water pouring out of a urinal onto the floor, purposefully walked through an inch

of standing water to enter a stall, then walked back through the standing water after

6 exiting the stall, and fell just as he reached the door of the bathroom. Id. at 813-14.

Both cases, unlike here, involved plaintiffs who saw the hazards before putting

themselves in proximity to the hazards.

Because there exists a genuine issue of material fact on whether Morano had

equal or superior knowledge of the hazard, Wal-Mart has not shown that it is entitled

to summary judgment.

Judgment reversed. Watkins and Padgett, JJ., concur.