UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________
No. 25-1644 _____________
BETTE EAKIN; DSCC; DCCC; AFT PENNSYLVANIA
v.
ADAMS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; ALLEGHENY COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BEAVER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BEDFORD COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BERKS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BLAIR COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BRADFORD COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BUCKS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; BUTLER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CAMBRIA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CAMERON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CARBON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CENTRE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CLARION COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CLEARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CLINTON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; COLUMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CRAWFORD COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; CUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FULTON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; HUNTINGDON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; INDIANA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD DAUPHIN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; DELAWARE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; ELK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FAYETTE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FOREST COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; OF ELECTIONS; JUNIATA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; LACKAWANNA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; LAWRENCE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; LEBANON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; LEHIGH COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; LUZERNE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; LYCOMING COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; MCKEAN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; MERCER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; MIFFLIN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; MONTOUR COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; NORTHAMPTON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; PERRY COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; PIKE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; POTTER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; SNYDER COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; SOMERSET COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; SULLIVAN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; TIOGA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; UNION COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; VENANGO COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WESTMORELAND COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WYOMING COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; ERIE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; GREENE COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; PHILADELPHIA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; SCHUYLKILL COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; YORK COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; ARMSTRONG COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE; NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE; REPUBLICAN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA, (Intervenors in District Court) Appellants
_____________________
District Court No. 1:22-cv-00340 ________________________
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING ________________________
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO, BIBAS, PORTER, MATEY, PHIPPS, FREEMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, CHUNG, BOVE, and SMITH,* Circuit Judges
* The vote of the Honorable D. Brooks Smith, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, is limited to panel rehearing.
2 The petition for rehearing filed by the Intervenor Appellant, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the petition for rehearing filed by the
Intervenor Appellants, the Republican National Committee, the National Republican
Congressional Committee, and the Republican Party of Pennsylvania, in the above-
entitled case having been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of
this Court and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active
service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and
a majority of the judges of the circuit in regular service not having voted for
rehearing, the petitions for rehearing by panel and the Court en banc, are denied.1
BY THE COURT,
s/D. Brooks Smith Circuit Judge
Dated: October 14, 2025 tmk/cc: all counsel of record
1 Judges Hardiman, Bibas, Porter, Matey, Phipps, and Bove would grant the petitions for rehearing by the en banc court. Judge Phipps, joined by Judges Hardiman, Bibas, Porter, Matey and Bove, files the attached dissent sur denial of rehearing. Judge Bove will file a separate dissent sur rehearing on a later date. 3 Eakin v. Adams County Board of Elections, No. 25-1644 PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, joined by HARDIMAN, BIBAS, PORTER, MATEY, and BOVE, Circuit Judges, dissenting sur denial of rehearing en banc. The decision in this case declared unconstitutional the date requirement for mail-in ballots in Pennsylvania on the ground that its burden on voters outweighed the Commonwealth’s interests in the orderly administration of elections, the solemnity of
elections, and the prevention of election fraud. Central to this Court’s analysis under that Anderson-Burdick balancing test1 was the Boockvar decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held that the Free and Equal Elections Clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution2 did not require either notice to voters of the rejection of their mail-in ballots or the opportunity to correct ballot defects. See Eakin v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 149 F.4th 291, 302, 309–10 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (citing Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 374 (Pa. 2020)). A month after this Court’s ruling, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Coalfield Justice, which held that the Inherent Rights Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution3 requires that mail-in voters receive notice of the
rejection of their ballots and the opportunity to correct ballot defects. Ctr. for Coalfield Just. v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 2025 WL 2740487, at *8, *25, *30 (Pa. Sept. 26, 2025). This Court’s decision evaluated the prior scheme for mail-in voting, not the one
now required by Coalfield Justice. As a legal matter, this Court’s decision was already questionable because in its Anderson-Burdick balancing, it did not treat the date requirement for mail-in ballots as a
1 See generally Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 2 Pa. Const. art. 1, § 5. 3 Pa. Const. art. 1, § 1; see also R. v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 152 (Pa. 1994) (“Even though the term ‘due process’ appears nowhere in [Section 1 or 11 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution], due process rights are considered to emanate from them.”).
1 de minimis burden, see Mazo v. N.J. Sec’y of State, 54 F.4th 124, 138–39 (3d Cir. 2022), and because it substantially undervalued the Commonwealth’s identified interests in the
date requirement.4 And that was before Coalfield Justice eliminated two of the key rationales for this Court’s decision: the lack of notice of a rejected mail-in ballot and the absence of an opportunity to correct such a rejected ballot. So now as a practical matter,
reconsideration of this Court’s decision is especially needed because it is not clear that the ruling has any applicability going forward – it appears not to.5 In short, there are significant questions about this Court’s decision, and as a matter
of exceptional importance, it merits en banc reconsideration. I therefore vote for such review.
4 Cf. generally Daunt v. Benson, 999 F.3d 299, 322–33 (6th Cir. 2021) (Readler, J., concurring) (identifying broader problems with the Anderson-Burdick balancing test and its application). 5 Cf. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 585 U.S. 33, 44 (2018) (“If the relevant state law is established by a decision of ‘the State’s highest court,’ that decision is ‘binding on the federal courts.’” (quoting Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 (1983))).
2 Eakin v. Adams County Board of Elections, No. 25-1644 BOVE, Circuit Judge, joined by Hardiman, Bibas, Porter, Matey, and Phipps, Circuit Judges, dissenting sur denial of rehearing en banc.
Several years ago, Judge Readler found it “hard to think of a less burdensome
requirement associated with the voting process” than Tennessee’s rule that first-time voters
must appear in person either to register or to cast their votes. Memphis A. Philip Randolph
Inst. v. Hargett, 2 F.4th 548, 563 (6th Cir. 2021) (Readler, J., concurring).1
Well, we found one. At issue here is Pennsylvania’s requirement that voters write
the date next to their signature on a declaration while transmitting a mail-in ballot. For a
voter with a functioning pen, sufficient ink, and average hand dexterity, this should take
less than five seconds. Yet Plaintiffs narrowed in on this decades-old requirement situated
within a package of recently reformed Pennsylvania laws, known as “Act 77,” that
established universal mail-in voting and other protections. These five seconds, Plaintiffs
alleged, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
At the headline level, this general claim strains credulity and defies common sense.
See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 209 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“That the State accommodates some voters by permitting (not
requiring) the casting of absentee . . . ballots, is an indulgence—not a constitutional
imperative that falls short of what is required.”); see also McDonald v. Bd. of Election
Comm’rs of Chi., 394 U.S. 802, 810-11 (1969) (“Ironically, . . . extending the absentee
1 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, alterations, and subsequent history.
1 voting privileges . . . provided appellants with a basis for arguing that the provisions operate
in an invidiously discriminatory fashion to deny them a more convenient method of
exercising the franchise.”).
A complex thicket of decisions—some of which also defy common sense—
obscured that reality and led to what I concede were “hard judgment[s].” Eakin v. Adams
Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 149 F.4th 291, 298 (3d Cir. 2025). The opinion, however, raised
significant federalism concerns, misapplied binding precedent from the Supreme Court and
this Court, deepened a Circuit split regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny, and
conflicted with a subsequent decision of Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court. See Eakin v.
Adams Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 2025 WL 2909016, at *1 (3d Cir. 2025) (Phipps, J.,
dissenting sur denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Ctr. for Coalfield Just. v. Wash. Cnty.
Bd. of Elections, 2025 WL 2740487 (Pa. 2025)). These issues of exceptional importance
add to existing uncertainty already faced by Pennsylvania officials preparing to administer
elections on November 4, 2025, as well as during the midterm congressional elections next
year. Therefore, the case merited en banc review.
I.
The Constitution vests authority over the administration of elections in politically
accountable bodies. The Elections Clause “provides that state legislatures—not federal
judges, not state judges, not state governors, not other state officials—bear primary
responsibility for setting election rules.” DNC v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct.
28, 29 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay) (citing U.S.
2 Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). As a “second layer of protection,” “[i]f state rules need revision,
Congress is free to alter them.” Id.
These textual commitments make sense. Compared to courts, legislatures are in a
better position to “make policy and bring to bear the collective wisdom of the whole people
when they do,” and they “enjoy far greater resources for research and factfinding.”
Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 29 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in denial of
application to vacate stay); see also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality
opinion) (reasoning that “a federal court should act cautiously” when “exercising its power
to review the constitutionality of a legislative Act” because a “ruling of unconstitutionality
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people”).
Apart from the lack of political accountability, the shortcomings of the judicially
created test applied in this case are another good reason for courts to proceed with caution
in this space. “[T]he States depend on clear and administrable guidelines from the courts.”
Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616, 2616 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the grant
of stay). But “Anderson-Burdick’s hallmark is standardless standards.” Daunt v. Benson
(Daunt II), 999 F.3d 299, 323 (6th Cir. 2021) (Readler, J., concurring in the judgment).
This is a “dangerous tool” in “sensitive policy-oriented cases,” as the test “affords far too
much discretion to judges in resolving the dispute before them.” Daunt v. Benson (Daunt
I), 956 F.3d 396, 424 (6th Cir. 2020) (Readler, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Graveline v. Benson, 992 F.3d 524, 553 (6th Cir. 2021) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (“This case
illustrates once again why applying Anderson-Burdick’s grant of discretion to the federal
judiciary can lead to tension with the principles of federalism and separation of powers.”).
3 “A case-by-case approach naturally encourages constant litigation.” Crawford, 553
U.S at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). It is a “metaphysical task,” and “legal
gymnastics” are often required. Daunt II, 999 F.3d at 323 (Readler, J., concurring in the
judgment); Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775, 783 n.4 (6th Cir. 2020). This “leaves much to
a judge’s subjective determination,” results in a lack of uniformity, and offers states
inadequate guidance to “govern accordingly.” Daunt I, 956 F.3d at 424-25 (Readler, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182,
208 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“When an election law burdens
voting and associational interests, our cases are much harder to predict . . . .”).
A sounder approach in voting-rights cases would leave it to “state legislatures to
weigh the costs and benefits of possible changes to their election codes,” with federal courts
stepping in to second-guess those judgments only when a state’s decision imposes “a severe
and unjustified overall burden upon the right to vote, or is intended to disadvantage a
particular class.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). That
is not the trend in this Circuit’s caselaw, which is one of the reasons I believe en banc
review was appropriate in this case.
By marginalizing the de minimis exception to Anderson-Burdick review, and
proceeding with invasive scrutiny of state interests relative to “downstream consequences”
and “impacts,” the panel opinion exacerbates the risk that judges act contrary to the will of
the People. Eakin, 149 F.4th at 311. Equally problematic, earlier and unnecessary dicta
purports to extend Anderson-Burdick to “vindicate a variety of constitutional rights.” Mazo
v. N.J. Sec’y of State, 54 F.4th 124, 138 (3d Cir. 2022). This stands in stark contrast to the
4 three specific contexts in which the Supreme Court has applied this unique balancing test:
“ballot-access claims, political-party associational claims, and voting-rights claims.”
Lichtenstein v. Hargett, 83 F.4th 575, 590 (6th Cir. 2023); see also id. at 593 (rejecting the
argument that Anderson-Burdick applies to “all election law challenges—whether the
challenger raises a free-speech claim, a substantive-due-process claim, an equal-protection
claim, or any other claim”).
These expansions of Anderson-Burdick have the potential to cause election chaos in
Pennsylvania and beyond. See McDonald, 394 U.S. at 809 (“[A] legislature need not run
the risk of losing an entire remedial scheme simply because it failed, through inadvertence
or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.”). Striking
the date requirement as unconstitutional risked activation of Act 77’s non-severability
clause. See Act 77 § 11. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is currently considering the
operation of that clause. See Baxter v. Phila. Bd. of Elections, 332 A.3d 1183 (Pa. 2025).
Other features of Act 77 will be struck if the clause is triggered, further undermining the
bipartisan democratic compromise that led to Act 77 in the first place. County clerks could
lose the ability to begin processing mail-in ballot applications more than 50 days before an
election, under § 5.1 of Act 77, which could result in delays that would be especially
challenging in smaller and more rural counties. The extension of the voter registration
deadline to 15 days before an election, under § 4, would likely revert to 30 days. The status
of voters who registered between those deadlines would be unclear. In connection with
the November 4, 2025 election and the midterms, voters could be misled by voter education
efforts that Pennsylvania commissioned to explain Act 77’s reform under § 10. These
5 examples demonstrate why Pennsylvania warned that the case has “the potential to wreak
havoc across the Election Code.” Intervenor-Appellant’s Emergency Mot. to Stay at 19,
Dkt. No. 145.
II.
The uncertainty created by the panel’s decision was unnecessary because existing
authority addresses the panel’s main concern relating to Pennsylvania discarding mail-in
ballots based on violations of the date requirement. See Eakin, 149 F.4th at 318 (“[W]e
are unable to justify the Commonwealth’s practice of discarding ballots contained in return
envelopes with missing or incorrect dates that has resulted in the disqualification of
thousands of presumably proper ballots”). The panel opinion offered a thorough treatment
of the history of absentee mail-in voting in Pennsylvania, but it omitted key litigation
developments that undermined the holding. There is no federal constitutional problem with
Pennsylvania rejecting ballots that do not comply with duly enacted statutory procedures,
and Pennsylvania’s constitution has been interpreted to mitigate any voting hardships
arising from that outcome.
Voting by mail in the Commonwealth dates back to 1937. See Eakin, 149 F.4th at
298. Absentee voting was expanded in 1963, and around that time Pennsylvania began to
require voters to “fill out, date, and sign” a declaration on the mail-in envelope. Id. at 299.
Pennsylvania enacted Act 77 in 2019. Among other things, the law “established a
comprehensive process for voting by mail” and “retained” the language now located at
25 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a).
6 After the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 Election, challenges to
Pennsylvania’s mail-in voting procedures worked their way through the Pennsylvania
courts. See, e.g., In re: Nov. 3, 2020 Gen. Election, 240 A.3d 591 (Pa. 2020); Kelly v.
Commonwealth, 240 A.3d 1255 (Pa. 2020). By January 2022, related federal litigation
commenced under the Civil Rights Act. A group of Pennsylvania voters obtained a short-
lived victory in this Court. See Migliori v. Cohen, 36 F.4th 153 (3d Cir. 2022). Later that
year, three Justices of the Supreme Court concluded that the Migliori panel’s interpretation
of the Civil Rights Act was “very likely wrong,” and the Court vacated the decision. Ritter
v. Migliori, 142 S. Ct. 1824, 1824 (2022) (Alito, J., dissenting from the denial of the
application for stay); Ritter v. Migliori, 143 S. Ct. 297 (2022).
Soon after the vacatur order in Migliori, a new group of plaintiffs brought a fresh
challenge to Pennsylvania’s date requirement under the Civil Rights Act. NAACP v.
Schmidt, 97 F.4th 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2024). A divided panel of this Court rejected that
claim. The Schmidt majority echoed the Migliori Justices’ guidance by reasoning that:
(i) “a voter who fails to abide by state rules prescribing how to make a vote effective is not
‘den[ied] the right . . . to vote’ when his ballot is not counted”; and (ii) “we know no
authority that the ‘right to vote’ encompasses the right to have a ballot counted that is
defective under state law.” 97 F.4th at 133. This reasoning addresses the concern in Eakin
that “[a] Pennsylvania mail-in voter who fails to comply with the date requirement will not
have his or her vote counted. Period.” 149 F.3d at 311. Even if that were true, the result
would be of no significance under the federal Constitution.
7 Furthermore, as Judge Phipps already pointed out, there is no longer any basis for
the suggestion that a Pennsylvania voter who submits a defective mail-in ballot will be
disenfranchised without notice. See Eakin, 2025 WL 2909016, at *1 (Phipps, J., dissenting
sur denial of rehearing en banc). While the Petitions For Rehearing were pending in this
case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “the Pennsylvania Constitution itself
creates a liberty interest in the right to vote that implicates the protections of procedural
due process” under Pennsylvania law. Coalfield Just., 2025 WL 2740487, at *12.
Pennsylvania voters “who submitted facially defective mail-in ballots” are entitled to
notice via email “that they still had a right to vote provisionally.” Id. at *25.
Coalfield Justice also addressed several of the more specific concerns expressed in
the panel’s opinion. The opinion asserted that “Pennsylvania county election boards have
no obligation under the Election Code to notify voters if their ballots are rejected for failure
to comply with the date requirement.” Eakin, 149 F.4th at 310. If that was ever accurate,
it is no longer the case. See Coalfield Just., 2025 WL 2740487, at *25 (requiring
“[a]ccurate SURE coding [that] would have triggered an email alerting the electors who
submitted facially defective mail-in ballots that they still had a right to vote provisionally”).
The opinion contended that “a Pennsylvanian who fails to comply with the date
requirement cannot vote in person.” Eakin, 149 F.4th at 308. Not a valid concern today.
See Coalfield Just., 2025 WL 2740487, at *30 (“[T]his case . . . . is about allowing a voter
who made a mistake on a mail-in ballot return packet . . . to avail herself of the remaining
fail-safe attempt to exercise her fundamental right: completing a provisional ballot on
Election Day.”). Nor, under Coalfield Justice, is Pennsylvania free to “induce its citizens
8 to vote by mail, yet proceed to discard countless ballots for any number of reasons . . . .”
Eakin, 149 F.4th at 308. The opinion “confirm[ed] a mandate to not mislead electors . . . .”
Coalfield Just., 2025 WL 2740487, at *30.
Therefore, our precedential decision in Schmidt and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s decision in Coalfield Justice allay the main concerns that appear to have led the
panel to strike the Commonwealth’s date requirement.
III.
The panel opinion also missed two dispositive offramps from the path to
standardless Anderson-Burdick balancing. Plaintiffs failed to allege an actual violation of
the Constitution, and the burden arising from the date requirement is de minimis.
Anderson-Burdick does not apply where there is “no cognizable constitutional right
at issue.” Mazo, 54 F.4th at 138. There is not one at issue here. See Election Integrity
Project Cal., Inc. v. Weber, 113 F.4th 1072, 1088 (9th Cir. 2024) (describing the
“commonsense principle that generally applicable, even handed, and politically neutral
election regulations that tend to make it easier to vote generally do not impose a cognizable
burden on the right to vote”). From the outset of the litigation, Plaintiffs made only vague
references to the “right to vote” and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. “[T]he right to
vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right.” Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic
Party, 457 U.S. 1, 9 (1982). The right to vote is undoubtedly fundamental, but it is properly
framed as a right to participate in elections “on an equal basis with other qualified voters
whenever the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any
segment of the State’s population.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
9 1, 35 n.78 (1973). Plaintiffs did not allege the types of speech, association, equal
protection, or due process claims that could arguably support Anderson-Burdick balancing.
Most importantly, “there is no constitutional right to vote by mail.” Org. for Black
Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 603, 607 (8th Cir. 2020); see also Schmidt, 97 F.4th at 133.
“[W]here only the claimed right to vote by mail is at issue, the Anderson/Burdick test, by
its own terms, cannot apply.” Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 616 n.6 (7th Cir. 2020). That
principle is dispositive here.
There was an alternative basis that required rejecting Anderson-Burdick balancing
in this case. The test does not apply where “the burden on a constitutional right is no more
than de minimis.” Mazo, 54 F.4th at 138-39; see also Eakin, 2025 WL 2909016, at *1
(Phipps, J., dissenting sur denial of rehearing en banc) (“[T]his Court’s decision was
already questionable because in its Anderson-Burdick balancing, it did not treat the date
requirement for mail-in ballots as a de minimis burden . . . .”). “De minimis” is an accurate
characterization of the five-second burden imposed by a state-law requirement that voters
date their signature. See Tex. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 136,
145 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding “no more than a de minimis burden on the right to vote” where
“some absentee voters would have to travel farther to drop off mail ballots at a centralized
location”). Another is “non-existent.” See Vote.org v. Callanen, 39 F.4th 297, 308 (5th
Cir. 2022) (reasoning that “one strains to see how” an original-signature requirement for
voting registration “burdens voting at all”).
The panel’s opinion concluded that the de minimis exception did not apply by
equating de minimis burdens with “speculative” ones. Eakin, 149 F.4th at 311. In fact, de
10 minimis means “[t]rifling; negligible,” or “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in
deciding an issue or case.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The “de minimis”
exception described in Mazo appears to have roots in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, where Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, applied Anderson-Burdick
balancing to a constitutional burden that was “not trivial” but “not severe.” 520 U.S. 351,
363 (1997); see also Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 606 (2d Cir. 2009) (“If the
burden is minor, but non-trivial, Burdick’s balancing test is applied.” (emphasis added)).
“Trivial” is essentially a synonym of de minimis. Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024)
(defining “trivial” as “[t]rifling; inconsiderable; of small worth or importance”). Tellingly,
the Eakin opinion acknowledged that a violation of the date requirement could arise from
“something as trivial as a stray mark on the date field.” 149 F.4th at 310 (emphasis added).
After restricting the de minimis exception to so-called speculative burdens, the
opinion put another thumb on the scale for Plaintiffs by speculating that failure to follow
the date requirement would result in an unconstitutional burden based on “downstream
consequences” and “downstream effects.” Eakin, 149 F.4th at 311. This was simply a
backdoor to the flawed disenfranchisement theory that is foreclosed by Schmidt and
weakened further by Coalfield Justice. See Schmidt, 97 F.4th at 133; Coalfield Just., 2025
WL 2740487, at *30; see also Migliori, 142 S. Ct. at 1824 (Alito, J., dissenting from the
denial of the application for stay) (“When a mail-in ballot is not counted because it was not
filled out correctly, the voter is not denied ‘the right to vote.’”); New Georgia Project v.
Raffensperger, 976 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2020) (reasoning that “no one is
11 ‘disenfranchised’” where “[v]oters must simply take reasonable steps and exert some effort
to ensure that their ballots are submitted on time”).
Accordingly, because Plaintiffs’ mail-in voting claims were not founded on a
cognizable constitutional right, and because the date requirement’s burden is at most de
minimis, there was no need to resort to Anderson-Burdick balancing. En banc review was
appropriate so that the Court could establish and clarify guideposts necessary to prevent
continued expansion of this amorphous test.
IV.
I believe that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim altogether, under Rule 12(b)(6), by
relying on vague references to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. App. 73-75 ¶¶ 41-
47. If the claim merited further scrutiny, however, the proper framework was rational-
basis review. By finding otherwise, the Eakin opinion misapplied additional binding
precedent and deepened a Circuit split.
In a decision that predated Anderson-Burdick, the Supreme Court applied rational-
basis review to an Illinois law that permitted absentee voting by some groups of voters but
not a class of pretrial detainees. See McDonald, 394 U.S. at 807. Like our opinion in
Schmidt, the McDonald Court distinguished between “the fundamental right to vote” and
the “claimed right to receive absentee ballots,” which has no basis in the Constitution. Id.
Granting Illinois courtesies that were not extended to Pennsylvania in this case, the
Supreme Court declined to assume the state had disenfranchised the plaintiffs and applied
a presumption that “[l]egislatures . . . have acted constitutionally.” Id. at 809. On rational-
basis review, the Court concluded that the Illinois law bore a “rational relationship to a
12 legitimate state end” by authorizing absentee voting for certain groups such as the
physically handicapped. Id.
The Supreme Court “has not discarded McDonald, sub silentio or otherwise.” Tex.
Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 406 (5th Cir. 2020). Under McDonald,
“rational-basis scrutiny applies to election laws that do not impact the right to vote—that
is, the right to cast a ballot in person.” Tully, 977 F.3d at 616. “As long as it is possible to
vote in person, the rules for absentee ballots are constitutionally valid if they are supported
by a rational basis and do not discriminate based on a forbidden characteristic such as race
or sex.” Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson, 977 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2020). This is
the rule in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. See id.; Tully, 977 F.3d at 616 n.6 (“So,
in cases like McDonald, where only the claimed right to vote by mail is at issue, the
Anderson/Burdick test, by its own terms, cannot apply.”); Abbott, 961 F.3d at 406
(“Because the plaintiffs’ fundamental right is not at issue, McDonald directs us to review
only for a rational basis . . . .”); Mays, 951 F.3d at 784 (“When States impose ‘reasonable
nondiscriminatory restrictions’ on the right to vote, courts apply rational basis review and
‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the
restrictions.” (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992))).
While working past McDonald, the Eakin opinion acknowledged the Circuit split
and aligned with decisions of the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. See 149
F.4th 309 at n.23. Only the Second Circuit’s divided decision addressed McDonald
explicitly. See Price v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2008). The
analysis in Price is consistent with the assertion in Eakin that McDonald “rest[ed] on
13 failure of proof” regarding disenfranchisement. Eakin, 149 F.4th at 307 n.21; Price, 540
F.3d at 109 n.9. That is a distinction without a difference in this case. The “very same
‘failure[s] of proof’ exist here, because, as explained, there is no evidence that
[Pennsylvania] has prevented the plaintiffs from voting by all other means.” Abbott, 961
F.3d at 404.
The Eakin opinion also asserted that, “[e]ven if no First Amendment right to vote
by mail exists, we still must scrutinize Pennsylvania’s mail-in voting regime to ensure that
it complies with the Constitution.” 149 F.4th at 308. The panel then cited a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection case that has no bearing on Plaintiffs’ constitutional
challenge to Pennsylvania’s facially neutral date requirement. Id. (citing Harper v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)); see also Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (reasoning that “[t]he State draws no classifications, let
alone discriminatory ones, except to establish optional absentee and provisional balloting
for” certain groups). This Court has applied rational-basis review—and rejected Anderson-
Burdick balancing—where the “challenge relies solely on the Fourteenth Amendment and
[plaintiff] makes no allegations based on freedom of association.” Biener v. Calio, 361
F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 2004). The Eakin opinion did not address that binding precedent
either.
Therefore, en banc review was appropriate for the additional reason that the panel’s
opinion deepened a Circuit split by declining to follow McDonald and not applying
rational-basis review to Pennsylvania’s date requirement.
14 V.
The panel opinion reflects a particularly invasive application of Anderson-Burdick
that illustrates how this amorphous test can result in an anti-democratic seizure of power
from the People’s politically accountable representatives. See Price, 540 F.3d at 115
(Livingston, J., dissenting) (“This approach ignores both the State’s interest in making
legitimate policy judgments about the benefits and potential drawbacks of absentee voting
in particular contexts, and the lack of judicial competence sensitively to balance the
competing interests.”).
As explained above, the date requirement’s alleged burden on unspecified
constitutional rights is de minimis if not non-existent. Some other state voting laws are far
more onerous. Alabama requires signatures on an absentee ballot from not only the voter,
but also two adult witnesses or a notary public. See Ala. Code § 17-11-7(b). Following a
district court injunction based on Anderson-Burdick, the Supreme Court entered a stay and
allowed the law to take effect during the 2020 elections. See Merrill v. People First of
Ala., 141 S. Ct. 25 (2020); People First v. Merrill, 491 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (N.D. Ala. 2020).
The plaintiffs then dismissed their case. See People First of Ala. v. Sec’y of State, 2020
WL 7028611 (11th Cir. 2020). The statute remains in effect.
Compared to Alabama’s requirements, it is “easy to place a date on a return
envelope.” Eakin, 149 F.4th at 309. So easy, in fact, that this had been a non-controversial
aspect of Pennsylvania election law for decades, as had been similar requirements in other
states. The Pennsylvania legislature retained the requirement when it revised numerous
other aspects of the law by passing Act 77 in 2019.
15 Act 77’s universal mail-in voting provisions were “only a fraction of the scope of
the Act.” McLinko v. Dep’t of State, 279 A.3d 539, 543 (Pa. 2022). The law also “included
robust anti-fraud measures . . . .” Eakin, 149 F.4th at 300. These measures were
“developed over a multi-year period, with input from people of different backgrounds and
regions of Pennsylvania.” McLinko, 279 A.3d at 543. Universal mail-in voting may not
have functioned perfectly from the outset, but the system was improved “with notable
results” through state-court litigation and efforts by the governor. Eakin, 149 F.4th at 302.
There is thus every reason to believe—and we are to presume—that the resulting system
was the product of a “consistent and laudable state policy.” McDonald, 394 U.S. at 811.
In defense of this policy, Pennsylvania proffered three interests: solemnity, orderly
election administration, and fraud detection and deterrence. See Appellant’s Emergency
Mot. to Stay at 19, Dkt. No. 145. These interests were more than enough to survive
rational-basis review and should have been sufficient to withstand Anderson-Burdick
balancing. See Eakin, 2025 WL 2909016, at *1 (Phipps, J., dissenting sur denial of
rehearing en banc) (reasoning that the opinion “substantially undervalued the
Commonwealth’s identified interests in the date requirement”).
Pennsylvania should not have been required to identify “incremental solemnity”
flowing from the date requirement alone. Eakin, 149 F.4th at 315; see also Luft v. Evers,
963 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Judges must not evaluate each clause in isolation.”).
The Commonwealth’s instructions for the outer envelope of a mail-in ballot contain three
features: “fill out” the declaration, “sign the declaration,” and “date” the signature.
25 P.S. §§ 3146.6(a), 3150.16(a). The panel agreed that “[a]ffixing one’s signature onto a
16 legal document does indeed constitute a solemn act.” Eakin, 149 F.4th at 315. The
Pennsylvania legislature decided that this “solemn act” should include a dated signature.
Mail-in voting is not the only context in which Pennsylvania imposes that requirement,2
and the Commonwealth is not alone in directing voters to write the date next to their
signature in connection with mail-in voting.3 The National Voter Registration Application
Form, which was produced at the direction of Congress, also calls for a dated signature.
See 52 U.S.C. § 20505.4 So too does the registration form used by Texas,5 which the panel
referenced. See Eakin, 149 F.4th at 315.
That other political bodies have exercised their judgment to proceed similarly to
Pennsylvania is inconsistent with the panel’s surmise that the “date requirement seems to
hamper rather than facilitate election efficiency.” Eakin, 149 F.4th at 317; see also
Lichtenstein, 83 F.4th at 604 (“[O]ur job is not to decide whether the ban represents good
or bad policy. . . . We may intervene to stop the enforcement of this democratically passed
law only if it violates some federal standard, here the First Amendment.”). “Anderson-
Burdick does not license such narrow second-guessing of legislative decision making.”
2 See 57 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 316; 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5331; 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201- 7(j.1)(iii)(3)(ii); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316.2(b); 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2186(c); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6206. 3 See e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-384(b); Ind. Code § 3-11-4-21(a)(5); Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.764a; N.Y. Elec. Law § 7-119(6); Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.40.091(2). 4 Election Assistance Commission, National Mail Voter Registration Form, available at https://perma.cc/C9ES-KCD5. 5 Texas Secretary of State, Texas Voter Registration Application, available at https://perma.cc/H6ML-29Z7.
17 Lawson, 978 F.3d 1040. “One less-convenient feature does not an unconstitutional system
make.” Luft, 963 F.3d at 675.
Pennsylvania’s interest in orderly administration of elections was discounted too
much. “A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its
election process.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006). “[P]ublic confidence in the
integrity of the electoral process has independent significance, because it encourages
citizen participation in the democratic process.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197 (plurality
opinion). The fact that the SURE system may also serve these interests in administration
and public confidence does not refute the Commonwealth’s position regarding the date
requirement. SURE is a “system that, despite its name, could fail or freeze, or just run out
of funding down the road.” See Migliori, 36 F.4th at 165 (Matey, J., concurring in the
judgment). “Many a lawyer prefers a belt-and-suspenders approach,” and one valid way
for a legislature to address these types of concerns is “redundant requirements in statutes.”
Luft, 963 F.3d at 677. The fact that judges may have chosen different redundancies, or no
redundancies at all, is of no constitutional moment.
Finally, Pennsylvania’s fraud concerns also justified the date requirement. “[T]he
potential and reality of fraud is much greater in the mail-in ballot context than with in-
person voting.” Richardson v. Tex. Sec’y of State, 978 F.3d 220, 239 (5th Cir. 2020).
“Courts recognize that legislatures need not restrict themselves to a reactive
role: legislatures are ‘permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process
with foresight rather than reactively.’” Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Off., 843 F.3d
366, 390 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195-96
18 (1986)); see also Brnovich v. DNC, 594 U.S. 647, 686 (2021) (“[I]t should go without
saying that a State may take action to prevent election fraud without waiting for it to occur
and be detected within its own borders.”).
Nor was it appropriate to write off as “bizarre” Pennsylvania’s example of a 2022
voter fraud conviction supported by evidence relating to the date on the mail-in envelope.
Eakin, 149 F.4th at 317; see ACLU of N.M v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1323 (10th Cir.
2008) (“In requiring the City to present evidence of past instances of voting fraud, the
district court imposed too high a burden on the City.”). To the contrary, the fact that
Pennsylvania was able to present specific and recent evidence supporting the State’s anti-
fraud interest is compelling. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 195-96 (plurality opinion) (noting
that “flagrant examples of such fraud . . . demonstrate that not only is
the risk of voter fraud real but that it could affect the outcome of a close election”). The
panel opinion acknowledged that the Commonwealth “demonstrate[d] that the date
requirement can narrowly advance the Commonwealth’s interest in fraud detection and
deterrence.” Eakin, 149 F.4th at 316-17. This was a sufficient showing even if the date
requirement’s burden was, as the panel concluded, “minimal.” Id. at 309. And in light of
the collective weight of the three interests articulated by the Commonwealth, Anderson-
Burdick was not a basis to strike the date requirement under our Constitution.
* * *
The record in this case demonstrates that state politics have pervaded the
implementation of the date requirement and Act 77’s universal mail-in voting system. In
a good way. Pennsylvania’s legislature retained the date requirement in 2019, the governor
19 led efforts to improve implementation, the Commonwealth’s Attorney General has
defended the date requirement in this case on behalf of Pennsylvania, and elected Justices
of Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court have stepped in to clarify the state constitutional and
statutory ground rules. This flurry of activity is entirely consistent with our guidance that
“a state’s sovereign interests are particularly implicated when the functions of its state
government—especially, its state legislature—are impaired, impeded, or called into
question.” Perrong v. Bradford, --- F. 4th ----, 2025 WL 2825982, at *7 (3d Cir. 2025).
All of that is not to say that every county clerk in the Commonwealth believes the
date requirement is worthwhile as a matter of policy and administration. Indeed, it is clear
from the briefing that Pennsylvania’s Secretary of State does not agree. Those disputes
will be hashed out in the “hurly-burly, the give-and-take of the political process.” Trump
v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. 848, 859 (2020). We are ill-equipped as an institution to
participate, and there are significant federalism reasons for us to stay out of this dispute
over mail-in voting rights that lack a federal constitutional dimension. Cases from the
Supreme Court, this Court, and other Circuits explain why.
Because the Petitions For Rehearing failed to command the necessary votes,
Pennsylvania must now look to the Supreme Court for assistance in restoring the state-
federal equilibrium contemplated by the Elections Clause. I believe we should have done
that ourselves, and therefore I respectfully dissent from the order denying rehearing en
banc.