Bethany Sulecki v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJune 17, 2024
DocketPH-0752-20-0108-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Bethany Sulecki v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Bethany Sulecki v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bethany Sulecki v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

BETHANY TAYLOR SULECKI, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0752-20-0108-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: June 17, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Chris Richmond , Beckley, West Virginia, for the appellant.

Craig Komorowski , Esquire, Huntington, West Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to apply the nonfrivolous allegation standard and to clarify the correct jurisdictional standard for a nonpreference eligible individual in the excepted service, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND The agency appointed the appellant to a Licensed Practical Nurse position in the excepted service effective April 14, 2019. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 67. On the Standard Form 50 documenting the appellant’s appointment, the agency stated that the appointment was subject to the completion of a 1-year initial probationary period. Id. at 67. Effective November 22, 2019, the agency terminated the appellant’s appointment for “failure to qualify” during the probationary period. Id. at 9-10. The agency’s termination letter noted that the termination was “due to conduct reasons.” Id. at 10. The appellant appealed the termination to the Board. IAF, Tab 1. In response to a jurisdictional order, the appellant argued that the termination was in violation of the agency’s policies set forth in a collective bargaining agreement and 5 C.F.R. § 315.805(b). IAF, Tab 4 at 4-5. Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. The administrative judge found that the 3

appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she was an “employee” with Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. ID at 3-4. He further found that, because the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, it also lacked jurisdiction to review or enforce the agency’s policies or the provisions of its collective bargaining agreement. Id. The appellant has filed a petition for review, predominantly challenging the merits of her probationary termination, and the agency has responded. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The appellant bears the burden of proving Board jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Tolbert v. Small Business Administration, 104 M.S.P.R. 418, ¶ 6, aff’d, 245 F. App’x 964 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). However, if an appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation that the Board has jurisdiction, she in entitled to a hearing on the jurisdictional question. 1 Tolbert, 104 M.S.P.R. 418, ¶ 7. Only an “employee,” as defined under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, subchapter II, can appeal to the Board from an adverse action such as a termination. 2 Ramirez-Evans v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 297, ¶ 9 (2010); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1), 7512(1), 7513(d). A nonpreference eligible

1 A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). An allegation generally will be considered nonfrivolous when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation that is more than conclusory, is plausible on its face, and is material to the legal issues in the appeal. Id. 2 The agency appointed the appellant to her Licensed Practical Nurse position under the authority of 38 U.S.C. § 7401(3). IAF, Tab 5 at 67. The Board has held that individuals appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(3) are entitled to the same appeal rights regarding disciplinary actions as individuals appointed under title 5 of the United States Code. Barrand v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 9 (2009). 4

individual 3 in the excepted service is an “employee” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7511 only if one of the following is true: (1) she is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service; or (2) she has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C) (i)-(ii); Ramirez-Evans, 113 M.S.P.R. 297, ¶ 9. The administrative judge did not address the first method of demonstrating whether a nonpreference eligible individual in the excepted service is an “employee” for purposes of chapter 75, and the appellant has not raised the issue on review. Nonetheless, we modify the initial decision to find that the appellant has failed to nonfrivolously allege she is an “employee” under the first method. 4 Specifically, the appellant has not alleged, and there is nothing in the record to suggest, that hers was an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service.

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Bethany Sulecki v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bethany-sulecki-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.