IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Committed Intimate Relationship of No. 86472-6-I
BETH GONZALES, DIVISION ONE
Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and
ANTHONY SCOTT CAMP,
Appellant.
DÍAZ, J. — Anthony Scott Camp and Beth Gonzales entered into a
committed intimate relationship (CIR) in 2004. Seventeen years later, Gonzales
petitioned to dissolve the CIR. Following trial in 2024, the superior court divided
the parties’ property. Camp now challenges this property division, primarily
arguing the court improperly mischaracterized his separate property as community
property. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Camp and Gonzales met in April 2003 and dated over the following months.
In May 2004, Gonzales became pregnant, and the parties and their children from
prior relationships started residing together at Gonzales’ property in Lake Stevens,
Washington, which she purchased prior to the CIR. It is undisputed on appeal that No. 86472-6-I/2
May 2004 marks the beginning of the CIR.
As will be elaborated upon below, in August 2005, Gonzales sold her Lake
Stevens property and received approximately $41,000 in profit. She applied those
proceedings to the benefit of the community. Concurrently, the parties and their
children moved to Camp’s property on 40th Avenue in Stanwood, Washington
(40th Avenue property), which Camp had purchased prior to the CIR and which
the parties improved over the next 13 years.
In May 2021, Gonzales petitioned the Snohomish County Superior Court
for dissolution of the CIR. It is undisputed that May 5, 2021 marks the end of the
CIR.
A three-day bench trial concluded in January 2024. Gonzales and Camp
served as the only witnesses. In February 2024, the superior court issued the
following final division of property:
1. The court awarded Gonzales the 40th Avenue property.
2. The court ordered Camp pay off a $47,000 loan he took out to prevent the
foreclosure of the 40th Avenue property.
3. The court awarded Camp a property on Happy Hollow Road in Stanwood,
Washington.
4. The court awarded Camp ownership of the Spectrum Services and
Spectrum Lab Services.
5. The court evenly split between Gonzales and Camp the value of the
following two retirement accounts: a Western Washington U.A.
Supplemental Pension Plan and a U.A. National Pension Fund account.
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Camp now timely appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Overview of the Division of Property of a CIR
There is “a three-prong analysis for disposing of property when a
meretricious relationship 1 terminates.” In re Pennington, 142 Wn.2d 592, 602, 14
P.3d 764 (2000). “First, the trial court must determine whether a meretricious
relationship exists. Second, if such a relationship exists, the trial court evaluates
the interest each party has in the property acquired during the relationship. Third,
the trial court then makes a just and equitable distribution of such property.” Id.
We need only address the second and third Pennington steps below, as Camp
concedes a CIR existed.
“[M]arital community property laws do not apply directly to CIR dissolution
proceedings.” In re Committed Intimate Relationship of Muridan, 3 Wn. App. 2d
44, 56 n.4, 413 P.3d 1072 (2018). But, “courts may look to those laws for
guidance” and thus “may apply by analogy community property laws to committed
intimate relationships.” In re Parentage of G.W.-F., 170 Wn. App. 631, 637, 285
P.3d 208 (2012).
As to the second step of the Pennington analysis, a “court’s characterization
of property is a mixed question of law and fact.” In re Marriage of Watanabe, 199
Wn.2d 342, 348, 506 P.3d 630 (2022). The “characterization of property is
reviewed de novo as a question of law.” Id. at 348-49. “Factual findings . . .
1A “meretricious relationship” is the former term for CIRs. Oliver v. Fowler, 161 Wn.2d 655, 661, 168 P.3d 348 (2007).
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supporting the characterization are reviewed for substantial evidence.” Id. at 348.
We “may not disturb findings of fact supported by substantial evidence even if there
is conflicting evidence.” Merriman v. Cokeley, 168 Wn.2d 627, 631, 230 P.3d 162
(2010). Rather, the substantial evidence threshold is “‘a quantum of evidence
sufficient to persuade a rational fair-minded person the premise is true.’” In re
Custody of A.T., 11 Wn. App. 2d 156, 162, 451 P.3d 1132 (2019) (quoting
Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879-80, 73 P.3d 369
(2003)). “As the trial court is in a better position to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, we do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s.” Id.
Otherwise as to the third analytic step, “[w]e apply the abuse-of-discretion
standard to a trial court’s distribution of property following a committed intimate
relationship.” In re Marriage of Byerley, 183 Wn. App. 677, 685, 334 P.3d 108
(2014). A court abuses its discretion “if it bases its decision on untenable grounds
or acts for untenable reasons or if the decision is manifestly unreasonable.” Id. at
685. Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. A.T., 11 Wn. App. 2d
at 163.
We review the five decisions enumerated above in turn.
B. The 40th Avenue Property
a. Transmutation
Camp disputes the court’s finding that, “[a]lthough the property was
originally separate,” it was—in Camp’s words—transmuted into community
property because “it was significantly improved by efforts made on behalf of the
community.” Camp also disputes the court’s conclusion that, “[g]iven the totality
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of the real property, business property and personal property awarded to [Camp],
the Court finds it is fair and equitable to award this property to [Gonzales] as her
sole and separate property.”
“[P]resumptions play a significant role in determining the character of
property as separate or community property.” In re Estate of Borghi, 167 Wn.2d
480, 483, 219 P.3d 932 (2009). These “are true presumptions, and in the absence
of evidence sufficient to rebut an applicable presumption, the court must determine
the character of property according to the weight of the presumption.” Id. at 484.
Among these presumptions is that the “character of property as separate or
community property is determined at the date of acquisition.” Id. “Once the
separate character of property is established, a presumption arises that it remained
separate property in the absence of sufficient evidence to show an intent to
transmute the property from separate to community property.” Id.
“Significantly, the evidence must show the intent of the spouse owning the
separate property to change its character from separate to community property.”
Id. at 484-85. “Where, as here, real property is at issue, an acknowledged writing
is generally required.” Id. at 485 (emphasis added). Further, “[l]ater community
property contributions to the payment of obligations, improvements upon the
property, or any subsequent mortgage of the property may in some instances give
rise to a community right of reimbursement protected by an equitable lien, but such
later actions do not result in a transmutation of the property from separate to
community property.” Id. at 491 n.7 (emphasis added).
Camp claims the court abused its discretion by characterizing the 40th
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Avenue property as community property by transmutation and distributing it to
Gonzales, contrary to the principles our Supreme Court announced in Borghi.
Camp primarily relies on the lack of a written agreement in claiming Gonzales
failed to present sufficient evidence of his intent to transmute the 40th Avenue
property. We disagree.
It is true that intent to transmute is often demonstrated through, e.g., a
quitclaim deed, other real property transfer, or community property agreement.
Borghi, 167 Wn.2d at 485. But our Supreme Court clearly has held that such
writings are only “generally” required to show the intent to transmute real property.
Id. The question is whether, under an abuse of discretion standard, there is
“evidence sufficient to rebut” such a presumption. Id. at 484. Thus, the undisputed
lack of a written agreement is not dispositive.
On the totality of facts adduced at trial, we hold that substantial evidence
supports the court’s factual finding that Camp intended to “change its character
from separate to community property.” Id. at 484-85. That intent is shown by more
than the improvements they indisputably made to the property.
Gonzales testified that, after forming the CIR, she and Camp intended to
buy a new property separate from the 40th Avenue property or her Lake Stevens
property. The parties hired a real estate agent and conducted an initial search, but
ultimately decided to move to the 40th Avenue property. Gonzales testified “the
only reason we went to the 40th Avenue was because of what [Camp] told [her],
that he wanted to wait to be married and have a wife be part of that, and what we
were looking for, we already had” in the 40th Avenue property. (Emphasis added).
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Gonzales also testified that improvements were necessary to the 40th
Avenue property to accommodate their growing family. As went unrebutted at trial,
the improvements and remodeling were “something that [Gonzales] wanted” for
the 40th Avenue property. Further, Gonzales testified they engaged in “significant
improvements to the property from 2004 through 2017 using joint funds,” not just
an isolated remodel.
Taken together, this testimony provides substantial evidence that, rather
than purchasing a third party’s property, Camp intended to “change the character”
of the 40th Avenue property from a home of his alone to a home for his new and
growing family. Borghi, 167 Wn.2d at 484-85. The trial court credited Gonzales’
testimony that such an understanding existed and we do not substitute our
judgment about a witness credibility for the trial court’s. A.T., 11 Wn. App. 2d at
162.
Gonzales’ testimony that she contributed the proceeds from the sale of her
Lake Stevens home bolsters the court’s interpretation of the parties’ intent. She
testified she funded the improvements needed to the 40th Avenue property
through the $41,000 from the sale of the Lake Stevens property. In other words,
Gonzalez forsook the opportunity to purchase a new property, alone or with Camp,
on the understanding that she and Camp “already had” what they “were looking
for” in the 40th Avenue property subject to significant improvements. It is not an
abuse of discretion to find that, underlying these decisions, was Camp’s intent to
change his separate property into community property.
Moreover, Camp’s argument is also undermined by this court’s holding that
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property “will retain [its] character as long as it can be traced or identified.” In re
Marriage of Schwarz, 192 Wn. App. 180, 189, 368 P.3d 173 (2016); Watanabe,
199 Wn.2d at 348. “‘Commingling’ of separate and community funds may give rise
to a presumption that all are community property.” Schwarz, 192 Wn. App. at 190.
“This is not commingling in the ordinary sense, however; it must be hopeless
commingling . . . only after the effort at tracing proves impossible.” Id. at 190.
In Schwarz, this court illustrated these principles by describing a case in
which “farm income was found to have been commingled where, for much of a 44-
year marriage, it was part separate (from the separate character of the farm
ground) and part community (from community effort)[.]” Id. (citing In re Estate of
Witte, 21 Wn.2d 112, 128, 150 P.2d 595 (1944)). Further, “‘there was never any
segregation as between the two items and . . . the entire amount was continuously
devoted as a whole to the acquisition of other lands which were treated in the same
manner.’” Id. (quoting Estate of Witte, 21 Wn.2d at 128).
While the 40th Avenue property is one asset, the funds the parties invested
in it were hopelessly comingled. Gonzales testified that the many years of
improvements were jointly funded. Gonzales also testified she deposited the
$41,000 was “absorbed within [their] relationship” for various projects after she
deposited it in a joint account. Gonzales also testified the parties still shared
expenses, and sometimes paid each other in cash, even after they stopped sharing
joint bank accounts. And, Gonzales testified Camp refused to give various
requested documents during discovery, making segregating or tracing their
maintenance of the 40th Avenue property even more “hopeless.” Schwarz, 192
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Wn. App. at 190.
Thus, we hold there was sufficient evidence to persuade a rational fair-
minded person that Camp demonstrated an intent to transmute the 40th Avenue
property, and that such an intent was further shown through the comingling of
funds for nearly two decades. Byerley, 183 Wn. App. at 684-85; A.T., 11 Wn. App.
2d at 162; Schwarz, 192 Wn. App. at 190.
In turn, as community property, the court did not abuse its discretion by
awarding the 40th Avenue property to Gonzales. Byerley, 183 Wn. App. at 684-
85; Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 602 (courts “have never divorced the meretricious
relationship doctrine from its equitable underpinnings” so “that one party is not
unjustly enriched at the end of such a relationship.”)
b. The $47,000 Loan
The court ordered that Camp “shall be solely responsible for a loan in the
amount of $47,000.” Camp argues the court abused its discretion in doing so
because it “awarded the home to [Gonzales] and should have ordered [her] to
assume that debt too as it went with the home.” We disagree.
In July 2021, the court provisionally ordered the parties to evenly split the
mortgage payments on the 40th Avenue property. In October 2023, the court
found Camp in contempt for, in part, failing to pay his portion of the mortgage
payments. At trial, Gonzales testified they had received foreclosure notices for the
40th Avenue property in February and September 2023. Camp testified he
borrowed $47,000 from a friend to arrest the foreclosure proceedings. Gonzales
testified Camp took this loan without her knowledge. She further claimed that
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Camp blocked her attempts to contact the bank and denied her access to
documents, and that he lied about his own communications with the bank.
In short, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Camp caused
the risk of foreclosure, independently took out this loan, and actively blocked
Gonzales from addressing the foreclosure. In turn, we hold that there is substantial
evidence for the court’s finding that Camp “was extremely intransigent in this case”
and “acted in bad faith by . . . failing to protect the 40th [Avenue] residence from
going into foreclosure proceedings, obstructing [Gonzales] from paying the bills for
items assigned to her by the Court.” Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d 342.
Camp’s two page argument also cites no authorities requiring that a loan
taken to preserve the property should remain with the homeowner solely because
Gonzales was awarded the property. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60
Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (“Where no authorities are cited in support
of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume
that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”).
Thus, we hold the court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Camp, and
Camp alone, to pay the $47,000 loan. Byerley, 183 Wn. App. at 684-85.
C. The Happy Hollow Property
The court awarded the Happy Hollow property to Camp, finding it was his
separate property and expressly offsetting its award of the 40th Avenue property
to Gonzales against its award of the remaining real property to Camp.
Camp now claims the court abused its discretion by including the Happy
Hollow property within its “overall calculation in dividing the assets and debts
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acquired during the CIR.” He argues that, “[b]y including [his] separate property
home in its calculation of assets and debts acquired during the CIR, the trial court
gave a disproportionate and unfair amount of the total assets rather than only the
assets acquired during the CIR.”
Camp relies on Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 350, 898 P.2d 831
(1995), where our Supreme Court held, on the one hand, that “a trial court may not
distribute property acquired by each party prior to the relationship,” as such a
characterization “limit[s] the distribution” of such property. Similarly, Camp relies
on Byerley, 183 Wn. App. at 685, where this court held, on the other hand, that a
trial court “may award” or “may distribute” property that would qualify as community
property.
Both of these general holdings are inapposite because each addresses the
wrongful distribution of improperly characterized property, and the proper
distribution of properly characterized property. Here, Camp’s claim is not that the
court improperly characterized the Happy Hollow property, i.e., the second step in
the Pennington analysis, but that, once so properly characterized, the court cannot
include it in the third step of the analysis: the just and equitable distribution.
Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 602. Neither case stands for that proposition. Neither
case limits a court’s overall discretion in justly and equitably distributing property
properly calculated, or otherwise requires courts to ignore the parties’ respective
financial positions.
On the contrary, our Supreme Court has stressed the importance of
ensuring a property division is just and equitable, stating, “[a]t the time of
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dissolution, all property is brought before the court for a ‘just and equitable’
distribution.” In re Marriage of Farmer, 172 Wn.2d 616, 625, 259 P.3d 256 (2011)
(quoting RCW 26.09.080). While Farmer involved legal marriages, we apply that
principle “by analogy” to this CIR. G.W.-F., 170 Wn. App. at 637.
Thus, we hold the court did not abuse its discretion by distributing the Happy
Hollow property, which was properly characterized as his separate property.
Byerley, 183 Wn. App. at 684-85.
D. The Distribution of the Businesses
The court awarded “both Spectrum Services Inc. and Spectrum Lab
Services, LLC, along with all of their business inventory, equipment and supplies,
accounts receivables, and any debts of said companies to [Camp] as his sole and
separate property.”
Camp claims that “[a]lthough the businesses were awarded to [him], the
characterization of at least Spectrum Services, Inc. was in error,” as the court still
included it in its overall calculation of weighing the total property awarded to each
party. We disagree.
In so arguing, Camp’s two-page argument cites only authorities already
discussed above. Again, these authorities discuss the distribution of property after
it is properly characterized, and do not discuss or limit the court’s final “just and
equitable” distribution. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 350; Byerley, 183 Wn. App. at 685.
Here, again, there is no challenge to the characterization of the property, and thus
his claim fails.
Thus, we hold the court did not abuse its discretion by utilizing the value of
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these two businesses in its final just and equitable distribution. Byerley, 183 Wn.
App. at 684-85.
E. Retirement Plans
Camp assigns error to the court’s distribution of the two retirement plans.
The court ordered both accounts “be split 50-50 between the parties . . . based on
the value of the funds in existence in [the] account for the period May 1, 2004
through May 5, 2021.” Importantly, the court expressly based its distribution on
“Camp’s intransigence in refusing to comply with discovery requests and failing to
provide Ms. Gonzales and the Court with the requisite records” leading it to “draw[]
a negative inference against Scott Camp that the funds are community funds
contributed during the CIR.” The court also found Camp not credible in that he
“denied making such contributions” to the accounts, despite evidence and
Gonzales’ testimony that Camp “made regular contributions to both of the pensions
plans during the existence of the CIR.” 2
Camp argues the court abused its discretion by not “limiting the division of
[his] two retirement plans to the funds contributed during the CIR and the
appreciation of those funds but rather divided the entire accounts 50/50” when the
“accounts were started over ten years before the CIR.” We disagree.
It is true that “[r]etirement income is generally considered to be deferred
2 Specifically, Gonzales testified Camp never provided account statements as she
requested or as ordered by the court during discovery. Ultimately, the court sanctioned Camp monetarily for his obstinance during discovery. Gonzales also testified that Camp contributed to the accounts during the CIR. Camp also provided conflicting testimony on his contributions. For example, he initially claimed he stopped contributing to the Supplemental Pension in 2021, before altering his estimate to “2000 – end of 2002, 2003.” 13 No. 86472-6-I/14
compensation” and the “portion of retirement income earned during the marriage
may be divided as community property.” In re Marriage of Anderson, 134 Wn. App.
111, 117, 138 P.3d 1118 (2006). However, our Supreme Court has also observed
“the purpose of [discovery] sanctions generally are to deter, to punish, to
compensate, to educate, and to ensure that the wrongdoer does not profit from the
wrong.” Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 496, 933 P.2d 1036
(1997) (emphasis added).
Here, because of Camp’s intransigence, the court had limited information
to work. Specifically, the court had no information before it to determine how much
was contributed prior to the CIR and during the CIR, from which it could award only
the latter. These findings are supported by substantial evidence. Watanabe, 199
Wn.2d at 348.
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court had not drawn an adverse
inference, or one without substantial evidence, the trial court may “properly
consider a spouse’s . . . concealment of assets” when making a property
distribution. In re Marriage of Wallace, 111 Wn. App. 697, 708, 45 P.3d 1131
(2002). Additionally, even if the split resulted in some unequal share of the
retirement accounts, courts are not required to distribute property equally. In re
Marriage of DewBerry, 115 Wn. App. 351, 366, 62 P.3d 525 (2003). “An equitable
division of property does not require mathematical precision, but rather fairness,
based upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the marriage, both past and
present, and an evaluation of the future needs of parties.” In re Marriage of
Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 556, 918 P.2d 954 (1996).
14 No. 86472-6-I/15
Thus, we hold the court did not abuse its discretion in making a negative
inference against Camp which he did not overcome, and, thereby, had tenable
grounds to divide the retirement accounts evenly. Byerley, 183 Wn. App. at 684-
85. 3
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
3 Finally, citing Watanabe, 199 Wn.2d at 348, Camp argues the court failed to make
required factual findings, simply because our Supreme Court there held that “[f]actual findings, including time of acquisition, method of acquisition, and intent of the donor, supporting the characterization are reviewed for substantial evidence.” We disagree with that characterization. Our Supreme Court did not require a court to make a certain type of factual findings, only that whatever findings were made were reviewed for substantial evidence. 15