Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
March 17, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II BETH ANNE CABRAL, No. 60613-5-II
Respondent,
v.
DUSTIN GLINSKI, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—Nicholas and Beth Cabral are guardians for their minor granddaughter, CG.
Dustin Glinski is the child’s father. The relationship between Glinski and the Cabrals has been
tense, at best, since the Cabrals petitioned for the guardianship of CG. After Glinski repeatedly
sent death threats and harassing messages to the Cabrals, the Cabrals obtained anti-harassment
protection orders against Glinski. Glinski has also engaged in nonstop litigation with the Cabrals,
including a voluminous motions practice, multiple appeals, and other filings, many of them
frivolous.
Based on this history, the Cabrals sought an order restricting Glinski from abusive
litigation. Glinski did not file a written memorandum to the trial court as the court requested, nor
did he appear at the hearing on this motion. The trial court entered orders restricting Glinski from
abusive litigation practices against Nicholas and Beth Cabral by requiring the court’s approval
before making any future filings.
Glinski appeals the orders restricting him from engaging in abusive litigation, arguing for
the first time that they are not supported by substantial evidence or the law. We disagree and affirm.
We also award the Cabrals appellate fees and costs. No. 60613-5-II
FACTS
Nicholas and Beth Cabral were granted guardianship of their granddaughter, CG, in
January 2024. The trial court found that neither the Cabrals’ daughter, CG’s mother, nor Dustin
Glinski, CG’s father, was willing or able to provide for CG. The guardianship order identified
Glinski’s substance abuse, neglect, and domestic violence as reasons to limit Glinski’s decision
making and visitation. But Glinski maintained some visitation rights; Glinski was entitled to one
phone or video visit each week or an in-person professionally supervised visit every other week.
In order to have an in-person visit, Glinski was required to pass a supervised urinary drug test the
morning of the visit. If Glinski wished to proceed to unsupervised visits, he was required to take
and pass a substance abuse evaluation with a 7-panel hair and nail test, comply with all treatment
recommendations, and show evidence of being clean and sober for at least three months.
Relations between the Cabrals and Glinski leading up to, during, and since the guardianship
trial have been tense. The Cabrals each filed a petition for an anti-harassment protection order from
Glinski under RCW 7.105 based on numerous death threats and harassing messages Glinski sent
to them. The messages also included threats to engage the Cabrals in time-consuming and costly
litigation. For example, Glinski said, “I hope you’re ready for appeals and litigation for years to
come I will put your [sh*t] in probate [b*tch]. . . . [T]hat is litigation to make you a broke [b*tch]
that you are.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 19 (Ex. 4). “I hope you’re ready for another lawsuit
degenerates. Word has it one has already been filed against you two perpetrating demons. And
there’s more to come.” CP at 21 (Ex. 6).
Despite having actual notice of the protection order hearing and opportunity to participate,
Glinski did not appear at the hearing in February 2024, nor did he respond or contact the court.
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The trial court entered protection orders for both Nicholas and Beth, finding that Glinski had
subjected the Cabrals to unlawful harassment and represented a credible threat to their physical
safety. As part of the protection order, the trial court ordered Glinski to obtain a mental health and
chemical dependency evaluation and to complete a domestic violence perpetrator treatment
program.
In August 2024, the Cabrals each filed a motion to restrict Glinski from the abusive use of
litigation against them. In support of their motions, the Cabrals identified 15 filings made by
Glinski between June 2023 and July 2024, each of which was either decided adversely to Glinski,
voluntarily withdrawn, or is currently pending in this court. Many filings pertained to the
guardianship case, including two motions for discretionary review by this court, which were each
denied; a motion for vacation, which was stricken because Glinski filed it without his attorney’s
knowledge while he was represented; a notice of discretionary review to the Washington State
Supreme Court, which was denied; a notice of appeal, which is currently pending in this court; a
notice of appeal that Glinski filed with CG’s mother’s forged signature, which was dismissed; and
three petitions to terminate the guardianship, each brought within four months of each other and
all denied. Glinski also filed three petitions for a protection order, each brought within 3 months
of each other and all denied. Glinski also filed a “Complaint re: Action for Injury to Child,” and a
complaint for damages alleging the unauthorized publication of personal identifying information,
which were both dismissed with prejudice following summary judgment. CP at 61.
At an initial hearing on the Cabrals’ abusive litigation petition, the superior court
commissioner requested that the parties submit legal memoranda on whether the Cabrals qualified
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as former or intimate partners to establish legal standing to bring a motion under RCW 26.51.020.1
The Cabrals filed a legal memorandum but Glinski did not file any written response.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion, but Glinski did not attend. See Br. of Appellant
at 12. In his appellate brief, Glinski claims he was “[u]nable to attend the hearing due to being
over 30 miles away from cell service for work.” Id. The trial court proceeded on the motion based
on the Cabrals’ written materials and statements at the hearing, without any written or in-person
response from Glinski.
The trial court found that the parties are considered “intimate partners” as defined under
former RCW 7.105.010(20)(c) (2024)2 because as a result of the guardianship, they share custody
of a child in common. CP at 69. The trial court further found that there was “domestic violence
(unlawful harassment) against the [Cabrals] by [Glinski]” based on the 2024 protection order in
cause number 24-2-07254-06. CP at 70. The trial court further found Glinski’s court actions
abusive because they were made primarily for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, or
maintaining contact with the Cabrals, and the abusive filings involved issues that had previously
been litigated and disposed of unfavorably to Glinski. The trial court also found that Glinski’s
court actions were abusive because the allegations and other legal contentions made in those cases
were not warranted by existing law or a reasonable argument. Finally, the trial court found that the
parties had been to court about the same or substantially similar issues in the past five years.
1 Glinski did not designate the verbatim report of proceedings from the hearing as part of the record on appeal. 2 At the time the order to restrict abusive litigation was filed, the definition of “intimate partners” was codified at former RCW 7.105.010(20)(c). See LAWS OF 2024, ch. 298, § 9.
4 No. 60613-5-II
Based on these findings, the trial court granted both Beth’s and Nicholas’ motions to
restrict abusive litigation and entered protective orders restricting Glinski from filing, initiating,
advancing, or continuing litigation against the Cabrals until October 2026, without prefiling
approval. The trial court also awarded $5,000 in attorney fees to both Beth and Nicholas.
Glinski appeals both orders restricting abusive litigation.
ANALYSIS
Glinski argues that the trial court’s orders are improper because the parties do not have an
intimate partner relationship, Glinski has not been found to have committed domestic violence
against the Cabrals, and Glinski’s litigation has not been abusive. We disagree.
I. GLINSKI’S FAILURE TO RESPOND AT THE TRIAL COURT
The record reflects that Glinski did not appear at the final hearing on the motions despite
having actual notice of the hearing. And the record on appeal is devoid of any written response or
memorandum opposing the motions. Accordingly, nothing in this record reflects that Glinski
raised any of the issues he now raises on appeal to the trial court. The Cabrals urge us not to
consider Glinski’s arguments based on waiver.
Under RAP 2.5(a), we generally will not review claims raised for the first time on appeal,
unless the party claiming the error can show an exception to that rule applies. State v. Robinson,
171 Wn.2d 292, 304, 253 P.3d 84 (2011). A party may raise a manifest error affecting a
constitutional right for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3).
Filing restrictions implicate the constitutional right to access the courts. WASH. CONST. art.
I, § 10. And if Glinski’s arguments are correct, they would undermine the basis for the trial court’s
order. Thus, Glinski raises issues that, if correct, would establish a manifest constitutional error.
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Accordingly, despite Glinski’s failure to adequately argue his position in the trial court, we
consider his claims.
II. ORDER RESTRICTING ABUSIVE LITIGATION
We review a trial court’s decision to restrict a litigant’s access to the courts for abuse of
discretion. Bay v. Jensen, 147 Wn. App. 641, 657, 196 P.3d 753 (2008). A court abuses its
discretion when its ruling rests on untenable grounds or is made for untenable reasons. In re
Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). We review a trial court’s
findings of fact to determine whether substantial evidence supports them and, if so, whether the
findings of fact support the trial court’s conclusions of law. Nordstrom Credit, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 120 Wn.2d 935, 939, 845 P.2d 1331 (1993). Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to
persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the declared premise. Merriman v. Cokeley, 168 Wn.2d
627, 631, 230 P.3d 162 (2010). The party challenging a finding of fact bears the burden of showing
that substantial evidence does not support the finding. Nordstrom, 120 Wn.2d at 939-40. We
review conclusions of law de novo. Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 880,
73 P.3d 369 (2003).
In 2020, the legislature adopted RCW 26.51 as a way to address abusive litigation in family
law cases. RCW 26.51.010. The legislature provided that the abusive litigation statute should be
liberally construed to serve its purpose to prevent abusive litigation against people who have
experienced domestic violence. RCW 26.51.900.
A party to litigation may seek an order restricting abusive litigation “if the parties are
current or former intimate partners and one party has been found by the court to have committed
domestic violence against the other party.” RCW 26.51.030(1). When a party moves for an order
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restricting abusive litigation, the court must “attempt to verify that the parties have or previously
had an intimate partner relationship and that the party raising the claim of abusive litigation has
been found to be a victim of domestic violence by the other party.” RCW 26.51.040(1). If the court
“verifies that both elements are true, or is unable to verify that they are not true,” it must “set a
hearing to determine whether the litigation meets the definition of abusive litigation.” Id.
Under RCW 26.51.020(1)(a), litigation is abusive if
(i) The opposing parties have a current or former intimate partner relationship;
(ii) The party who is filing, initiating, advancing, or continuing the litigation has been found by a court to have committed domestic violence against the other party pursuant to: (A) An order entered under chapter 7.105 RCW or former chapter 26.50 RCW; (B) a parenting plan with restrictions based on RCW 26.09.191(4)(a)(iii); or (C) a restraining order entered under chapter 26.09, 26.26A, or 26.26B RCW, provided that the issuing court made a specific finding that the restraining order was necessary due to domestic violence; and
(iii) The litigation is being initiated, advanced, or continued primarily for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, or maintaining contact with the other party.
A. Intimate Partner Relationship
Glinski argues that the Cabrals lack legal standing to move for an order restricting abusive
litigation because the Cabrals and Glinski do not have an intimate partner relationship. We
disagree.
The trial court found that the Cabrals and Glinski had an intimate partner relationship as
defined in RCW 7.105.010. The statute defines “intimate partner” as “persons who have a child in
common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time, unless
the child is conceived through sexual assault.” RCW 7.105.010(21)(c). On appeal, Glinski
contends that the trial court erred by finding that the Cabrals and Glinski have a child in common
based on the Cabrals’ legal guardianship of CG. We disagree.
7 No. 60613-5-II
While most instances where RCW 7.105.010(21)(c) applies likely involve two biological
parents, nothing in the definition limits the concept of a “child in common” to biological parents.
Notably, the statute does not define intimate partners as “parents who have a child in common,”
or “persons who have a biological child in common.” In the eyes of the law, under the current
guardianship order, the Cabrals and Glinski have a child in common. The Cabrals have sole
decision making authority and full residential custody of CG; Glinski’s parental rights have not
been terminated, and he has the potential for supervised visitation. These facts amounted to an
intimate partner relationship, as defined in RCW 7.105.010(21)(c), between the Cabrals and
Glinski. The fact that guardians are not specifically named in the definition of intimate partner is
not fatal where the plain language is broad enough not to exclude guardians, and the legislature
has called for liberal interpretation to effectuate the purpose of the act. In sum, the Cabrals had
legal standing to move to restrict Glinski’s abusive litigation.
B. Domestic Violence
Glinski also argues that the trial court erred by finding that he had committed domestic
violence against the Cabrals. Specifically, he contends that the anti-harassment protection order
entered against him does not meet the requirements of RCW 26.51.020(1)(a)(ii)(A) because there
was no prior finding that he committed domestic violence against the Cabrals.3 We disagree.
RCW 26.51.020(1)(a)(ii)(A) requires a finding that “[t]he party who is filing, initiating,
advancing, or continuing the litigation has been found by a court to have committed domestic
violence against the other party pursuant to: (A) An order entered under chapter 7.105 RCW or
3 Glinski also argues that there were no restrictions in the guardianship order based on domestic violence. While that is not true, the trial court’s order restricting abusive litigation did not base its finding of domestic violence on the guardianship order (although it could have).
8 No. 60613-5-II
former chapter 26.50 RCW.” The anti-harassment protection order entered against Glinski is an
order entered under chapter 7.105 RCW; CP at 53. The remaining question is whether the trial
court found Glinski had committed domestic violence therein.
“Domestic violence” is defined as “[p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction
of fear of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual
sexual penetration; coercive control; unlawful harassment; or stalking of one intimate partner by
another intimate partner. RCW 7.105.010(10)(a) (emphasis added).4 It is undisputed that the trial
court found that Glinski had unlawfully harassed the Cabrals. As previously discussed, the Cabrals
and Glinski are intimate partners for purposes of this analysis. And the trial court’s anti-harassment
order required Glinski to participate in domestic violence perpetrator treatment. Thus, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Glinski had committed domestic violence against
the Cabrals based on the anti-harassment protection order.
The same trial court commissioner entered the protection order and the order restricting
abusive litigation and was thus familiar with the facts of both cases and the court’s findings. Under
these circumstances, we hold that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that
Glinski had committed domestic violence against the Cabrals.
C. Abusive Litigation
Glinski also challenges the trial court’s finding that his litigation constituted abusive
litigation. Br. of Appellant at 20. We disagree.
4 At the time the anti-harassment order was filed, the definition of “domestic violence” was codified at former RCW 7.105.010(9)(a) (2024). See LAWS OF 2024, ch. 298, § 9. We cite the current version here as the definition has not changed.
9 No. 60613-5-II
The abusive litigation statute creates a rebuttable presumption that litigation is being
initiated, advanced, or continued “primarily for the purpose of harassing, intimidating, or
maintaining contact with the other party” if there is evidence that “[t]he same or substantially
similar issues between the same or substantially similar parties have been litigated within the past
five years,” or if courts have sanctioned the alleged abusive litigant “for filing one or more cases,
petitions, motions, or other filings[] that were found to have been frivolous, vexatious, intransigent,
or brought in bad faith involving the same opposing party.” RCW 26.51.050(1), (3).
Here, the trial court found that Glinski’s court actions were abusive because the issues at
the basis of his actions had previously been filed, litigated, and disposed of in other actions; the
allegations and legal contentions made in the case were not warranted by law or reasonable
argument; and the parties had been to court about the same or substantially similar issues in the
past five years. These findings were supported by substantial evidence.
The Cabrals detailed 15 filings Glinski made over the course of about a year, and Glinski
prevailed on none of them.
Despite not challenging the Cabrals’ contentions before the trial court, Glinski now argues
that these numerous filings cannot constitute abusive litigation because CR 11 sanctions were
never issued or threatened, and because he thoroughly researched each filing. But neither previous
sanctions nor lack of research is required to find that a party has engaged in abusive litigation
under RCW 26.51.050.
The trial court found that Glinski filed the actions primarily for the purpose of harassing,
intimidating, or maintaining contact with the Cabrals. The court found that the filings repeated
issues that had already been litigated and disposed of in the Cabrals’ favor. And the trial court
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found the actions were not warranted by existing law or reasonable argument. Each of these was a
valid reason to find abusive litigation under the abusive litigation statute. These findings are
supported by the record—including the multiple messages Glinski sent the Cabrals threatening
expensive and lengthy litigation—and Glinski did not show in this record that he provided the trial
court with any evidence to the contrary.
On this record, we hold that the trial court did not err by finding Glinski’s court filings
constituted abusive litigation. Because Glinski cannot show error, he has failed to establish a
manifest error affecting a constitutional right. We affirm the trial court’s orders restricting Glinski
from further filing abusive litigation.
ATTORNEY FEES AND SANCTIONS
The Cabrals seek attorney fees and costs on appeal. Under RAP 18.1, a party may seek
reasonable attorney fees on appeal. We may award attorney fees on appeal if a contract, statute, or
recognized ground in equity permits recovery of attorney fees at trial and the party substantially
prevails. Burrowes v. Killian, 195 Wn.2d 350, 363, 459 P.3d 1082 (2020). Here, the abusive
litigation statute requires an award of attorney fees and costs without regard for whether the
arguments are frivolous. RCW 26.51.060(2)(b) (court must award “reasonable [attorney] fees and
costs of responding to the abusive litigation”). Because the Cabrals prevail on appeal and this
appeal is part of an ongoing pattern of abusive litigation, we grant their requests for attorney fees
and costs.
The Cabrals also request that we restrain Glinski from engaging in additional appellate
litigation involving them without first having any filings screened and authorized by a
commissioner of our court. Such relief is within our discretion and has been imposed in the past.
11 No. 60613-5-II
See Ord., Gallery Belltown Condo. Ass’n v. Roland Ma, No. 100725-6 (Wash. July 13, 2022). In
Gallery, the Supreme Court declared the petitioner to be a vexatious litigant based on his lengthy
history of frivolous filings in the court, which were undeterred by the imposition of sanctions. The
Supreme Court, therefore, prohibited the petitioner from filing any future filings with the court
without first obtaining permission from the court clerk. Ord., No. 100725-6, at 1.
The Cabrals request that we impose similar equitable sanctions against Glinski. To date,
Glinski has filed two interlocutory appellate matters related to the guardianship case, one in this
court and another in the Supreme Court (No. 58181-7-II and No. 102369-3). Both cases were
decided in favor of the Cabrals. Glinski also has a pending appeal in the guardianship case, No.
59281-9-II, which was set for consideration by this court on the January 2026 docket. In that case,
our court found that Glinski had forged CG’s birth mother’s signature on a notice of appeal. This
is in addition to Glinski’s abusive litigation tactics in the trial court that are recited above.
Based on Glinski’s extensive litigation against the Cabrals, we find that Glinski has
habitually and persistently used this court’s, and the trial court’s, processes to hinder the
administration of justice, delay proceedings, place an unacceptable burden on court staff, impede
the court’s essential functions, and harass the Cabrals. We find that Glinski has impeded the
orderly conduct of proceedings and abused the judicial process in multiple cases.
We conclude that Glinski is a vexatious litigant. Under RAP 18.9, we have authority to
“condition a party’s right to participate” in appellate cases in this court “on compliance with terms
of an order or ruling.” RAP 18.9(a). We also have inherent authority to control the conduct of
litigants in this court when they have impeded the orderly conduct of proceedings. Yurtis v. Phipps,
143 Wn. App. 680, 693, 181 P.3d 849 (2008). We have discretion to place reasonable restrictions
12 No. 60613-5-II
on any litigant who abuses the judicial process, so long as the restrictions are no more than
necessary to remedy the vexatious conduct. Id.
In addition, we are aware that sanctions and attorney fee awards only serve as a deterrent
to frivolous or harassing litigation if they are paid. In light of the findings discussed above, we
order the clerk of this court not to accept further notices of appeal or discretionary review from
Glinski in cases involving the Cabrals until he has submitted proof that all of his sanctions and
attorney fees imposed in all cases involving them have been paid. Further, Glinski must submit
with any new notice of appeal or notice of discretionary review a pleading consisting of no more
than 2500 words stating the basis for the appeal or discretionary review in basic terms. Any
discretionary review must be based only on RAP 2.3(b)(4). No other filings will be accepted
regarding the notice of appeal or notice of discretionary review unless and until the notice is
accepted for filing.
Our commissioner must reject any notice of appeal or notice of discretionary review from
Glinski unless Glinski has shown that all of his sanctions and attorney fees in cases involving the
Cabrals have been paid. Our commissioner must reject any notice of appeal or notice of
discretionary review from Glinski that is not accompanied by the pleading described above. Our
commissioner must reject any notice of discretionary review from Glinski that relies on any basis
other than RAP 2.3(b)(4).
Our commissioner may reject any notice of appeal or notice of discretionary review that is
based on a previously resolved legal issue; or that is frivolous or lacks facial merit. In order to
reduce the burden of multiple filings on our court, our commissioner may reject any amended or
supplemental notice of appeal or notice of discretionary review. Our commissioner may reject any
13 No. 60613-5-II
notice of appeal or notice of discretionary review that is filed after the deadline established in the
rules of appellate procedure.
CONCLUSION
We affirm. We order Glinski to pay attorney fees on appeal in an amount to be set by a
commissioner of this court. And we order the clerk of this court not to accept for filing further
notices of appeal or discretionary review from Glinski in cases involving the Cabrals until he has
submitted proof that all of his sanctions and attorney fees imposed in all cases involving them have
been paid. Finally, Glinski must submit with any new notice of appeal or notice of discretionary
review a pleading consisting of no more than 2500 words stating the basis for the appeal or
discretionary review in basic terms. Any discretionary review must be based only on RAP
2.3(b)(4). No other filings will be accepted regarding the notice of appeal or notice of discretionary
review unless and until the notice is accepted for filing after review by a commissioner of this
court that is consistent with the restrictions discussed above.
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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
GLASGOW, J. We concur:
MAXA, J.
VELJACIC, A.C.J.