Besteiro v. Besteiro

45 S.W.2d 379
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided December 16, 1931·No. No. 8689·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinions

SMITH, J.

This is the second appeal upon the merits in this cause. Besteiro v. Besteiro (Tex. Civ. App.) 18 S.W.(2d) 829. The last trial was had upon the identical pleadings upon which the former trial was had. In the former trial appellant herein recovered judgment. In the last trial her adversaries recovered. We quote this preliminary statement from the opinion of this court in the former appeal:

“In 1918, at the time of the occurrence of the transaction out of which this controversy arose, Julia Perez de Besteiro, now deceased, owned a substantial estate in Cameron county. She had four sons and three daughters, one of whom, Estolia, was married, and the other two, Rosalia and Maria Inez, unmarried. The two unmarried daughters lived with their mother, but the other children lived apart, in their own homes. On May 24, 1918, the mother executed and delivered a general warranty deed, conveying substantially all her property to one of her unmarried daughters, Maria Inez. The recited consideration for this conveyance was that the grantee would take care of, and provide for, her mother, the grantor, during the latter’s life time, and give her a Christian burial at her death, and would provide for the remaining unmarried daughter, Rosalia, until she married. This deed of conveyance was filed for record on the day it was executed, and was duly recorded.
“The mother continued, as before, to reside with the two unmarried daughters, and was cared for by them, until she died in 1928, ten years after the execution and registration of said deed. And Maria Inez, the grantee, gave her mother a Christian burial, and provided for her sister Rosalia, until the latter’s marriage shortly thereafter. By these means the grantee performed in full the consideration exacted of her in the deed of conveyance.
“The mother died in January, 1928, and in March thereafter all her surviving children other than the daughters Maria Inez and Rosalia brought this suit against the two daughters last named to recover the property conveyed by the deed mentioned above. The suit was brought primarily in the form of trespass to try title, and specifically to set aside and cancel the deed in question. As stated in appellants’ brief:
“ ‘The ground upon which the deed was sought to be canceled and set aside was that for many years prior to and at the time of the execution of the deed, and continuously up to the time of the death of Julia Besteiro, deceased, on the 26th day of January, 1928. Julia Perez de Besteiro was a very old woman, feeble in mind and body, suffering from, diseases that rendered her weak mentally and peculiarly subject to the power of suggestion, and easily controlled and influenced-by those associated with her, and that Maria Besteiro and Rosalia Besteiro, prior, to her marriage, had lived constantly for many years prior to the execution of the deed and continuously up to the death of the old lady, with their mother, and by reason of undue influence exercise prior to the execution of the deed, at the time thereof, and continuously up to the death of the old woman, on the part of Maria Besteiro and Rosalia Besteiro, the mother was caused to execute and deliver the deed and to remain inactive up until the time of her death; and by reason thereof the deed was null and void.’ ”

. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiflfs in the court below upon the answers of the jury to the following special issues:

“Did Julia Perez de Besteiro, deceased, execute and deliver the deed now in evidence before you by reason of undue influence, if any, exercised by Maria Inez Besteiro and Rosalia Besteiro, or either of them? You will answer this question ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ ’’ To which the jury answered, “Yes.”
“Did such undue influence continue to operate on the mind of said Julia Perez de Beste-iro after the execution of said instrument, and if yes, for what length of time?” To which the jury answered, “Up to the day of her death.”

[381] The controlling questions presented in. the appeal are embraced in appellant’s contentions that appellees’ cause of action was barred by limitation, and that there was not sufficient evidence to support the claims of undue influence. Upon the former appeal, the judgment, based on a directed verdict, was at first affirmed, but upon rehearing was reversed upon the “conclusion that the evidence upon the issue of undue influence was such as to raise an issue of fact that should have been submitted to the jury, under proper instructions.” It may be said that upon the last trial the evidence was not in all phases substantially the same as that adduced upon the former trial. Nearly all the testimony in the record now before this court relates to transactions occurring subsequent to the execution of the deed in controversy. It was admitted as bearing upon the question of limitation, although not so limited in its operation upon the jury, who no doubt considered it in determining the main issue. Be that as it may, that testimony cannot be given effect in determining the controlling question of whether the claimed undue influence was effectually exerted prior to or at the very time the deed was executed.

The question of Mrs. Besteiro’s mental incapacity to execute the deed in controversy is not in the case, either in the pleadings or in the evidence. The only question raised in the pleadings is that of undue influence, which “in its essential elements has no real relation to the ground of mental incapacity.” Scott v. Townsend, 106 Tex. 322, 166 S. W. 1138, 1143.

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