Best Auto v. Autohaus, LLC

339 S.W.3d 372, 2011 WL 1316898
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 25, 2011
Docket05-09-01452-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 339 S.W.3d 372 (Best Auto v. Autohaus, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Best Auto v. Autohaus, LLC, 339 S.W.3d 372, 2011 WL 1316898 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION

Opinion By

Justice MYERS.

Best Auto appeals the take-nothing summary judgment rendered on its claims against Autohaus, LLC d/b/a Ewing Auto-haus (Ewing). Best Auto brings seven issues contending the trial court erred by sustaining Ewing’s objections to Best Auto’s summary judgment evidence and by granting Ewing’s motion for summary judgment on Best Auto’s claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). We conclude the trial court did not err in granting Ewing’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

In an auction on March 29, 2007, Best Auto purchased the vehicle that is the subject of this lawsuit, a 2002 Mercedes-Benz CL600C with 57,045 miles, for $27,595. Best Auto purchased the car with the intention of reselling it for a profit. The manufacturer’s warranty had expired when the car exceeded 50,000 miles.

On March 8, 2007, about two weeks before the auction, the previous owner of the vehicle took it to Ewing, a Mercedes dealership and servicer, which estimated the necessary repairs to the vehicle would cost about $10,000. Best Auto’s owners, Niko-lay Vladov and Teodora Arsova, were unaware of the need for these repairs when Best Auto purchased the vehicle. However, they were aware that the “check engine” light was illuminated.

On April 9, 2007, Vladov took the vehicle to Ewing because of the check-engine light and because the car was running “rough.” A service manager at Ewing showed Vla-dov a copy of the repair estimate given to the previous owner, and the service manager told Vladov that the oil-level sensor was leaking. In fact, the oil-pressure sensor was leaking. Vladov declined to have Ewing perform the service. The vehicle was not examined by a E-wing employee that day.

Vladov took the vehicle back to Ewing on May 4, 2007 because of the check-engine light. A Ewing mechanic examined the car and showed Vladov oil on the wiring harness, coils, sensors, and the engine control module. The mechanic estimated it would cost $6,875 to repair these parts, and the estimate did not include the cost to fix the oil leak that was damaging the parts. Vladov again declined to have Ewing perform the repairs. Relying on the advice of Ewing’s mechanics, Vladov bought several parts for the car, including an oil-level sensor and an oil-pressure sensor, to repair the car himself. After installing the parts, the check-engine light turned off. However, after less than 5,000 miles, the check-engine light came on and the car stalled. Then the car’s suspension collapsed, rendering it undrivable.

Vladov asked Mercedes if the oil leak was subject to a recall, and the company told him it was not. Vladov later learned that Mercedes had issued a service campaign for certain defective oil-pressure sensors. 1 The service campaign required *374 the service departments of Mercedes dealers to check the oil-pressure sensors of cars within a range of VIN numbers. If the date code stamped on the oil-pressure sensor showed it was manufactured before a particular date, it was subject to the service campaign and would be replaced. If the oil-pressure sensor was manufactured after a particular date, dealers were to inspect the sensor and replace it if it was leaking. Dealers were also to replace any other parts damaged by a leaking oil-pressure sensor. Dealers were instructed to paint a stripe on any replacement oil-pressure sensors.

Best Auto’s vehicle was within the range of vehicles subject to the service campaign. However, the oil-pressure sensor was manufactured after the date of those subject to the service campaign. The service campaign was performed on the vehicle in October 2005, which made the campaign “closed” as to the vehicle.

Mercedes provided an emissions warranty covering parts relating to emissions for eight years or 80,000 miles. The vehicle’s wiring harness and engine control module were included under the warranty. However, the emissions warranty applied only to vehicles that had failed an “EPA approved emissions short test.”

Best Auto sued Ewing for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and DTPA violations for representing and leading Best Auto to believe that the oil leakage was not covered by a recall or service campaign requiring Ewing to cover the cost of repairing the oil leakage; failing to disclose that the oil leakage was covered by a recall or service campaign; representing that the engine control module and mounting hardware were not covered by the emissions warranty; and failing to disclose that the engine control module and mounting hardware were covered by the emissions warranty. 2 Ewing moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment, which the trial court granted, rendering judgment that Best Auto take nothing.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Best Auto’s first six issues assert the trial court erred in granting Ewing’s motion for summary judgment.

Standard of Review

We review a no-evidence summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency standard used to review a directed verdict. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Flood v. Katz, 294 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Thus, we must determine whether the nonmovant produced more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a fact issue on the material questions presented. See Flood, 294 S.W.3d at 762. When analyzing a no-evidence summary judgment, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the movant. Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex.2006) (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex.2005)). A no-evidence summary judgment is improperly granted if the respondent brings forth more than a scintilla of probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.2003). “More than a scintilla *375 of evidence exists when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable, fair-minded persons to differ in their conclusions.” Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997)). “Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is ‘so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion’ of a fact.” Id. (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.1983)).

Misrepresentation

Best Auto sued Ewing for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and DTPA violations.

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339 S.W.3d 372, 2011 WL 1316898, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/best-auto-v-autohaus-llc-texapp-2011.