Beshel v. Lehman

2024 IL App (2d) 240197-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 12, 2024
• Docket: 2-24-0197
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (2d) 240197-U No. 2-24-0197 Order filed December 12, 2024

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

NICOLE BESHEL, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lake County. Petitioner-Appellee and ) Cross-Appellant, ) v. ) Nos. 13-F-491 ) 19-F-939 ) CHRISTOPHER S. LEHMAN, ) ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant and ) Jacquelyn D. Melius, Cross-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: This court could not consider the merits of respondent’s arguments due to a lack of jurisdiction and due to his failure to provide a sufficient record.

¶2 Respondent, Christopher Lehman, appeals pro se from various orders of the circuit court

of Lake County that set his child support obligations for his two minor children, allocated his

parental responsibilities, and determined what fees he was obligated to pay related to the

proceedings. We dismiss part of his appeal due to lack of jurisdiction and affirm the remainder.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND 2024 IL App (2d) 240197-U

¶4 Christopher and petitioner, Nicole Beshel, have two children together: TJL, born

September 24, 2012, and KAL, born November 29, 2019. In 2012, Nicole initiated a parentage

action, which culminated in a joint parenting agreement on February 18, 2014. This agreement

was subsequently amended later in 2014 and again in 2016. Pursuant to those orders, Nicole had

sole decision-making authority over TJL and, as of 2016, joint decision making on extra-curricular

activities by agreement. The routine parenting time schedule for TJL in place, from March 2014

through January 2020, gave Nicole eight and Christopher six overnights in a two-week period.

Christopher’s support obligation was originally set in October 2013 at $50 per week.

¶5 On November 12, 2019, Christopher filed a petition to modify the amended joint parenting

agreement. He sought to reallocate parental responsibility, expand his parenting time, and set child

support. On December 6, 2019, Christopher filed a new petition regarding the parties’ daughter

KAL. Christopher sought to establish paternity, the sole allocation of parental responsibilities,

and parenting time. In response, Nicole filed a motion to modify parenting time and extra-

curricular decision making and a motion to modify child support. The trial court consolidated both

of Christopher’s petitions and appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for the children.

¶6 On January 9, 2020, the parties agreed that Christopher would have custody of TJL every

Monday at 8:30 am through Wednesday at 8:30 am and alternating weekends on Friday at 8:30

am to Sunday at 6 pm. On November 19, 2020, the parties agreed that Christopher would have

this same custody arrangement as to KAL.

¶7 In September 2023, the trial court conducted a trial on Christopher’s petitions. On

November 17, 2023, the trial court entered an allocation judgment of parental responsibilities and

parenting plan. As relevant to this appeal, the trial court assigned sole decision-making authority

to Nicole for the children’s education, extracurricular activities, health care and religion after

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consultation and consideration of Christopher’s position. The trial court ordered that the parenting

schedule that had been in place since January 2020 would remain in effect.

¶8 In addition to the allocation judgment, the trial court determined Christopher’s child

support obligations. The trial court reduced Christopher’s monthly child support obligation

retroactive to January 11, 2021. For the period of January 11, 2021, through December 31, 2023,

it reduced Christopher’s monthly support from $608 to $212. As of January 1, 2024, it reduced

his monthly payment to $165. The trial court determined that Christopher’s child support arrearage

was $3,990.

¶9 On December 12, 2023, following a hearing, the trial court determined that Christopher

owed $13,960 in GAL fees.

¶ 10 On February 2, 2024, Nicole filed a petition for a rule to show cause due to Christopher’s

alleged failure to pay certain extra-curricular and school activity fees. On February 8, 2024,

Christopher filed a motion for leave to file his own rule to show cause, asserting that Nicole owed

him over $1,000 for expenses that he had incurred on behalf of the children.

¶ 11 On February 14, 2024, the trial court denied both parties motions to reconsider. The trial

court also denied Christopher’s application for a waiver of court fees. The trial court found that

he was not indigent. It noted that he pays TJL’s private school tuition, takes discretionary draws

from his company, has access to funds in his business accounts, and owns his home free of any

encumbrances.

¶ 12 On March 13, 2024, Christopher filed two notices of appeal seeking review of the trial

court’s (1) November 17, 2023, allocation judgment and support order; (2) December 12, 2023,

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GAL fee order and (3) the February 14, 2024, fee waiver order. 1 Nicole filed a notice of cross-

appeal, but subsequently decided not to pursue it.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 At the outset, we note that Nicole argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over most of

Christopher’s appeal because the record does not reveal that all the issues below have been

resolved. Specifically, Nicole points to her rule to show cause and Christopher’s motion seeking

leave to file his own petition as remaining pending when Christopher filed his notice of appeal.

¶ 15 “An order is final and appealable if it terminates the litigation between the parties on the

merits or disposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or a separate part

thereof.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 151

(2008). Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016),

“[i]f multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may

be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims

only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for

delaying either enforcement or appeal or both.”

“[A] ‘claim’ is any right, liability or matter raised in an action.” Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant

Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 465 (1990). “Absent a Rule 304(a) finding, a final order

1 We are cognizant of our obligation under Supreme Court Rule 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018)

to issue our decision within 150 days after Christopher filed his notice of appeal. However, due

to Christopher’s appellate counsel moving to withdraw just five days before the 150-day deadline

was set to expire and because of Christopher’s repeated requests for an extension of time to file

his brief thereafter, we were unable to comply with that deadline.

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disposing of fewer than all of the claims is not an appealable order and does not become appealable

until all of the claims have been resolved.” Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d at 151. There are only limited

exceptions to this rule. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304 (b)(6) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) (allowing for the appeal of

certain specified judgments including an allocation judgment without 304(a) findings).

¶ 16 Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court resolved Nicole’s rule to show cause and

Christopher’s motion seeking leave to file his own petition for a rule to show cause. Because the

trial court made no Rule 304(a) finding despite these pending claims, this court only has

jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the trial court’s allocation judgment. See id. As to the

remainder of the appeal, we note that In re Marriage of Knoerr, 377 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1049-50

(2007), provides for possible reinstatement of the appeal. Christopher’s options depend on

whether the trial court’s jurisdiction has lapsed since the orders it entered on February 14, 2024.

¶ 17 If the trial court’s jurisdiction has not lapsed, Christopher must file a timely notice of

appeal. See id. That is, Christopher must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after (1) a Rule

304(a) finding on the February 14, 2024 order, or, if no such finding is entered, (2) the final

judgment on the last pending claim (provided that if either party files or has filed a timely

postjudgment motion, petitioner must wait for the ruling on that motion and file his notice of appeal

within 30 days thereafter (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017)).

¶ 18 If, however, the trial court’s jurisdiction has lapsed, such that it is now too late to file a

timely notice of appeal, Christopher may invoke the savings provision of Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017), which states, in pertinent part, that “a notice of appeal filed

before the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion, or before the final

disposition of any separate claim, becomes effective when the order disposing of said motion or

claim is entered.” Under this rule, we may give effect to Christopher’s premature notice of appeal

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upon the resolution of the last pending claim. Thus, if he cannot file a timely notice of appeal,

Christopher may move within 21 days to establish our jurisdiction by supplementing the record to

show both (1) the rulings on any pending claims and (2) the absence of any claims still pending.

If the motion is well founded, we will grant it, vacate this order, and proceed to the merits. 2

¶ 19 Turning to the one issue that this court does have jurisdiction over—the propriety of the

trial court’s September 2023 allocation judgment—Nicole argues that we should dismiss

Christopher’s appeal as to this issue as well due to his failure to provide a sufficient record.

Specifically, she points out that Christopher has failed to include in the record: (1) the parties’

September 2023 trial stipulations; (2) a transcript of proceedings or bystander’s report from the

September 20, 2023 trial; (3) all exhibits admitted into evidence at the September 2023 trial; (4) a

report of proceedings or bystander’s report and exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing on

the parties’ respective motion to reconsider.

¶ 20 “From the very nature of an appeal it is evident that the court of review must have before

it the record to review in order to determine whether there was the error claimed by the appellant.”

Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984). The appellant “has the burden to present a

sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the

absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was

2 In Knoerr and several subsequent cases, we stated that an appellant may pursue this course

via a petition for rehearing. See, e.g., Knoerr, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 1050. However, a petition for

rehearing is technically an inappropriate vehicle because the establishment of our jurisdiction in

the manner described does not raise any error in our decision. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 367(b) (eff. Nov.

1, 2017).

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in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis” with “[a]ny doubts which may arise from

the incompleteness of the record of the record [to] be resolved against the appellant.” Id. at 391-

92.

¶ 21 In challenging the trial court’s allocation of parental responsibilities, Christopher

specifically contends that the trial court erred in formulating a parenting time schedule and

allocating to Nicole sole decision-making authority as to the children’s health, education, religion

and extracurricular activities. Decisions adjudicating parenting issues are entitled to a “strong and

compelling presumption” in favor of validity “because [the trial court] is in a superior position to

evaluate the evidence and determine the best interests of the child.” In re Marriage of Agers, 2013

IL App (5th) 120375, ¶ 25. A trial court’s determination regarding the child’s best interests will

not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, and it appears

that a manifest injustice has occurred. In re P.D., 2017 IL App (2d) 170355, ¶ 18. The trial court’s

decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the evidence “clearly” calls for a

conclusion opposite to that reached by the trial court or only if the factual findings on which the

decision depends are clearly, plainly, and indisputably erroneous. Id.

¶ 22 Based on this standard of review, it is impossible for us to assess whether the trial court’s

decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence when not all the evidence that the trial

court considered is before us. As such, we have no basis to disturb the trial court’s decision. See

Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.

¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s allocation of parental responsibilities

between the parties. The remainder of Christopher’s appeal is dismissed.

¶ 25 Appeal dismissed in part; judgment affirmed in part.

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