Berube v. Salvation Army, Inc.

Connecticut Superior Court

Berube v. Salvation Army, Inc.

157 A.2d 493, 21 Conn. Super. Ct. 487, 21 Conn. Supp. 487, 1960 Conn. Super. LEXIS 150

CourtConnecticut Superior Court

DecidedJanuary 5, 1960

DocketFile 117954

StatusPublished

This text of 157 A.2d 493 (Berube v. Salvation Army, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Berube v. Salvation Army, Inc., 157 A.2d 493, 21 Conn. Super. Ct. 487, 21 Conn. Supp. 487, 1960 Conn. Super. LEXIS 150 (Colo. Ct. App. 1960).

Pincite

Opinion

FitzGerald, J.

“The doctrine of charitable immunity is only operative against the ‘recipients’ of the charity, and does not afford a defense against a visitor to the premises who is injured by some *488 culpable defect.” Wright, Connecticut Law of Torts, p. 127, citing Cohen v. General Hospital Society, 113 Conn. 188, 199.

The status of the injured plaintiff as alleged in the complaint is that of a customer while in a store maintained by the defendant at the time of sustaining the alleged injuries due to defective conditions alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant’s employees. Consequently, the interposed special defense pleaded by the defendant as a legal bar to a recovery is precluded. Obviously, the plaintiff was not at the time the recipient of any charity being dispensed to her by the defendant. This is so even though the status of the defendant as alleged in its special defense, and which the demurrer necessarily admits, is that of “a charitable corporation without capital stock, whose members derive no profit from its operation.” Wright, id.; Cohen v. General Hospital Society, supra.

The plaintiff’s demurrer to the special defense of the defendant is sustained.

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FitzGerald, J.

“The doctrine of charitable immunity is only operative against the ‘recipients’ of the charity, and does not afford a defense against a visitor to the premises who is injured by some *488 culpable defect.” Wright, Connecticut Law of Torts, p. 127, citing Cohen v. General Hospital Society, 113 Conn. 188, 199.

The status of the injured plaintiff as alleged in the complaint is that of a customer while in a store maintained by the defendant at the time of sustaining the alleged injuries due to defective conditions alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant’s employees. Consequently, the interposed special defense pleaded by the defendant as a legal bar to a recovery is precluded. Obviously, the plaintiff was not at the time the recipient of any charity being dispensed to her by the defendant. This is so even though the status of the defendant as alleged in its special defense, and which the demurrer necessarily admits, is that of “a charitable corporation without capital stock, whose members derive no profit from its operation.” Wright, id.; Cohen v. General Hospital Society, supra.

The plaintiff’s demurrer to the special defense of the defendant is sustained.

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Bluebook (online)

157 A.2d 493, 21 Conn. Super. Ct. 487, 21 Conn. Supp. 487, 1960 Conn. Super. LEXIS 150, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berube-v-salvation-army-inc-connsuperct-1960.

Opinion

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