IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0998 Filed September 10, 2015
BERTRUM BURKETT, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II,
Judge.
An applicant appeals the summary dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Nathan A. Mundy of Carney & Appleby, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Celene Gogerty, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ. 2
VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
Generally, an application for postconviction relief “must be filed within
three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an
appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Iowa Code § 822.3
(2013). There is an exception for “a ground of fact or law that could not have
been raised within the applicable time period.” Id.
Bertrum Burkett filed a postconviction-relief application twenty-nine years
after his appeal from his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder became
final. See State v. Burkett, 357 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa 1984). To circumvent the
time-bar, he argued a 2006 opinion, State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa
2006), changed the substantive law applicable to his case and a 2013 opinion,
Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2013), authorized retroactive application
of Heemstra. In his view, Nguyen stated a “ground of law that could not have
been raised within the applicable time period.” Iowa Code § 822.3. Burkett filed
his application shortly after Nguyen was decided.
The district court granted the State’s motion for summary disposition. The
court concluded Burkett could not avail himself of the “ground of law” exception
to the three-year time bar and his application was untimely. This appeal
followed.
I. Heemstra and Nguyen
In Heemstra the defendant challenged a jury instruction allowing the State
to prove first-degree murder either by establishing premeditation or by
establishing “[t]he defendant was participating in [w]illful [i]njury.” 721 N.W.2d at
552-53. With respect to the second alternative, the court held “if the act causing 3
willful injury is the same act that causes the victim’s death, the former is merged
into the murder and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for felony-
murder purposes.” Id. at 558. The court overruled precedent reaching a contrary
conclusion and stated:
The rule of law announced in this case regarding the use of willful injury as a predicate felony for felony-murder purposes shall be applicable only to the present case and those cases not finally resolved on direct appeal in which the issue has been raised in the district court.
Id. Because the court did not know whether the jury found guilt under the felony
murder instruction or under the premeditated murder instruction, the court
reversed Heemstra’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at
559.
In Nguyen the court considered a postconviction-relief application filed
“more than three years after procedendo had issued on his original direct appeal,
but less than three years after Heemstra.” 829 N.W.2d at 186. Nguyen argued
the Heemstra holding amounted to “a ground of . . . law that could not have been
raised within the applicable time period.” Id. at 186-87. The district court
concluded “the line of cases” leading up to Heemstra would have alerted counsel
to the argument. Id. at 186. The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed, stating:
[A] ground of law that had been clearly and repeatedly rejected by controlling precedent from the court with final decision-making authority is one that “could not have been raised” as that phrase is used in section 822.3. . . . [S]ection 822.3 must incorporate the notion that there had to be a possibility of success on the claim. It must envision a category of legal claims that were viewed as fruitless at the time but became meritorious later on. We believe a claim that Nguyen's felony-murder instruction was improper falls into this category. 4
Id. at 188. The court reversed the district court’s summary dismissal of Nguyen’s
postconviction-relief application and remanded the case “for further proceedings
on whether retroactive application of Heemstra is required by the equal
protection, due process, and separation of powers clauses of the Iowa
Constitution, or the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.”
Id. at 189.
II. Implied Time Bar on Raising “Ground of Law” Exception
As noted at the outset, Iowa Code section 822.3 imposes a three-year
time bar unless the applicant raises “a ground of . . . law that could not have
been raised within the applicable time period.” The statute says nothing about a
deadline for raising the “ground of law” exception.
The Iowa Supreme Court broached this issue in Nguyen but did not
explicitly resolve it. As noted, the court made reference to the fact Nguyen filed
his application within three years of the change of law announced in Heemstra.
Id. at 186 (“Nguyen applied again for postconviction relief on April 2, 2009, more
than three years after procedendo had issued on his original direct appeal, but
less than three years after Heemstra.”). The implication, then, is that the “ground
of law” exception premised on Heemstra could be raised only within three years
of the filing of Heemstra.
This court held just that in Thompson v. State, No. 14-0138, 2015 WL
1332352, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2015); see also 4A B. John Burns, Iowa
Practice Series, Criminal Procedure § 33:3, at 637-38 n.12 (2015 ed.) (citing
Heemstra and Nguyen for proposition that “[u]nder some circumstances, an
otherwise time-barred petition may be filed within three years of an appellate 5
decision creating a substantial right that represents a clear break in the law that
could not have been anticipated at the time the defendant’s case was pending”
(emphasis added)). Faced with a postconviction-relief application raising a
Heemstra challenge but filed well after Thompson’s direct appeal became final
and more than three years after Heemstra, we read Nguyen as “implicit[ly]”
imposing “the requirement that the postconviction-relief application asserting
such a claim be filed within three years of the Heemstra decision.” Thompson,
2015 WL 1332352, at *1. Because Thompson did not file his application within
this time-frame, we affirmed the district court’s summary dismissal of the
application as time-barred. Id.
This implicit three-year limitation on raising the ground-of-law exception
makes sense. In part, the purpose of section 822.3 is to “restore a sense of
repose in our criminal judicial system.” Cornell v.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0998 Filed September 10, 2015
BERTRUM BURKETT, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II,
Judge.
An applicant appeals the summary dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Nathan A. Mundy of Carney & Appleby, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Celene Gogerty, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ. 2
VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
Generally, an application for postconviction relief “must be filed within
three years from the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an
appeal, from the date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Iowa Code § 822.3
(2013). There is an exception for “a ground of fact or law that could not have
been raised within the applicable time period.” Id.
Bertrum Burkett filed a postconviction-relief application twenty-nine years
after his appeal from his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder became
final. See State v. Burkett, 357 N.W.2d 632 (Iowa 1984). To circumvent the
time-bar, he argued a 2006 opinion, State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa
2006), changed the substantive law applicable to his case and a 2013 opinion,
Nguyen v. State, 829 N.W.2d 183 (Iowa 2013), authorized retroactive application
of Heemstra. In his view, Nguyen stated a “ground of law that could not have
been raised within the applicable time period.” Iowa Code § 822.3. Burkett filed
his application shortly after Nguyen was decided.
The district court granted the State’s motion for summary disposition. The
court concluded Burkett could not avail himself of the “ground of law” exception
to the three-year time bar and his application was untimely. This appeal
followed.
I. Heemstra and Nguyen
In Heemstra the defendant challenged a jury instruction allowing the State
to prove first-degree murder either by establishing premeditation or by
establishing “[t]he defendant was participating in [w]illful [i]njury.” 721 N.W.2d at
552-53. With respect to the second alternative, the court held “if the act causing 3
willful injury is the same act that causes the victim’s death, the former is merged
into the murder and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for felony-
murder purposes.” Id. at 558. The court overruled precedent reaching a contrary
conclusion and stated:
The rule of law announced in this case regarding the use of willful injury as a predicate felony for felony-murder purposes shall be applicable only to the present case and those cases not finally resolved on direct appeal in which the issue has been raised in the district court.
Id. Because the court did not know whether the jury found guilt under the felony
murder instruction or under the premeditated murder instruction, the court
reversed Heemstra’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at
559.
In Nguyen the court considered a postconviction-relief application filed
“more than three years after procedendo had issued on his original direct appeal,
but less than three years after Heemstra.” 829 N.W.2d at 186. Nguyen argued
the Heemstra holding amounted to “a ground of . . . law that could not have been
raised within the applicable time period.” Id. at 186-87. The district court
concluded “the line of cases” leading up to Heemstra would have alerted counsel
to the argument. Id. at 186. The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed, stating:
[A] ground of law that had been clearly and repeatedly rejected by controlling precedent from the court with final decision-making authority is one that “could not have been raised” as that phrase is used in section 822.3. . . . [S]ection 822.3 must incorporate the notion that there had to be a possibility of success on the claim. It must envision a category of legal claims that were viewed as fruitless at the time but became meritorious later on. We believe a claim that Nguyen's felony-murder instruction was improper falls into this category. 4
Id. at 188. The court reversed the district court’s summary dismissal of Nguyen’s
postconviction-relief application and remanded the case “for further proceedings
on whether retroactive application of Heemstra is required by the equal
protection, due process, and separation of powers clauses of the Iowa
Constitution, or the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.”
Id. at 189.
II. Implied Time Bar on Raising “Ground of Law” Exception
As noted at the outset, Iowa Code section 822.3 imposes a three-year
time bar unless the applicant raises “a ground of . . . law that could not have
been raised within the applicable time period.” The statute says nothing about a
deadline for raising the “ground of law” exception.
The Iowa Supreme Court broached this issue in Nguyen but did not
explicitly resolve it. As noted, the court made reference to the fact Nguyen filed
his application within three years of the change of law announced in Heemstra.
Id. at 186 (“Nguyen applied again for postconviction relief on April 2, 2009, more
than three years after procedendo had issued on his original direct appeal, but
less than three years after Heemstra.”). The implication, then, is that the “ground
of law” exception premised on Heemstra could be raised only within three years
of the filing of Heemstra.
This court held just that in Thompson v. State, No. 14-0138, 2015 WL
1332352, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2015); see also 4A B. John Burns, Iowa
Practice Series, Criminal Procedure § 33:3, at 637-38 n.12 (2015 ed.) (citing
Heemstra and Nguyen for proposition that “[u]nder some circumstances, an
otherwise time-barred petition may be filed within three years of an appellate 5
decision creating a substantial right that represents a clear break in the law that
could not have been anticipated at the time the defendant’s case was pending”
(emphasis added)). Faced with a postconviction-relief application raising a
Heemstra challenge but filed well after Thompson’s direct appeal became final
and more than three years after Heemstra, we read Nguyen as “implicit[ly]”
imposing “the requirement that the postconviction-relief application asserting
such a claim be filed within three years of the Heemstra decision.” Thompson,
2015 WL 1332352, at *1. Because Thompson did not file his application within
this time-frame, we affirmed the district court’s summary dismissal of the
application as time-barred. Id.
This implicit three-year limitation on raising the ground-of-law exception
makes sense. In part, the purpose of section 822.3 is to “restore a sense of
repose in our criminal judicial system.” Cornell v. State, 529 N.W.2d 606, 610-11
(Iowa Ct. App. 1994). The purpose of “the escape clause of section 822.3 is to
provide relief from the limitation period when an applicant had ‘no opportunity’ to
assert the claim before the limitation period expired.” Id. at 611. These purposes
would be frustrated if an applicant had an unlimited amount of time to raise the
“ground of law” exception. Nguyen suggests an applicant should have to raise a
change in the law within a reasonable period after the change is announced and
the opinion implies the reasonable period is three years.
Burkett essentially concedes the applicability of this implied limitation
period. He acknowledges his application was filed more than three years after
Heemstra but argues, just as Heemstra changed the law, so did Nguyen, 6
triggering a new implied limitation period. Specifically, he asserts until Nguyen,
he “had no reason to anticipate that Heemstra would be applied retroactively.”
Contrary to Burkett’s assertion, Nguyen did not hold Heemstra could be
applied retroactively. Nguyen simply held Heemstra was a “ground of law that
could not have been raised within the applicable time period” under section
822.3. This principle of allowing review of a conviction where there has been a
change in the law affecting the validity of a conviction was recognized decades
ago in State v. Edman, 444 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). Nguyen did
not change the landscape.
We acknowledge similar terminology is used in applying a retroactivity
analysis and the “ground of law” exception contained in section 822.3. See
Perez v. State, 816 N.W.2d 354, 360 (Iowa 2012). But, as the court explained in
Perez, the concepts of retroactivity and the “ground of law” exception are distinct.
Id. at 360-61. One allows for retroactive application of an opinion which did not
change the law and the other allows for circumvention of the three-year time bar
if an opinion changed the law. Id. at 360 (noting it would be contradictory to
argue an opinion was merely an application of preexisting law for retroactivity
purposes but a change in law for purposes of the “ground of law” exception).
Nguyen left intact Heemstra’s limited application of its holding “to the
present case and those cases not finally resolved on direct appeal in which the
issue has been raised in the district court.” The court only remanded the case to
the district court to consider whether certain constitutional provisions required
retroactive application of Heemstra. 7
Because Nguyen did not announce a change in the law, we conclude
Burkett’s attempt to avail himself of an implied limitation period to raise a “ground
of law” exception to the statutory time-bar, beginning on the date Nguyen was
decided, necessarily fails. Burkett’s postconviction-relief application was time-
barred, and the district court did not err in dismissing it.1
AFFIRMED.
1 Even if Burkett could avail himself of the ground-of-law exception, we have repeatedly rejected equal protection challenges to the prospective-only application of Heemstra. Langdeaux v. State, No. 10–1625, 2012 WL 1439077, at *6-7 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2012); Dixon v. State, No. 10–1691, 2011 WL 5867929, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011); Herrarte v. State, No. 08-1295, 2011 WL 768763, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2011). We find those opinions persuasive. See also Goosman v. State, 764 N.W.2d 539, 544-45 (Iowa 2009) (rejecting defendant’s federal due process challenge).