Berthiaume v. Ticor Ins.

2010 DNH 150

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: August 13, 2010
• Docket: CV-09-221-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

Berthiaume v . Ticor Ins. CV-09-221-PB 8/13/10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Edward D . Berthiaume

v. Case N o . 09-cv-221-PB Opinion N o . 2010 DNH 150 Ticor Insurance Services, Inc. et a l .

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Edward Berthiaume has sued Ticor Insurance, Inc. for breach

of contract, alleging that Ticor, a title insurance company,

failed to conduct an updated title search prior to Berthiaume’s

closing on property that was subject to a federal lien of which

he was unaware. Ticor has responded with a counterclaim alleging

that Berthiaume owes payments on a promissory note and mortgage

that have been assigned to Ticor. Ticor argues in separate

motions for summary judgment that the breach of contract claim is

barred by the statute of limitations and that undisputed facts

demonstrate that it is entitled to prevail on its counterclaim.

For the reasons set forth below, I grant Ticor’s motion

addressing the breach of contract claim and deny its other

summary judgment motion without prejudice. I. BACKGROUND

Berthiaume purchased real property located at 26 Channel

Lane in Goffstown, New Hampshire (“the property”) from Gary

Bilodeau on or about March 2 4 , 2005, and mortgaged the property

to BNC Mortgage (“BNC”). Berthiaume and BNC both purchased title

insurance policies from Ticor. (See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp.

of Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. N o . 20-1, at 2.) Unbeknownst to

Berthiaume and Ticor, however, the federal government had filed a

lien on the property under federal statutes authorizing the

forfeiture of property used in the commission of drug crimes.1

(See Def.’s Answer, Doc. N o . 5 , at 6.) Thus, when Berthiaume

closed on the property in March 2005, he “took title” to the

property subject to the federal government’s lien.

1 The federal government commenced the forfeiture proceeding because Bilodeau allegedly used the property in the commission of drug crimes. Ticor argues that Berthiaume “knew o f , acquiesced i n , and/or otherwise participated in the criminal conduct” that gave rise to the federal government’s forfeiture proceeding, that he concealed that information from Ticor, and that he purchased the property using drug-trafficking proceeds. (See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. on Countercl. I I , Doc. N o . 29-1, at 3 ) . Berthiaume’s alleged criminal conduct has no bearing on whether his claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations or whether he defaulted on payments owed to Ticor; thus, I do not address the details of that alleged criminal conduct here.

-2- In approximately August 2005, Berthiaume received notice of

the federal government’s lien and notified Ticor. Ticor, by and

through its Vice President, Howard Kleiman,2 hired attorney David

Vicinanzo to represent Berthiaume in the forfeiture proceeding.

(See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. N o .

20-1, at 2.) Vicinanzo later withdrew as Berthiaume’s counsel,

and Ticor refused to provide Berthiaume with another attorney.

Berthiaume then hired Attorney Beryl Cohen at his own expense.3

(See id. at 4.) Berthiaume failed to appear at the forfeiture

hearing, and the court entered a default against him on January

1 8 , 2006. The government then moved for a final order of

forfeiture, of which Berthiaume was notified on January 2 0 , 2006.

The court granted the government’s motion on January 2 4 , 2006.4

2 Berthiaume asserted a misrepresentation claim against Kleiman. I dismissed that claim in a written order on January 2 1 , 2010, as Berthaiume had failed to plead the essential elements of that claim. (See Order Granting Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, Doc. N o . 19.) 3 Berthiaume alleges that Attorney Cohen committed malpractice and negligently handled his forfeiture claim. (See Compl., Doc. N o . 4 , ¶¶ 2 , 17-22.) The merits of Berthiaume’s claim against Cohen are not affected by this order. 4 The government thereafter moved to amend the order of forfeiture for reasons immaterial to the present case. The court granted that motion on February 6, 2006. (See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. N o . 20-1, at 5.)

-3- (See id. at 4-5.) This gave the government “all right, title and

interest” in the property, “free from the claims of any other

party, including mortgagees and their assigns.” (See Def.’s Mot.

for Summ. J. Ex. 2 B , Doc. N o . 20-3, at 2-3.)

Since the government’s lien was filed before Berthiaume

closed on the property, BNC’s mortgage interest was subordinate

to the federal government’s interest in the property. Ticor

unsuccessfully petitioned the government for remission or

mitigation of the forfeiture order, and, under the terms of BNC’s

title insurance policy, was obligated to pay BNC the $131,850

principal balance of Berthiaume’s mortgage on account of the

forfeiture. (See Pl.’s Objection to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. C C ,

Doc. N o . 23-3.) On October 2 4 , 2006, BNC assigned to Ticor the

full value of Berthiaume’s mortgage and promissory note. (See

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. on Countercl. I I , Doc. N o . 29-2, Ex. A.)

On January 3 0 , 2009, Berthiaume filed suit in New Hampshire

Superior Court, alleging that Ticor breached its contract with

Berthiaume in failing to conduct an updated title search, which

would have revealed the federal lien, immediately prior to

closing. (See Compl., Doc. N o . 4 , ¶¶ 9, 22.) The defendants

later removed the case to this court on diversity of citizenship

grounds. On July 2 1 , 2009, Ticor filed its answer, along with

-4- two counterclaims: (1) a claim for offensive recoupment to

recover the amounts that it paid on account of the forfeiture

proceeding and the real property’s forfeiture, and (2) a claim to

recover missed payments on the mortgage and promissory note that

BNC assigned to Ticor. (See Def.’s Answer, Doc. N o . 5 , ¶¶ 5 2 ,

53.) On February 3 , 2010, Ticor moved for summary judgment as to

Berthiaume’s contractual claims, arguing that they were barred by

the applicable statute of limitations. (See Def.’s Mem. of Law

in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. N o . 20-1.) On May 1 3 , 2010,

Ticor also moved for summary judgment on its second counterclaim,

alleging that Berthiaume had failed to make the required payments

on the note and mortgage that had been assigned to Ticor.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A party seeking summary judgment must first identify the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v .

Catrett, 477 U.S. 3 1 7 , 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the

nonmoving party to “produce evidence on which a reasonable finder

-5- of fact, under the appropriate proof burden, could base a verdict

for i t ; if that party cannot produce such evidence, the motion

must be granted.” Ayala-Gerena v . Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., 95

F.3d 8 6 , 94 (1st Cir. 1996); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Berthiaume’s Claim Against Ticor

Under New Hampshire law, a breach of contract claim must “be

brought within three years of the act or omission complained of”

o r , under the discovery rule exception, “within three years of

the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of

reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its

causal relationship to the act or omission complained of.” See

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4, I ( 1997); see also Black Bear

Lodge v . Trillium Corp., 136 N.H. 635, 637 (1993)(applying

§ 508:4 to contract claims). In a contract action, the relevant

“act or omission” is a party’s alleged breach; thus, the statute

of limitations begins to run when the alleged breach occurs, or

when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that a

breach occurred. See, e.g., Coyle v . Battles, 147 N.H. 9 8 , 100

(2001); A & B Lumber Co., LLC v . Vrusho, 151 N.H. 754 (2005).

-6- Berthiaume argues that Ticor breached its contract of

insurance when it “failed to update the title [of the property]

between the scheduled and actual closing dates,” and therefore

“failed to discover the new federal lien.” (Compl., Doc. N o . 4 ,

¶ 9.) This claim is plainly time-barred. Berthiaume admits that

he learned of the federal forfeiture lien, at the latest, on

August 1 , 2005; thus, it is undisputed that he knew of Ticor’s

alleged breach by this date. See § 508:4, I ; (Def.’s Mot. for

Summ. J. Ex. 3 , Doc. N o . 20-4, ¶ 2.) Berthiaume did not file

suit, however, until January 3 0 , 2009--over five months after his

claim expired under the three-year statute of limitations.5 See

§ 508:4, I .

Berthiaume attempts to salvage his claim by arguing that

Ticor subjected him to “[c]ontinuing [v]iolations” that extended

“months into 2006". (Pl.’s Objection to Def.’s Mot. for Summ.

J., Doc. N o . 2 3 , at 2.) Specifically, he alleges that he made

5 Berthiaume does not allege that Ticor breached its contract of insurance in failing to provide him with an attorney or insurance coverage. Even if he had asserted such a claim, Berthiaume himself admits that this breach occurred, and that he was aware of this breach, by December 3 1 , 2005--more than three years before he filed his claim on January 3 0 , 2009. (See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. 3 , Doc. N o . 20-4, ¶ 8.) Thus, his claim would still be barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See § 508:4, I .

-7- mortgage payments on the property, at Kleiman’s direction, until

at least March of 2006. (See id. at 3.) Under this theory,

Berthiaume would have had until March of 2009--three years after

these alleged “continuing violations” occurred--to file his

claim; thus, his filing date of January 3 0 , 2009 would be timely.

See § 508:4, I .

Berthiaume’s reliance on the so-called “continuing wrong”

doctrine is misplaced. Under the “continuing wrong” doctrine, an

action will not be barred by the statute of limitations “when a

tort is of a continuing nature, although the initial tortious act

may have occurred longer than the statutory period prior to the

filing of an action[.]” Singer Asset Fin. Co., LLC v . Wyner, 156

N.H. 4 6 8 , 478 (2007). The doctrine, however, has traditionally

been applied only in tort actions, and Berthiaume cites no cases

that have applied the doctrine to a breach of contract claim.

Even assuming, without deciding, that the doctrine does apply in

the contractual context, the evidence does not support

Berthiaume’s claim. Berthiaume lists a series of phone calls in

which Kleiman allegedly told Berthiaume that “Ticor was buying

the property back” and that Berthiaume “must continue to make [ ]

mortgage payments” on the property. (See Pl.’s Objection to

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Doc. N o . 2 3 , at 3.) The latest of

-8- those phone calls took place, however, on January 2 4 , 2006--over

three years prior to the date on which Berthiaume filed suit.

(See id.) Thus, even if those calls did demonstrate that Ticor

breached the terms of its insurance policy, they would not

warrant an extension of the limitations period. See Singer, 156

N.H. at 478.

B. Ticor’s Counterclaim Against Berthiaume

Ticor also moves for summary judgment on its counterclaim

that Berthiaume defaulted on the mortgage and promissory note

that Berthiaume executed in order to finance his purchase of the

property.6 (See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. on Countercl. I I , Doc.

N o . 29-2, Ex. A.) It is undisputed that Ticor made a payment of

$131,850 to BNC in order to satisfy Berthiaume’s overdue mortgage

payments, that the mortgage and promissory note were validly

assigned to Ticor, and that Berthiaume failed to make the

required payments. (See Pl.’s Objection to Mot. for Summ. J. Ex.

C C , Doc. N o . 23-3; Pl.’s Objection to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. on

6 Ticor argues that the allegations set forth in its counterclaim must be admitted on account of Berthiaume’s failure to file a responsive pleading in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). (See Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. on Countercl. I I , Doc. N o . 3 5 , at 2.) As Ticor concedes, however, Berthiaume’s objection disputes Ticor’s allegations, even if it does not comply with the formal requirements of responsive pleading. I therefore consider Berthiaume’s arguments.

-9- Countercl. II Ex. Q Q , Doc. N o . 32-5, ¶¶ 26-29.) Berthiaume

argues, however, that Ticor is estopped from collecting any

overdue payments on account of its own misconduct, and Ticor has

not responded to this allegation. (See Pl.’s Objection to Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J. on Countercl. I I , Doc. N o . 3 2 , ¶ 4 ; Def.’s

Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. on Countercl. I I , Doc. N o .

35.) Since this issue has not been adequately briefed by the

parties, I am not prepared to grant summary judgment on Ticor’s

counterclaim at this time.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, I grant Ticor’s motion for

summary judgment on Berthiaume’s breach of contract claim (Doc.

N o . 2 0 ) , and deny Ticor’s motion for summary judgment on its

second counterclaim (Doc. N o . 29) without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge

August 1 3 , 2010

cc: Timothy AA.. Gudas, Esq. Edward D. Berthiaume

-10-