Bertha Zinc & Mineral Co. v. Carico

61 F. 132, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2974

• Court: District Court, W.D. Virginia
• Decided: August 3, 1893
• Status: Published

Opinion

PAUL, District Judge.

The principal question presented by the foregoing statement of facts, and the only one necessary to be considered by the court, is tha t of jurisdiction. Was the case 'Of Carieo v. Bertha Zinc Company, pending in the circuit court of Wythe county, one that could be removed into the United States circuit court, and did this court have authority to grant the writs of injunction asked for in the original bill, and in the petition and supplemental bill, and which were granted? Section 2 of the act of congress of March 3,1887, as amended by act of August 13, 1888, provides.

“And when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different states, and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the circuit court of the United States for the proper district.”

Section 3 of said act provides:

“That whenever any party entitled to remove any suit such as is mentioned in the next preceding (the 2nd) section, except such cases as are provided for in the last clause of said section, may desire to remove such suit from a state court to the circuit court of the United States he may malee and file a petition in such suit in such state court at the time, or any time before the defendant is required by the laws of the state or the rule of the state court in which suit is brought, to answer or to plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff, for the removal-of such suit into the circuit court to be held in the district where such suit is pending, and shall mate and file therewith a bond, with good and sufficient surety, for Ms or their entering in such circuit court on the first day of its then next, session, a copy of the record in such suit and for paying all costs that may be awarded by the said circuit court if said circuit court shall hold that such suit was wrongfully and improperly removed there-to, and also for their appearance and entering special bail in such suit if special bail was originally required therein. It shall then be the duty of the state court to accept such petition and bond, and proceed no'further in such suit.”

It is clear that the statute contemplates the removal shall be made by a defendant or defendants who are actual parties to the suit. It malíes no provision for removal at the instance of persons who may be beneficially interested. It makes no provision for compelling or allowing other parties to interplead in a case, and thereby make the case removable from a state to a United States circuit court, which was not so removable as between the original parties to the action. The court knows of no principle of law or statutory provision that gives the defendant the power to require the plaintiff to summon and bring in a third party, and make him the defendant in an action at law in place of the party whom he has chosen to proceed against; and there is no rule of practice, certainly in this court, that allows such a proceeding. The only provisions of the Code of Virginia by which a third party can be made a defendant and required to interplead in an action at law are found in sections 2998 and 2999, Code of Virginia, 1887. They clearly do not apply to an action for damages such as Carico instituted against the Bertha Zinc Company; and, the plaintiff and the defendant both being citizens of the state of Virginia, the case was not removable into a court of the United States, nor had the Bertha Zinc & Mineral Company any right to remove that case into the federal court. It was not a party to the record, and peremptorily refused to enter itself as a party defendant to the action, though claiming and demanding all the rights and privileges secured a defendant under the statute. It was an entire stranger to the occurrences out of which the action grew. Carico’s contract of service was with the Bertha Zinc Company. It was in the service of that company he was injured. If he desired to recover damages, he was compelled to sue the Bertha Zinc Company. There was no privity between him and any other. At the time Carico entered into the service of the Bertha Zinc Company, and at the time he was injured, the Bertha Zinc & Mineral Company, so far as the record shows, was not in existence; certainly it had no interest in the property of the Bertha Zinc Company until the 20th. day of February, 1892, when it purchased the property of the Bertha Zinc Company. This was over two years sifter the injury sustained by Carico, and nearly two years after he had commenced his suit against the Bertha Zinc Company; fifteen days before the term at which the trial was had, and three terms of the court having passed since the defendant was required to plead to the declaration. Under these circumstances, the stale court could not remove the case into the federal court, and the same was not removed by operation of law, as claimed by the complainant, the Bertha Zinc & Mineral Company. As we have said, it was not a party defendant to the suit, and refused to enter itself on the record as such. It would he a strange construction of the statute allowing removals to permit the complainant, standing entirely outside of the record of the case in the stale court, to present its petition and secure the removal of a case in which the defendant of record had no right to ask for a removal. On this subject Dillon says:

“Where the jurisdiction o£ the fedei’al court depends on citizenship, it is the citizenship of the parties to the record that is alone considered, and not of those who, although not parties, may be beneficially interested in the litigation.” Dill. Item. Causes (5th Md.) § 101.

The case in the state court not being removed or capable of being removed into the federal court, the writ of injunction granted on the original hill, restraining the plaintiff Carico from prosecuting his suit in the state court, was improvidently awarded. The same is true of the writ of injunction granted on the petition and supplemental hill, restraining the plaintiff Carico, his attorneys, and the sheriff of Wythe county from levying and collecting the execution issued on the judgment rendered in his favor in the state court. These writs were evidently granted under a misapprehension by the learned circuit judge of the true status of the case in the state court.

It is unnecessary to discuss the question as to the power of a federal court to enjoin proceedings in a state court. It is sufficient on this point, in view of the facts presented in this case, to refer to section 720, Rev. St. U. S. Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179; Dial v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340; Fost. Fed. Pr. § 211; Garrett v. Terminal Co., 36 Fed. 513; Hemsley v. Myers, 45 Fed. 283.

The objection urged by counsel for fhe complainant, the Bertha Zinc & Mineral Company, that the court cannot entertain the motion to dissolve the injunction, because Carico, one of the defendants, asks that it be perpetuated, is not well taken. Walker, Caldwell, Kirby, and Harkrader, the other defendants, have a right to move, as they do, for its dissolution. If no one moved for its dissolution, it would he the duty of the court to dismiss the suit when it found that it had no jurisdiction. Section 5, c. 137 (18 Slat.), provides:

“That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court or removed from a state court to a circuit court of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court * * * the said circuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit, * * * and shall make such order as to costs as shall be just”

The court being without jurisdiction in this suit, it cannot enter the order asked for by the complainant in its petition and amended petition, perpetuating the injunctions heretofore awarded.

The demurrer, and motion to dissolve the same, must be sustained, and the cause dismissed, at the costs of the complainant. The case of Carico v. Bertha Zinc & Mineral Co., pending on the law side of the court, will also be dismissed.