[Cite as Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2026-Ohio-1773.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CHRISTINE M. BERTALAN, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115533 v. :
GEORGE ANTHONY BERTALAN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 14, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-21-384906
Appearances:
Christine M. Tuneberg, a.k.a., Christine M. Bertalan, pro se.
George Anthony Bertalan, pro se.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Defendant-appellant George A. Bertalan (“George”) appeals from the
trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate the final divorce decree pursuant
to Civ.R. 60(B). Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s decision. Plaintiff-appellee Christine M. Bertalan (“Christine”) filed a
complaint for divorce from George on April 15, 2021.1 During the pendency of the
action, George filed two affidavits of disqualification and an amended affidavit of
disqualification seeking to disqualify the trial court judge from presiding over the
divorce case. Those affidavits were denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio on or
about September 18, 2023, and November 22, 2023. Thereafter, the trial court
issued a judgment entry of divorce on December 28, 2023, and the court issued a
nunc pro tunc judgment entry of divorce on January 8, 2024. The trial court
denied George’s motion for a new trial on January 9, 2024.
A direct appeal was filed, and on April 24, 2025, this court affirmed
the trial court’s judgment entry of divorce and the denial of the motion for new
trial in Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443 (8th Dist.). In that appeal, among
other determinations, this court found no abuse of discretion or error in the trial
court’s denial of George’s motions to continue the trial proceedings and no error
by the trial court proceeding with the trial ex parte when George failed to appear
on the final day of trial. Id. at ¶ 42-60. This court also found nothing in the record
to suggest a due-process violation and recognized George’s two affidavits of
disqualification were both rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which we are not
permitted to second-guess. Id. at ¶ 64-65. Additionally, this court found no error
regarding the property division in the divorce. Id. at ¶ 67-86.
1 It appears from the appellate briefing that Christine M. Bertalan is now known
as Christine M. Tuneberg. On August 8, 2025, George filed a motion to vacate the final divorce
decree pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). In that motion, George asserted “newly
substantiated evidence of judicial misconduct and denial of due process” and
referenced findings by the Ohio Board of Professional Conduct (“the Board”)
relating to the trial court judge, not related to this action, to suggest issues of
judicial impartiality, due process, and fundamental fairness were involved in this
case. George asserted grounds for relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (3), raising
issues with the denial of his requests for a continuance of trial and with the
conditions under which the parenting terms were executed. George also sought
relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), generally asserting the Board’s findings “undermine
the integrity of the judgment,” “corroborate [his] prior Affidavits of
Disqualification,” and “demonstrate a retaliatory motive” in the issuance of the
trial court’s judgment in his case. He further sought relief under the inherent
authority of the court, referencing due process and fundamental fairness, and he
made other assertions.
On September 3, 2025, the trial court denied George’s Civ.R. 60(B)
motion. The trial court found the law-of-the-case doctrine is applicable, and the
court also found the claims for relief pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (3), which
were made more than a year after judgment was entered, were untimely. The trial
court further determined that the alleged grounds for the claim for relief under
Civ.R. 60(B)(5) were not relevant to the instant case, and the court also noted that
the prior affidavits of disqualification filed by George were denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, the trial court rejected other arguments and found
that George’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion “appears essentially as an attempt to relitigate
the prior appeal of this matter.”
George filed an appeal from the trial court’s ruling on his Civ.R.
60(B) motion. Under his three assignments of error, George argues that the trial
court erred in denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion because he claims (1) due process
prohibits a judge from ruling on a motion challenging her own impartiality and
conduct, (2) the failure to provide an independent review constitutes structural
error, and (3) subsequent disciplinary findings of judicial misconduct rendered the
underlying judgment constitutionally infirm.
As an initial matter, we are mindful that George is a pro se litigant.
Nevertheless, pro se litigants are “held to the same standard as litigants who are
represented by counsel” and “the failure of an unrepresented party to properly
present their case for review can lead to arguments not being reviewed at all.”
(Cleaned up.) In re M.C., 2026-Ohio-1051, ¶ 20.
Insofar as George claims the trial court judge should not have ruled
on his Civ.R. 60(B) motion in light of the Board’s findings, he failed to demonstrate
that any recusal or disqualification was warranted in this case. George’s challenges
stem from findings of judicial misconduct that were not related to this action, but
which George nevertheless seeks to impute herein. As this court determined in the
prior appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected George’s prior affidavits of
disqualification in this case, and the record did not show any due-process violation occurred. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443, at ¶ 64-65 (8th Dist.). Further, this court
observed that “[t]he record instead suggests the trial court, tasked with handling a
demonstrably recalcitrant party, met that challenge with restraint.” Id. at ¶ 64.
George fails to show that the Board’s findings, or any subsequent repercussions
involving the trial court judge, have any relevance to his individual divorce case.
We also find that the cases upon which George relies to support his argument are
distinguishable. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884-887
(2009) (an “exceptional case” dealing with “extreme facts” where “the probability
of actual bias [rose] to an unconstitutional level”); Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927) (a criminal case in which the mayor who tried the case had a direct,
personal, and pecuniary interest in the decision). There are no extreme facts
involved in his case, and George’s assertions of judicial bias and impartiality in this
matter did not rise to a constitutional level. See Bertalan at ¶ 63-64. Simply put,
George fails to demonstrate that any due-process violation or structural error
occurred. We overrule his first and second assignments of error.
Additionally, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
denying the motion under Civ.R. 60(B). The trial court properly determined that
the Civ.R.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2026-Ohio-1773.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CHRISTINE M. BERTALAN, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115533 v. :
GEORGE ANTHONY BERTALAN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 14, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-21-384906
Appearances:
Christine M. Tuneberg, a.k.a., Christine M. Bertalan, pro se.
George Anthony Bertalan, pro se.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Defendant-appellant George A. Bertalan (“George”) appeals from the
trial court’s order denying his motion to vacate the final divorce decree pursuant
to Civ.R. 60(B). Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s decision. Plaintiff-appellee Christine M. Bertalan (“Christine”) filed a
complaint for divorce from George on April 15, 2021.1 During the pendency of the
action, George filed two affidavits of disqualification and an amended affidavit of
disqualification seeking to disqualify the trial court judge from presiding over the
divorce case. Those affidavits were denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio on or
about September 18, 2023, and November 22, 2023. Thereafter, the trial court
issued a judgment entry of divorce on December 28, 2023, and the court issued a
nunc pro tunc judgment entry of divorce on January 8, 2024. The trial court
denied George’s motion for a new trial on January 9, 2024.
A direct appeal was filed, and on April 24, 2025, this court affirmed
the trial court’s judgment entry of divorce and the denial of the motion for new
trial in Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443 (8th Dist.). In that appeal, among
other determinations, this court found no abuse of discretion or error in the trial
court’s denial of George’s motions to continue the trial proceedings and no error
by the trial court proceeding with the trial ex parte when George failed to appear
on the final day of trial. Id. at ¶ 42-60. This court also found nothing in the record
to suggest a due-process violation and recognized George’s two affidavits of
disqualification were both rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which we are not
permitted to second-guess. Id. at ¶ 64-65. Additionally, this court found no error
regarding the property division in the divorce. Id. at ¶ 67-86.
1 It appears from the appellate briefing that Christine M. Bertalan is now known
as Christine M. Tuneberg. On August 8, 2025, George filed a motion to vacate the final divorce
decree pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). In that motion, George asserted “newly
substantiated evidence of judicial misconduct and denial of due process” and
referenced findings by the Ohio Board of Professional Conduct (“the Board”)
relating to the trial court judge, not related to this action, to suggest issues of
judicial impartiality, due process, and fundamental fairness were involved in this
case. George asserted grounds for relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (3), raising
issues with the denial of his requests for a continuance of trial and with the
conditions under which the parenting terms were executed. George also sought
relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5), generally asserting the Board’s findings “undermine
the integrity of the judgment,” “corroborate [his] prior Affidavits of
Disqualification,” and “demonstrate a retaliatory motive” in the issuance of the
trial court’s judgment in his case. He further sought relief under the inherent
authority of the court, referencing due process and fundamental fairness, and he
made other assertions.
On September 3, 2025, the trial court denied George’s Civ.R. 60(B)
motion. The trial court found the law-of-the-case doctrine is applicable, and the
court also found the claims for relief pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (3), which
were made more than a year after judgment was entered, were untimely. The trial
court further determined that the alleged grounds for the claim for relief under
Civ.R. 60(B)(5) were not relevant to the instant case, and the court also noted that
the prior affidavits of disqualification filed by George were denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, the trial court rejected other arguments and found
that George’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion “appears essentially as an attempt to relitigate
the prior appeal of this matter.”
George filed an appeal from the trial court’s ruling on his Civ.R.
60(B) motion. Under his three assignments of error, George argues that the trial
court erred in denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion because he claims (1) due process
prohibits a judge from ruling on a motion challenging her own impartiality and
conduct, (2) the failure to provide an independent review constitutes structural
error, and (3) subsequent disciplinary findings of judicial misconduct rendered the
underlying judgment constitutionally infirm.
As an initial matter, we are mindful that George is a pro se litigant.
Nevertheless, pro se litigants are “held to the same standard as litigants who are
represented by counsel” and “the failure of an unrepresented party to properly
present their case for review can lead to arguments not being reviewed at all.”
(Cleaned up.) In re M.C., 2026-Ohio-1051, ¶ 20.
Insofar as George claims the trial court judge should not have ruled
on his Civ.R. 60(B) motion in light of the Board’s findings, he failed to demonstrate
that any recusal or disqualification was warranted in this case. George’s challenges
stem from findings of judicial misconduct that were not related to this action, but
which George nevertheless seeks to impute herein. As this court determined in the
prior appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected George’s prior affidavits of
disqualification in this case, and the record did not show any due-process violation occurred. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443, at ¶ 64-65 (8th Dist.). Further, this court
observed that “[t]he record instead suggests the trial court, tasked with handling a
demonstrably recalcitrant party, met that challenge with restraint.” Id. at ¶ 64.
George fails to show that the Board’s findings, or any subsequent repercussions
involving the trial court judge, have any relevance to his individual divorce case.
We also find that the cases upon which George relies to support his argument are
distinguishable. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884-887
(2009) (an “exceptional case” dealing with “extreme facts” where “the probability
of actual bias [rose] to an unconstitutional level”); Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927) (a criminal case in which the mayor who tried the case had a direct,
personal, and pecuniary interest in the decision). There are no extreme facts
involved in his case, and George’s assertions of judicial bias and impartiality in this
matter did not rise to a constitutional level. See Bertalan at ¶ 63-64. Simply put,
George fails to demonstrate that any due-process violation or structural error
occurred. We overrule his first and second assignments of error.
Additionally, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
denying the motion under Civ.R. 60(B). The trial court properly determined that
the Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (3) portions of George’s motion were barred by the one-
year time limit and that the issues raised were addressed in the prior appeal.
Although a motion made under Civ.R. 60(B)(5) must be made within a reasonable
time, as the trial court observed, it appears that George was merely using the Civ.R.
60(B) motion as an attempt to relitigate matters previously determined. To the extent George is claiming newly discovered evidence supports his Civ.R. 60(B)(5)
ground for relief, Civ.R. 60(B)(5) ordinarily cannot be used in this manner. State
ex rel. Richard v. Cuyahoga Cty. Commrs., 89 Ohio St.3d 205, 206 (2000), citing
Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174 (1994). Even if it were proper with regard
to the assertion of judicial misconduct, Civ.R. 60(B)(5) “is only to be used in an
extraordinary and unusual case when the interests of justice warrant[] it.” State ex
rel. Hatfield v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-429, ¶ 12, quoting Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio
App.2d 97, 105 (8th Dist. 1974). This is not such a case. Upon our review, we find
no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Accordingly, we overrule the third
assignment of error.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR