Berry v. New York City Department of Correction

Second Circuit

Berry v. New York City Department of Correction

622 F. App'x 10

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedNovember 10, 2015

Docket14-2142-cv

StatusUnpublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 622 F. App'x 10 (Berry v. New York City Department of Correction) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Berry v. New York City Department of Correction, 622 F. App'x 10 (2d Cir. 2015).

Pincite

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Shawn M. Berry, pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees the New York City Department of Correction and Correction Officers Beckwith and Castro in Berry’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, which raises Eighth Amendment failure to protect and excessive force claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,' and the issues on appeal.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawpng] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir.2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). ‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

An independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. Berry failed to demonstrate that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to support his failure to protect claim, see Hayes v. New York City Dep’t of Corrs., 84 F.3d 614, 620-21 (2d Cir.1996), or that Defendant-Appellant Beckwith’s use of pepper spray was excessive, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 21-22 (2d Cir.2000). Beckwith and Castro, in any event, are entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). We therefore affirm for the reasons stated by the district court in its May 22, 2014 decision.

*12 We have considered all of Berry’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Shawn M. Berry, pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees the New York City Department of Correction and Correction Officers Beckwith and Castro in Berry’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, which raises Eighth Amendment failure to protect and excessive force claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,' and the issues on appeal.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawpng] all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir.2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). ‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

An independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. Berry failed to demonstrate that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to support his failure to protect claim, see Hayes v. New York City Dep’t of Corrs., 84 F.3d 614, 620-21 (2d Cir.1996), or that Defendant-Appellant Beckwith’s use of pepper spray was excessive, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 21-22 (2d Cir.2000). Beckwith and Castro, in any event, are entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). We therefore affirm for the reasons stated by the district court in its May 22, 2014 decision.

*12 We have considered all of Berry’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

622 F. App'x 10, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berry-v-new-york-city-department-of-correction-ca2-2015.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack