Berry v. Berry

94 A.D.2d 837, 463 N.Y.S.2d 107, 1983 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 18311
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMay 5, 1983
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 94 A.D.2d 837 (Berry v. Berry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Berry v. Berry, 94 A.D.2d 837, 463 N.Y.S.2d 107, 1983 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 18311 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

— Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Harvey, J.), entered March 19, 1982 in Schenectady County, which denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The parties to this action entered into a separation agreement on August 17, 1971, which provided, in pertinent part, that defendant husband would pay $90 per week for the support of the children “until such time as the children reach their majority”. This separation agreement further provided that its terms would survive any action for divorce. The parties were subsequently divorced, the judgment of divorce providing that the terms of the separation agreement “are incorporated herein and made a part of this judgment”. On April 30, 1980, plaintiff filed petition for modification and [838]*838enforcement of the divorce decree in Family Court, seeking arrears of some $11,000, upward modification of the alimony payment, and payment of $90 per week until the youngest of the parties’ four children reaches majority. After trial in Family Court, plaintiff commenced an action in Supreme Court, seeking $17,415 for breach of the separation agreement. Defendant movéd, inter alia, to dismiss plaintiff’s Supreme Court action on the ground that it may not be maintained because of collateral estoppel (CPLR 3211, subd [a], par 5). This motion was denied and the present appeal was then commenced. Defendant contends that the instant breach of contract action should be dismissed on the ground that Family Court has already decided the issue of enforcement of child support and, therefore, this action is barred by collateral estoppel. Defendant’s position is based upon Family Court’s necessary interpretation of the separation agreement in order to make its determination. Since the parties had a full opportunity to litigate the issues concerning the interpretation of the separation agreement, they are barred by collateral estoppel from relitigatirig the same issues, albeit in the content of a different cause of action (Schwartz v Public Administrator of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 70-71). In so holding, we note Family Court determined that under the terms of the contract, defendant’s obligation to support each child terminated as each attained age 21 and thus a 25% reduction of the total support obligation when a child attained age 21 was appropriate. However, a calculation of the amount due plaintiff under the separation agreement was not made by Family Court and, accordingly, collateral estoppel does not bar Supreme Court from entertaining this action. As Special Term pointed out, Family Court could and, in fact did, cancel arrears pursuant to section 458 of the Family Court Act. Specifically, after interpreting the pertinent paragraph of the separation agreement, Family Court, “acting as a Court of equity”, canceled certain amounts that plaintiff was due under the agreement.

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Related

White v. Burke
131 Misc. 2d 59 (New York Supreme Court, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
94 A.D.2d 837, 463 N.Y.S.2d 107, 1983 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 18311, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/berry-v-berry-nyappdiv-1983.