Bernstein v. GTE Directories Corp.

631 F. Supp. 1551, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26664
CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedApril 16, 1986
DocketCV LV 85-447 RDF
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 631 F. Supp. 1551 (Bernstein v. GTE Directories Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bernstein v. GTE Directories Corp., 631 F. Supp. 1551, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26664 (D. Nev. 1986).

Opinion

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ROGER D. FOLEY, Senior District Judge.

FACTS

Plaintiffs Edward M. Bernstein and Carl F. Piazza are practicing attorneys in Las Vegas, Nevada. Defendants GTE Directories Corp., GTE Sales Corp., and GTE Directory Services Corp. (collectively GTE), are Delaware corporations licensed to do business in Nevada and are responsible for the compilation and issuance of the Centel telephone directory for Clark County, Nevada. Prior to July 1984, plaintiffs entered into an agreement with GTE to place plaintiffs’ names, telephone listings and display advertisement in the July 1984 and January 1985 telephone directories. Both directories were printed and circulated. However, plaintiff Piazza’s name was omitted from the white pages of both directories, and the yellow pages of the January 1985 directory failed to contain the names, listings and display advertisement of either plaintiff.

The front page of the written agreement states that the agreement is in accordance with the terms on the reverse side. It also states: “ADVERTISER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE/SHE RECEIVED A DUPLICATE COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT AND HAS READ ITS TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON THE REVERSE____” The reverse side of the agreement, under the heading “TERMS AND CONDITIONS,” states in bold letters:

8. GTEDC shall not be liable to the advertiser for damages resulting from failure to include in the directory any item of advertising provided in this agreement or from errors in the advertising printed in the directory, whether or not occasioned by the negligence of GTEDC, in excess of the amount paid by the advertiser for the item(s) of advertising shown on the face of this application with respect to which the error or omission occurred.

GTE does not contest the fact that plaintiffs’ names and listings were omitted from the directories, but based upon the above provision seeks partial summary judgment limiting its liability to the amount plaintiffs paid for the advertising. Plaintiffs claim the agreement is unenforceable. They claim the limitations clause makes the contract an unconscionable adhesion contract which violates public policy. Plaintiffs believe they are entitled to damages for financial loss in excess of $10,000.

ANALYSIS

Although this issue has not been addressed by the Nevada Supreme Court, a significant number of other jurisdictions have addressed the identical issue that is presented in this case. The majority of those cases have held that a telephone company may, by contract, limit its liability for omissions and mistakes in the yellow pages so long as it does not seek immunity from gross negligence or wilful misconduct. Wille v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976). In Wille, an operator of a heating and air conditioning sales and service business brought an action for damages against the telephone company for omission of a portion of the plaintiff’s ad from the yellow pages. The court held the mere fact that there was a disparity of bargaining power did not make the agreement unconscionable. The court held that the limitations clause was neither unconscionable nor inequitable because the clause was phrased in clear and concise language, was set out in clearly legible type on the reverse side of *1553 the agreement, and the plaintiff was an experienced businessman who had advertised in the yellow pages for 13 years.

In University Hills Beauty Academy v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 38 Colo.App. 194, 554 P.2d 723 (1976), a beauty school brought an action for damages resulting from a negligent omission of a listing in a telephone directory. The court held that the limitation of liability clause was not so unreasonable as to shock the conscience when there were other directories and publications which the plaintiffs could have used and the omission left the plaintiff in the same position it would have been in had he made no contract at all. The court reasoned that to void the limitation of liability clause would make the telephone company an insurer against consequential damages by advertisers. The court said such a situation would be inequitable because the premiums, in the form of advertising billings, are disproportionately low compared to the magnitude of the potential liability in claimed damages.

Similarly in Mendel v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 117 Ariz. 491, 573 P.2d 891 (Ariz.Ct.App.1978), the court held that absent a demonstration of bad faith, fraud, or willful or wanton conduct by the telephone company, the limitation of liability, for errors or omissions contained in the contract for directory advertising, was reasonable and did not violate public policy. Several courts which have decided the issue have cited, with approval, 14 Williston on Contracts, 3d Ed., § 1632, which states:

People should be entitled to contract on their own terms without the indulgence of paternalism by courts in the alleviation of one side or another from the effects of a bad bargain. Also, they should be permitted to enter into contracts that actually may be unreasonable or which may lead to hardship on one side. It is only where it turns out that one side or the other is to be penalized by the enforcement of the terms of a contract so unconscionable that no decent, fairminded person would view the ensuing result without being possessed of a profound sense of injustice, that equity will deny the use of its good offices in the enforcement of such unconscionability.

Mendel, 573 P.2d at 892-93; University Hills Beauty Academy, 554 P.2d at 726; Wille, 549 P.2d at 909.

Plaintiffs claim the contract in this case is an unenforceable adhesion contract and rely upon the definition of an adhesion contract found in Obstetrics and Gynecologists William G. Wixted, M.D., Patrick M. Flanagan, M.D., William F. Robinson, M.D. Ltd., v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev.1985). In Pepper, a medical clinic required all patients to sign an agreement, that all disputes between the parties would be settled by arbitration and that the parties expressly waived the right to trial. The court held that the agreement was unconscionable. The court defined an adhesion contract as follows:

An adhesion contract has been defined as a standardized contract form offered to consumers of goods and services essentially on a “take it or leave it” basis, without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain, and under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or service except by acquiescing to the form of the contract. Miner v. Walden, 101 Misc.2d 814, 422 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1979). The distinctive feature of an adhesion contract is that the weaker party has no choice as to its terms.

693 P.2d at 1260.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
631 F. Supp. 1551, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26664, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bernstein-v-gte-directories-corp-nvd-1986.