Bernnadette Cecena v. Michael R. Billick
This text of Bernnadette Cecena v. Michael R. Billick (Bernnadette Cecena v. Michael R. Billick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-0184 Filed May 25, 2022
BERNNADETTE CECENA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL R. BILLICK, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cedar County, Stuart P. Werling,
Judge.
Michael Billick appeals the denial of his petition to modify or vacate a
protective order. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey M. Beatty, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Bernnadette Cecena, Tipton, self-represented appellee.
Considered by May, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ. 2
MAY, Presiding Judge.
On October 16, 2020, Michael Billick filed a petition to correct, vacate, or
modify a July 26, 2019 protective order pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.1012. As the district court recognized, though, rule 1.1013 requires
such petitions to be filed within one year after entry of the order in question.
Because Billick’s petition was not filed within one year, the court denied the
petition.1
On appeal, Billick raises two new arguments concerning the rule 1.1013
deadline. First, Billick draws our attention to his petition to change the protective
order under Iowa Code section 236.5(2) (2019), which Billick filed shortly after the
protective order was entered. Billick claims we should treat his section 236.5(2)
petition as a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904.2 That way, Billick
argues, the one-year clock under rule 1.1013 would not have started until August
2, 2019, when the district court denied the section 236.5(2) petition.
So far as our record reveals,3 though, Billick never presented this argument
to the district court. And the court did not address this argument in its ruling
denying Billick’s rule 1.1012 petition. And Billick did not bring this omission to
1 Rule 1.1013 actually requires the petition to be both “filed” and “served” within the one-year period. Billick did not serve Cecena until October 18, 2020. As will be explained, however, this two day difference between filing and service does not change the outcome in this case. So we focus only on the October 16, 2020 filing. 2 Billick does not cite—and we did not find—cases holding that a petition under
Iowa Code section 236.5(2) (2019) should be treated as a rule 1.904 motion. Because error is not preserved, however, we do not reach this question. 3 A court reporter memorandum and certificate shows there was a reported hearing
on January 11, 2021. However, Billick’s combined certificate shows he only ordered the transcript from the initial July 26, 2019 hearing. See Iowa R. App. 6.803(1) (requiring the appellant to order necessary transcripts). So we do not have a transcript from the January 11, 2021 hearing to review. 3
court’s attention through a rule 1.904 motion. As a result, the district court never
ruled on Billick’s argument. Because the argument was not “presented to or
decided by the district court,” we conclude the argument was not preserved for our
review. See State v. Wilson, 968 N.W.2d 903, 918 (Iowa 2022) (citing Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537–41 (Iowa 2002)).
Similar problems plague Billick’s second argument. Here Billick argues that
the one-year period under rule 1.1013 should be extended by seventy-six days
because of a May 22, 2020 Iowa Supreme Court order. See Iowa Supreme Ct.
Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing Provisions For Coronavirus/COVID-
19 Impact on Court Services (May 22, 2020). So far as our record reveals,
however, Billick did not raise this argument in the district court. Nor did the district
court address this argument in its ruling denying Billick’s rule 1.1012 petition. Nor
did Billick bring this omission to the court’s attention through a rule 1.904 motion.
Because Billick’s second argument was not “raised and decided by the district
court,” we do not consider it. See State v. Bynum, 937 N.W.2d 319, 324 (Iowa
2020) (citation omitted).4
4 Contrast this case with the facts described in Askvig v. Snap-On Logistics Co., 967 N.W.2d 558, 559 (Iowa 2021). There, a workers’ compensation claimant filed an untimely petition for judicial review. Id. When the employer moved to dismiss the petition as untimely, the claimant resisted—and “support[ed] her resistance with . . . citations to our [supreme] court’s COVID-related supervisory orders of April 2 and May 8” which—like the May 22 order at issue here—tolled the time for filing original actions. Id. at 560. Ultimately, the district court granted the employer’s motion, reasoning that the supervisory orders did not apply to the deadline for judicial-review petitions. Id. at 559. The supreme court affirmed. Id. at 563. To be clear, Askvig contains no explicit discussion of error preservation. And it is easy to see why: error was plainly preserved because (1) the claimant raised the supervisory-order argument in the district court and (2) the district court expressly ruled on that argument. Neither of those things happened here. 4
Of course, we recognize that we and the district court are bound by our
supreme court’s orders, including the May 22, 2020 order. Even so, in our
adversarial system, it is the parties’ obligation to argue that particular authorities
require a particular outcome in the particular case before the court. See, e.g., id.
(finding criminal defendant did not preserve argument that failure to give instruction
violated due process because defendant “did not raise his constitutional argument
during the jury instruction discussion or by motion, and it [did] not appear the district
court considered that argument”); cf. Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (“The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not
sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters
of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.”). So it was
Billick’s obligation to argue to the district court that the May 22, 2020 supervisory
order extended the one-year filing period under rule 1.1013. At a bare minimum,
when Billick saw that the court’s dismissal order had not mentioned the May 22,
2020 order or its seventy-six day extension, Billick was obligated to highlight that
omission through a rule 1.904 motion. Because Billick elected not to file such a
motion, the district court “was not given an opportunity to address its failure” to rule
on whether the seventy-six day extension applied. See Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 539.
So we cannot say error was preserved.
Finally, we note that—even if we were to assume that error-preservation
principles do not apply to the May 22, 2020 order—the outcome of this case would
not change. As explained, Billick’s petition to correct, vacate, or modify the July
26, 2019 protective order was not filed until October 16, 2020. This means that—
before we could find that Billick’s petition was timely—we would have to not only 5
give Billick the benefit of an extra seventy-six days under the May 22, 2020
supervisory order but also accept Billick’s argument that the one-year period did
not begin running until August 2, 2019, when the district court denied Billick’s
section 236.5(2) petition. Unless we accept both of Billick’s arguments, we cannot
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Bernnadette Cecena v. Michael R. Billick, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bernnadette-cecena-v-michael-r-billick-iowactapp-2022.