Bernards v. Prod Holding Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedNovember 20, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-01522
StatusUnknown

This text of Bernards v. Prod Holding Inc. (Bernards v. Prod Holding Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bernards v. Prod Holding Inc., (D. Or. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

JACOB JAMES BERNARDS, Case No. 3:24-cv-01522-JR

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

PROD HOLDING, INC. et al.,

Defendants. ___________________________ RUSSO, Magistrate Judge: Pro se plaintiff Jacob Bernards initiated this action against defendants Prod Holding Inc./Progressive Leasing LLC,1 Cricket Wireless, Chase Bank, and Sutton Bank/Cash App. On September 25, 2024, the Court granted plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis but instructed the Clerk of the Court not to issue process until further order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). In addition, the Court granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

1 Plaintiff asserted claims against Progressive Leasing LLC in his initial complaint but has since omitted them as a named defendant. Plaintiff nonetheless describes Prod Holding Inc. and Progressive Leasing LLC as related entities in his amended complaint. Am. Compl. pg. 6 (doc. 6) (“the leasing company cricket wireless uses is Progressive leasing LLC also known as Prod holding INC”). Consistent with plaintiff’s complaint, the Court construes these parties as a single defendant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, either sua sponte or pursuant to a motion made by the opposing party if it “is frivolous or malicious,” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). To avoid dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e), the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While the plaintiff need not detail all factual allegations, the complaint must nonetheless provide “more than labels and conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, to state a plausible claim for relief, the complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts” to support its legal conclusions. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Pro se plaintiffs do not have the benefit of legal counsel, therefore their pleadings are “held to less stringent standards” than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 923 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). Even construing plaintiff’s pleadings in the most favorable and liberal light, his amended complaint is dismissed.

Initially, much of plaintiff’s amended complaint is conclusory and devoid of factual support. As with plaintiff’s prior complaint, he makes allegations of “covert co-opt surveillance” and “wiretapping” surrounding the use of his data by other parties. Am. Compl. pgs. 3, 13 (doc. 6). The Court once again construed these allegations under the Federal Wiretap Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and found the amended complaint does not add any well-plead facts that cure the previously identified deficiencies. Order 4-5 (Sept. 25, 2024) (doc. 5). For the reasons stated in the Court’s prior order, these types of allegations fail to state a claim. Similarly, plaintiff’s allegations that cookies and preloaded applications constitute “Black OPS PSY.OPS.” and “brainwashing,” and the listed banks “steal people’s personal information” through wiretapping and “mind hacking techniques” remain “beyond unlikely or improbable.” Id. at 5 (quoting Order of Dismissal 5 (Case. No. 3:24-00633-CL, doc. 9)); Am. Compl. pgs. 6-16 (doc. 6). Additionally, the amended complaint includes a number of far-ranging and vague allegations that date back several years and involve several poorly defined events and/or

individuals/entities that are not named as defendants. See, e.g., Am. Compl. pg. 6 (doc. 6) (“[m]y claim began in 2019 . . . when I become aware of random individuals posting me on facebook/on the internet saying saladeris [sic] comments”; “more recently . . . I was arrested on March 16, 2024 by Mikaylay Odom and Robert B. Koback two arresting officers for the Portland police bureau that stole my Iphone 14 pro max, my rare irreplaceable artifacts and auctioned them off”). It therefore remains unclear from the amended complaint whether all of plaintiff’s claims fall within the statute of limitations or are otherwise redressable. Cf. Subramaniam v. Beal, 2013 WL 5462339, at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 27, 2013) (“[p]laintiff arguably pleads the necessary elements with sufficient particularity as to People’s Choice [but] People’s Choice is not a defendant in this suit, and so no fraud claim is supported by these allegations”); see also Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d

1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (tort and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are subject to a two year statute of limitations in Oregon). To the extent plaintiff alleges distinct factual scenarios, they are equally deficient. First, plaintiff alleges a transaction for the purchase of an iPhone with Cricket Wireless, financed by Prod Holding Inc./Progressive Leasing LLC: Around March of 2023 I went to cricket wireless to purchase a new phone. I had about $4000 in my bank account so I was going to spend about $500-$750 for a mid level phone. While at the store the sales associate obviously tried to sell me one of the newer phones telling me I could put a down payment down and pay the rest off later, I decide on the Iphone 14 pro max the price was $1200, the sales associate told me I would have 90 days to pay it in full for $1200 or 1 years to pay $2,000, he told me they would take one payment a month $115.90 then at the 90 day mark I was to pay the remaining balance owed or I would have to take the year lease of $2000 . . . I put down $500 as a downpayment Prod Holding Inc. was taking 2 payments a month of $115.90 totaling $331.80, so if you do the math within 3 months of the purchase the phone should have been paid off. I want to [point] out that they already breached the contract by taking 2 payments of $115.90 instead of the 1 payment the sales associate told me[.] Also I want to point out another thing in the transaction history the payments did not include the down payment, and the final amount magically changed from $2000 to $3000 for the phone. I want it to be known that I would not have made a purchase if the sales associate would have been honest and not misrepresented their product.

Am. Compl. pg. 6 (doc. 6). Second, plaintiff alleges an incident involving Prod Holding Inc./Progressive Leasing LLC and Chase Bank: Not only did they steal my money and Chase bank allowed it but they stole and abused my sensitive personal information such as my phone number, social security number, and obviously my bank information.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A.
639 F.3d 916 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Matchniff v. Great Northwest Insurance Co.
224 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Oregon, 2016)
Starr v. Baca
652 F.3d 1202 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)

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Bernards v. Prod Holding Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bernards-v-prod-holding-inc-ord-2024.