Bernardo C. Huerta v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 21, 2025
• Docket: 04-24-00421-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-24-00421-CR

Bernardo C. HUERTA, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022-CR-6940 Honorable Stephanie Boyd, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 21, 2025

AFFIRMED

Appellant Bernardo C. Huerta appeals the trial court’s order revoking probation and

sentencing him to eight years confinement with time served. He contends the trial court abused its

discretion by accepting his plea of “true” without sua sponte conducting an inquiry into his

competence to stand trial. Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

FACTS

In July of 2023, Huerta entered into a plea bargain wherein he was convicted of the offense

of robbery, sentenced to eight years confinement, and placed on community supervision subject to 04-24-00421-CR

certain conditions. 1 In November of 2023, a motion to revoke was filed asserting that he had failed

to report to the Supervision Officer as directed and failed to provide proof of employment or SSI.

He pleaded “true” to the violations and was ordered to complete a mental health evaluation while

in custody. On February 15, 2024, the trial court entered its “Order Amending Conditions of

Community Supervision” which added the following condition:

Participate in the Mental Health Initiative and comply with all rules, regulations, and instructions as directed by the Court and/or the Supervision Officer.

a. Comply with all rules, regulations, instructions and personnel of the Center for Health Care Services and participate in Substance Abuse and Psychological counseling, treatment, diagnostic evaluation and/or intervention as directed, or

b. Continue treatment with private psychiatrist and/or other mental health agency, including the Veterans Administration, and will provide verification of treatment attendance and medication compliance on a monthly basis.

Huerta completed an initial mental health evaluation but was recommended for further

evaluation for placement in a Dually Diagnosed Residential Facility (DDRF). 2 On April 30, 2024,

a counselor attempted to conduct a final mental health evaluation for that purpose, but Huerta

refused. A violation report and a second motion to revoke were filed on May 8, 2024, alleging

Huerta violated conditions of probation, specifically referring to his refusal to comply with the

final mental health evaluation.

At the May 28, 2024 hearing on the Motion to Revoke, Huerta again pleaded “true” to the

violation and an open plea was presented to the judge, with a recommendation of the State to alter

or amend the conditions of probation, holding Huerta in custody until the recommended mental

1 Before Huerta was originally convicted for the offense of robbery, in May of 2022, an order was entered in this cause recognizing “reasonable cause to believe that [Huerta] has a mental illness” and ordering him to “[f]ollow recommendations of clinician for Mental Health Services.” 2 The mission of the DDRF is to provide treatment for mentally ill probationers who have been ordered by the courts to participate in the program as a result of a motion to revoke, an original condition of placement on community supervision, or as an agreed placement between offender and the courts. -2- 04-24-00421-CR

health evaluation was completed by the Center for Health Care Services. Huerta stated he wanted

to be sentenced instead. The trial court ordered him confined for eight years with credit for time

served.

The trial court certified his right to appeal, and an appeal was timely filed. Here, Huerta

asserts the trial court erred by not sua sponte inquiring into his competency to enter a plea of “true.”

Specifically, he alleges that, given the condition he allegedly violated involved the requirement of

a mental health evaluation and given his conduct during the hearing, the trial court had reason to

believe he was not competent to enter a plea on the motion to revoke.

MOTION TO REVOKE HEARING

At the motion to revoke hearing in May of 2024, the trial court asked Huerta, who was

represented by counsel, how he pleaded to the alleged violation. Huerta pleaded “true.” The trial

court then offered him an opportunity to discuss the matter with counsel. After a break, the

following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Let’s go back on the record in 2022-CR-6940. All right. Mr. Huerta, it’s the Court’s understanding you’ve had time to speak to your attorney—

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: —in regards to your plea of true?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Do you still wish to plead true to violation of condition number 39 after speaking to Counsel? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: All right. Did you understand by pleading true to violation of condition number 39, the Court could find it true, grant the motion, and sentence you up to eight years in the prison?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Knowing that, do you still wish to plead true to violation of condition number 39?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. -3- 04-24-00421-CR

The State then recommended to the court that the conditions of probation be amended, and Huerta

held in custody until the mental health evaluation was completed. Defense counsel explained that

Huerta refused to comply with the final mental health evaluation because he preferred outpatient

treatment versus inpatient and did not want to remain in custody waiting for the final evaluation.

It was explained that the current waiting list to have the final evaluation is long, meaning he could

be held for months before it was done. The trial court pointed out that, had he complied with the

earlier request, he would not have had to wait for another opening for the evaluation. Huerta

responded, “Yes, Your Honor. I do understand that, but it’s still a six to seven month’s wait. I have

almost two years of back time on this case already just sitting in jail.” The court then took a break,

allowing Huerta to again confer with his counsel.

After the break, Huerta’s counsel confirmed on the record that they had talked about

whether he would agree to comply with the DDRF evaluation and that he had indicated he would

not. Huerta again asserted his desire to do outpatient treatment. Both the trial court and his own

counsel reiterated that outpatient treatment was not an option. The following exchange then

occurred:

THE DEFENSE: Mr. Huerta, I explained to you the only options in front of you are DDRF if you agree to it or if we have a sentencing and the Judge will determine how much time you receive. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: And since outpatient is not an option, would you like to avail yourself of the opportunity to do DDRF or do you want to be sentenced today?

THE DEFENDANT: I guess I’ll be sentenced.

THE DEFENSE: Okay. And I advised you to go with DDRF, correct?

-4- 04-24-00421-CR

The State then recommended, once again, not to sentence him but to order him to inpatient

treatment. And, once again, the Court offered for him to be interviewed for DDRF, to which he

answered:

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I guess—

THE COURT: No. It’s not I guess. It’s either yes or no.

THE DEFENDANT: Well, yes.

THE COURT: You—you can’t write your own program. Here are your options. Your options are you can be interviewed for DDRF and if they deem that you’re acceptable to the program, that’s where you’re going to be. Or if you don’t want to do that and you tell the Court you don’t want to do that, then I will revoke you. Those—those are your two options. Now, if the Court were to revoke you, then the most I could sentence you to is eight years. I’m sure your attorney will ask for something probably less than eight. .... . . . [L]egally, I have to give you credit for any time served that you’ve been in custody. So those are your options. Do y’all need to discuss this again or no?

THE DEFENSE: Do you want to do the DDRF or do you want to be sentenced? THE DEFENDANT: I want—

THE DEFENSE: That’s not an option. The Judge has told you and I have told you that’s not an option. Sentence—we don’t know how much time—

THE COURT: All right. So you want to be sentenced?

THE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial, or in this case to enter a plea at a

probation revocation hearing, unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(b); see Thompson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tex. App.—Tyler

1983, no pet.) (recognizing a probation revocation hearing is a trial for purposes of competency

issues). To be found incompetent, it must be shown that he does not have (1) sufficient ability to

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well

as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(a).

-5- 04-24-00421-CR

As neither counsel requested the trial court perform an inquiry into Huerta’s competency,

the question becomes whether there was reason for the court, on its own, to conduct such an

inquiry. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(a) (stating either party or the trial court itself may

suggest that the defendant may be incompetent). “If evidence suggesting the defendant may be

incompetent to stand trial comes to the attention of the court, the court on its own motion shall

suggest that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial.” Id. art 46B.004(b); see Babyak v.

State, No. 04-21-00216-CR, 2022 WL 2334549, *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 29, 2022, no

pet.). The evidence suggesting incompetence must be sufficient to create a “bona fide doubt” in

the mind of the trial judge as to the defendant’s competence. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420,

424 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Turner v. State,

422 S.W.3d 676, 692, n.31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “A bona fide doubt may exist if the defendant

exhibits truly bizarre behavior or has a recent history of severe mental illness or at least moderate

mental retardation.” Id.

Under article 46B.004(c-1), a suggestion of incompetency “may consist solely of a

representation from any credible source” or “may be based on observations made in relation to one

or more of the factors described in Article 46B.024 or on any other indication that the defendant

is incompetent within the meaning of Article 46B.003.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(c-

1). “The factors set out in article 46B.024 include the capacity of the defendant during criminal

proceedings to (1) rationally understand the charges against him and the potential consequences

of the criminal proceedings, (2) disclose to his defense counsel pertinent facts, events, and states

of mind, (3) engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options, (4) understand the

adversarial nature of the criminal proceedings, (5) exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior, and (6)

testify.” Babyak, 2022 WL 2334549, at *1 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.024(1)). Other

considerations that may lead to a finding that the defendant is not competent include a mental

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illness or an intellectual disability, “whether the identified condition has lasted or is expected to

last continuously for at least one year,” whether “medication is necessary to maintain the

defendant’s competency,” and “the degree of impairment resulting from the mental illness or

intellectual disability, if existent, and the specific impact on the defendants capacity to engage with

counsel in a reasonable and rational manner.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.024(2)–(5).

A trial court’s decision to hold or not hold a sua sponte inquiry into a defendant’s

competency is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Babyak, 2022 WL

2334549, at *2 (citing Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426). We, therefore, review the information before

the trial court to determine if she acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner or contrary to

guiding principles. Id. But, we do so giving deference to the fact that the trial court, not us, had the

opportunity to observe the behavior of the defendant first-hand and is, therefore, “in a better

position to determine whether [the defendant] was presently competent.” Id. (quoting Montoya,

291 S.W.3d at 426).

ANALYSIS

From the record before us, it appears Huerta not only had the opportunity to confer with

his counsel before and during the hearing, but that he understood and voluntarily chose to go

against the advice of counsel. He never vacillated between two positions. He maintained his refusal

to engage in inpatient treatment and exhibited appropriate courtroom behavior, paying respect to

the trial court and to his own counsel. Rather than evidencing a misunderstanding of the

proceedings or the choices before him, Huerta was clear in his desire to avoid inpatient treatment

as well as the long wait time for further evaluation. He may very well have been contemplating

the time he would serve on his eight-year sentence, given credit for time served (as he stated,

“almost two years”), compared to what he might have to endure with an inpatient treatment

program.

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Notably, while there is mention of a potential mental illness in a court record from 2022,

there is no information presented to the court as to any diagnosis. And, Huerta did not demonstrate

bizarre or confused behavior. A mental illness, by itself, does not equal incompetence, but is just

one factor to consider under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 46B.024. See Montoya, 291

S.W.3d at 425 (citing Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). “The

considerations when evaluating competency to stand trial include the defendant’s level of

understanding of the proceeding and ability to consult with counsel in preparation for the

proceeding.” Id. at 425–26.

Here, Huerta evidenced an understanding of the proceedings, was able to testify under oath

and meaningfully confer with his counsel. Further, since his mental health was first referenced in

an early court order, Huerta has pleaded guilty to the offense of robbery, pleaded “true” to a prior

probation violation, and was sworn in by his own counsel to provide testimony relating to the

violation at issue here. Neither counsel for Huerta nor the State ever indicated that they were

uncomfortable with his ability to rationally understand the choices provided to him at this hearing

or at the time of his prior pleas. Where the record does not show “recent severe mental illness,

moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts, and there was no suggestion by Appellant’s attorney,

the State, or the trial court, all of whom observed Appellant’s behavior at the hearing, that

Appellant appeared unable to understand the proceedings,” we will appropriately defer to the trial

court’s judgment. Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426.

On these facts, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sua

sponte hold an informal competency hearing. See Sanchez v. State, No. 04-20-00379-CR, 2021

WL 1199052, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 31, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). We, therefore,

affirm.

Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

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