Bernard Cyrille v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 25, 2025
• Docket: 19-72955
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 25 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BERNARD CYRILLE, 19-72955 Agency No. Petitioner, A209-383-838 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 8, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: RAWLINSON, MILLER, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Bernard Cyrille, a native and citizen of Haiti, petitions for review of a

decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal of an

immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo. See Garcia v. Wilkinson,

988 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2021). We review the agency’s factual findings for

substantial evidence and must uphold the findings “unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Garland v. Ming

Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 365 (2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and

withholding of removal. To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of

removal, an applicant “must demonstrate a nexus between [his] past or feared harm

and a protected ground.” Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1143 (citing Barajas-Romero v.

Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359–60 (9th Cir. 2017)).

Cyrille claims to fear persecution on account of his imputed political opinion

and his membership in the particular social group of “immediate family members

of a targeted political activist.” The immigration judge found that the motives of

the men who attacked Cyrille’s mother’s home in April 2011 were “still

unknown,” and that there was “insufficient evidence . . . that they were even after

[Cyrille].” As for an incident in 2012 when an unidentified person in a car flashed

the car’s lights at Cyrille and his mother, the immigration judge found that

“whoever these people were,” they did not “know [Cyrille’s] political opinion.”

The immigration judge found insufficient evidence in the record to establish that

Cyrille’s family membership or imputed political opinion motivated any of the

2 24-4705 individuals who attacked his mother’s home or who flashed car lights at him and

his mother. Based on that finding, the Board affirmed the immigration judge’s

determination that Cyrille “did not establish the requisite nexus between a

protected characteristic and the harm he fears.”

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination. Cyrille told the

immigration judge that he did not know why the men attempted to enter his

mother’s home. Although Cyrille’s mother was involved in a disagreement with

members of a political organization to which she belonged, Cyrille did not ask her

if she knew the identities of the individuals who came to her home, and he did “not

know if [they were] the same people in that political group.”

Cyrille argues that the Board erred because it reviewed the immigration

judge’s nexus determination for clear error. The Board reviews the immigration

judge’s “underlying factual findings, such as what a persecutor’s motive may be,

for clear error,” but it “must review de novo whether a persecutor’s motives meet

the nexus legal standards.” Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 552 (9th Cir.

2023). Even if the Board misstated the standard of review, however, the

misstatement was harmless. The Board accepted the immigration judge’s finding

that Cyrille did not establish the attackers’ persecutory motives. Because the Board

found that there was no evidence of persecutory motive, it could not have found

nexus. Cf. Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Because

3 24-4705 the BIA adopted the IJ’s finding of no nexus between the harm to [the petitioner]

and the alleged protected ground, . . . remand to the BIA ‘would be an idle and

useless formality.’” (quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6

(1969))). For similar reasons, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of

Cyrille’s claim for withholding of removal. Id.

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief. To

qualify for protection under the CAT, Cyrille must show that it is more likely than

not that, if removed to Haiti, he will be tortured. See Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918

F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). To constitute torture,

severe harm must be inflicted by, “or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public

official.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

The record does not compel the conclusion that Cyrille will be tortured with

the consent or acquiescence of the Haitian government if removed. The harm that

Cyrille experienced while in Haiti was perpetrated by private actors, and there is

no evidence that public officials were involved. Cyrille asserts that his stepfather

hired an attorney, who reported the attack to the Haitian police, and Cyrille thinks

that the police investigated the attack, but he does not know if the police have

arrested anyone. Inaction, on its own, is insufficient to establish acquiescence. See

Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). Cyrille has

provided generalized evidence of country conditions, but that is insufficient to

4 24-4705 establish that the government will acquiesce to any harm that he may experience.

See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(holding that generalized evidence of crime was not particularized or sufficient to

establish eligibility for CAT protection).

The temporary stay of removal will remain in place until the issuance of the

mandate, and the motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 1) is otherwise denied.

PETITION DENIED.

5 24-4705